Both sides now accuse the other of violating the agreement first. While neither has formally declared the MoU void, the latest escalation has cast doubt over whether diplomacy can survive another round of fighting.
Has the MoU collapsed?
The clearest signal yet came from U.S. President Donald Trump, who formally notified Congress in a letter dated Friday that military operations against Iran had resumed under his direction.
In a letter to lawmakers, Trump described the strikes on Iran that began on July 7 as “military action consistent with my responsibility to protect Americans and United States’ interests both at home and abroad.” This notification starts a new 60-day period during which the Trump administration can conduct military operations in the region without congressional approval.
On Monday, Trump said on Truth Social that the United States was “reinstating the Iranian blockade, so named because it is only stopping Iran’s ships or customers from entering or leaving,” and proposed charging a 20 percent fee on cargo transiting the Strait of Hormuz.
However, Tehran insists it is not the side that abandoned the agreement.
Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesman Esmaeil Baghaei said on Monday that the MoU had entered a “crisis phase” because Washington had continuously violated its obligations. He said Iran would follow a principle of “commitment for commitment” and warned that if the United States continues breaching the deal, Iran would no longer see any reason to fulfill its own obligations.
Can diplomacy revive?
Before the latest escalation, the two sides had been using regional mediators to preserve the fragile agreement.
According to Axios, Washington demanded that Iran publicly reaffirm that the Strait of Hormuz remained open and “stop firing on commercial ships,” arguing that Tehran had violated the MoU.
Trump also said last week that the United States had agreed to continue talks with Iran, although he simultaneously declared that the ceasefire was “over.”
Iran denied requesting new negotiations but indicated it remained willing to engage through regional intermediaries, including Qatar, according to Qatar’s Al Jazeera television.
The fighting has nevertheless intensified. The U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) said its latest wave of strikes against Iran concluded late Monday after strikes on military targets across Iran, including Bushehr, Chah Bahar, Jask, Konarak, Abu Musa, and Bandar Abbas, to “further degrade Iran’s ability to attack commercial shipping.”
Iran has continued missile and drone attacks on U.S. positions and regional targets, including Oman, Bahrain, Jordan and Kuwait.
The Islamic Revolution Guard Corps (IRGC) said Tuesday that it has launched missile and drone attacks on the U.S. Fifth Fleet based in Bahrain. “The retaliatory operation continues,” the statement said.
Who controls Hormuz?
The Strait of Hormuz has once again become the main flashpoint.
Early Sunday, Iran’s IRGC announced that the Strait of Hormuz would remain closed “until further notice” and until “the end of U.S. interference in this region.”
The U.S.-led Joint Maritime Information Center and the U.S. Naval Forces Central Command said Sunday that the southern route remains operational despite Iranian claims, adding that “U.S. forces are prepared to maintain freedom of navigation and safeguard lawful commerce.”
On Monday, CENTCOM announced that it would resume blockading maritime traffic entering and leaving Iranian ports beginning at 4 p.m. ET (2000 GMT) Tuesday.
Baghaei said Sunday that arrangements for the future administration of maritime traffic in the Strait of Hormuz must be made through consultations with Oman.
Those competing visions directly contradict one of the MoU’s central provisions, which envisioned the lifting of the U.S. naval blockade while Iran ensured safe passage for international shipping.
For now, the memorandum has not been formally abandoned. But with military operations expanding, the agreement appears to be surviving more on paper than in practice.
Fresh U.S. airstrikes and Iranian retaliation have plunged Washington and Tehran back into open conflict less than a month after they signed a 14-point memorandum of understanding (MoU) aimed at ending the war and paving the way for broader negotiations.
The summit, which began on July 10, 2016, brought together African leaders in Kigali, with high-level meetings scheduled for July 17 and 18. About 35 presidents had confirmed their participation.
However, as Rwanda prepared to welcome the continent’s leaders, it found itself at the centre of a diplomatic storm involving debates from The Hague in the Netherlands, Khartoum in Sudan and Kigali.
At the heart of the controversy was one question: Would Rwanda arrest Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir and hand him over to the International Criminal Court (ICC)?
Bashir had been invited to the AU Summit as the leader of a member state.
At the same time, he had been wanted by the ICC for seven years over allegations of war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide-related charges linked to the conflict in Sudan’s Darfur region.
On July 14, 2016, just days before the summit, the Rwandan government confirmed that it had received a request from the ICC asking it to arrest Bashir if he entered the country.
Bashir’s international legal troubles
Omar Hassan Ahmad al-Bashir, a former military officer, seized power in Sudan in 1989 after overthrowing Prime Minister Sadiq al-Mahdi’s government. He became president in 1993 and remained in power until he was removed in 2019.
His name became widely associated with international justice proceedings following the outbreak of conflict in Darfur in 2003.
On July 14, 2008, ICC prosecutors accused Bashir of playing a role in a campaign targeting the Fur, Masalit and Zaghawa communities through killings, sexual violence and forced displacement.
The ICC issued its first arrest warrant against him on March 4, 2009, containing charges of crimes against humanity, including murder, extermination, forcible transfer, torture and rape. He was also accused of war crimes, including attacks against civilians and pillaging.
At the time, judges said there was insufficient evidence to charge him with genocide.
A second arrest warrant was issued on July 12, 2010, adding three genocide charges. Bashir became the first sitting head of state to be wanted by the ICC.
Although Sudan was not a signatory to the Rome Statute that established the ICC and did not recognize the court’s jurisdiction, the UN Security Council had referred the Darfur situation to the ICC.
From then on, every foreign trip by Bashir became a potential diplomatic challenge for the countries he visited.
South Africa’s failed attempt to detain Bashir
The pressure on Rwanda was intensified by events in South Africa a year earlier.
In June 2015, Bashir travelled to South Africa to attend an AU summit. South Africa was a signatory to the Rome Statute, meaning it had an obligation to arrest individuals wanted by the ICC who entered its territory.
A South African court ordered that Bashir should not leave the country while it considered whether he should be arrested and transferred to The Hague.
However, Bashir’s aircraft later departed and returned him to Khartoum after the South African government allowed him to leave, despite the court order.
The incident triggered international criticism. The ICC and human rights groups accused South Africa of failing to meet its obligations, while some African leaders argued that Bashir enjoyed immunity as a sitting head of state attending an AU meeting.
This raised concerns over whether Rwanda would face a similar situation when hosting the 2016 AU Summit.
Kagame sets Rwanda’s position
Before the ICC sent its request, President Paul Kagame had already indicated that Bashir would be welcomed if invited by the AU.
Speaking to journalists on May 13, 2016, Kagame said Rwanda would receive any leader invited by the continental organisation.
He stressed that Rwanda, as the host country, had a responsibility to welcome AU invitees and noted that Rwanda was not party to the Rome Statute.
Rwanda rejects ICC request
On July 14, 2016, then Foreign Affairs Minister Louise Mushikiwabo revealed that the ICC had formally requested Rwanda to arrest Bashir two days earlier.
She said Rwanda did not have the legal authority to detain him and that all leaders invited by the AU would be welcomed and protected.
Mushikiwabo added that Rwanda was not bound by the ICC request because it had not signed the Rome Statute.
Following Rwanda’s position, Bashir arrived in Kigali on Saturday, July 16, 2016, where he was received by then Minister of Internal Security Sheikh Musa Fazil Harerimana.
Mushikiwabo said Rwanda did not support impunity but believed that the ICC’s operations had become influenced by politics.
She argued that African leaders attending AU activities should be granted immunity while serving in office, citing AU positions submitted to the UN Security Council.
She also questioned why, after years of ICC operations, most individuals prosecuted by the court were Africans.
Bashir was eventually removed from power on April 11, 2019, following months of protests that began in December 2018 over rising living costs, poverty and his three-decade rule.
The military overthrew him, detained him and later placed him in Kober Prison in Khartoum.
His removal ended one of Africa’s longest presidential tenures and marked a new chapter in Sudan’s turbulent political history.
Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir during his visit to Kigali to attend the African Union Summit.
The complaint, submitted on July 10, 2026, details a series of actions by state authorities and individuals linked to the ruling establishment that the legal team avers amount to crimes against humanity in different parts of the country. The ICC prosecutor’s office is expected to assess the submission before deciding whether any further action, including a possible preliminary examination, is warranted.
The lawyers cited 11 incidents, including deaths and injuries at Kinshasa’s Makala prison during a 2024 attempted prison break, as well as killings in Lubumbashi, Kolwezi and other parts of the former Katanga region.
Hervé Diakiese, one of the lawyers involved in the case, accused the youth movement Force du Progrès, which has been associated by critics with President Félix Tshisekedi’s ruling UDPS party, of involvement in some of the cited abuses. Human Rights Watch has previously raised concerns over violence involving members of the group during political unrest, while the UDPS has rejected accusations linking the party to such acts and said individuals may have been misusing the group’s name.
Diakiese also accused some political actors of promoting ethnic-based rhetoric favouring members of the Luba community, President Tshisekedi’s ethnic group.
“There are statements showing a sense of superiority among some people from the President’s community,” he said, alleging that some officials and individuals close to power have used language suggesting that the Luba are not simply holders of political power but represent power itself.
Another lawyer involved in the complaint, Bernard Maingain, said the decision to seek international justice was motivated by Congolese institutions’ to address the said abuses.
“Article 15 of the Rome Statute has been respected,” Maingain said, referring to the provision that allows individuals or groups to submit information to the ICC prosecutor. He argued that the complaint had been properly filed and should be examined according to ICC procedures.
The complaint was also submitted in Belgium because some of the individuals mentioned in the case are said to hold Belgian nationality.
Following the filing of the complaint, the next stage will involve reviewing the
allegations and determining whether they fall within the court’s jurisdiction and meet the criteria for further action.
Bernard Maingain, one of the lawyers involved in the complaint, said the decision to seek international justice was motivated by Congolese institutions’ failure to address the abuses in question.The complaint, submitted on July 10, 2026, details a series of actions by state authorities and individuals linked to the ruling establishment that the legal team avers amount to crimes against humanity in different parts of the country.
Announced on Monday at a Paris summit hosted by French President Emmanuel Macron, the landmark alliance, which includes defence heavyweights Britain, France, Germany, Italy, and Spain, aims to build an integrated, sovereign missile defence architecture to deter escalating Russian aerial threats.
A new role for Ukraine and the “Freyja” initiative
Significantly, this agreement marks a paradigm shift in how the West interacts with Kyiv. Rather than treating Ukraine as a passive recipient of military aid, the coalition positions Ukraine as a founding co-developer. The alliance’s immediate flagship initiative is the Freyja project, designed to break Europe’s reliance on prohibitively expensive U.S. Patriot interceptors, which cost upwards of $4 million per shot.
Instead, the coalition will focus on manufacturing a low-cost, mass-producible European alternative. By leveraging Ukraine’s active combat experience and cutting-edge domestic defence firms, such as Fire Point, which recently prototyped a $700,000 interceptor, the coalition plans to fuse Western aerospace engineering with Ukrainian wartime innovation.
The reality check: No cash, no timeline
Yet, behind the grand rhetoric of the joint declaration lies a stark industrial reality: the initiative currently exists only on paper. The charter commits member states merely to “exploring appropriate opportunities for funding,” leaving the project without a designated budget, a lead nation, or a centralised administrative secretariat.
Developing, testing, and integrating a brand-new anti-ballistic missile system from scratch is an incredibly complex engineering feat. Defence analysts warn that delivering an operational Freyja system will take several years, meaning it will offer zero protection for Ukraine’s vulnerable power grid during the immediate, impending winter bombardment campaign.
Furthermore, the coalition must navigate deep-seated European rivalries. While Macron used the Paris summit to urge European states to abandon “go-it-alone” national procurement, getting European capitals to collaborate remains notoriously difficult, a reality recently highlighted by the near-collapse of joint Franco-German defence programs.
Predictably, the initiative drew immediate fire from the Kremlin. Moscow spokesman Dmitry Peskov swiftly dismissed the alliance, branding it a “coalition of the deluded” and warning that such steps would only further destabilise the region.
Ultimately, the Paris declaration is a major political victory for Ukraine’s long-term integration into European defence infrastructure. However, until member nations back their signatures with hard currency, the Freyja project remains a promising blueprint rather than an active shield. For now, Europe’s skies will continue to rely on dwindling legacy stockpiles while this new coalition attempts to turn political promises into physical defences.
French President Emmanuel Macron (C-L) and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky (C) pose for a group photo with heads of states and governments ahead of the Coalition of the Willing summit on security guarantees for Ukraine at the Hotel des Invalides in Paris, France, 13 July 2026. (EPA)
The question is no longer distant. France has officially set the first round of its next presidential election for April 18, 2027, with a possible run-off on May 2, 2027. Macron, who has served two consecutive terms, cannot run again. This means that in less than a year, France will have a new president, and Rwanda will be dealing with a new political personality at the Élysée.
For Rwanda, this transition is important because the Macron years marked one of the most significant diplomatic resets between Kigali and Paris since the 1994 Genocide against the Tutsi. Relations that had for decades been shaped by suspicion, accusations and unresolved historical grievances were gradually reopened through a more direct political conversation.
Macron’s approach to Rwanda was unusually personal and symbolic. In May 2021, during his visit to Kigali, he stood at the Kigali Genocide Memorial and recognised France’s heavy historical and political responsibility in Rwanda. He said that only survivors could grant forgiveness to France.
“Standing here today, with humility and respect, by your side, I have come to recognize our responsibilities,” said Macron.
That moment did not erase the past, but it changed the diplomatic atmosphere. It allowed both countries to move from confrontation toward cooperation. In June 2026, Macron and President Paul Kagame jointly inaugurated a memorial in Paris in honour of the victims of the 1994 Genocide against the Tutsi. Macron described the memorial as placing the genocide “at the heart” of France’s capital and history, and as the result of a long search for truth.
This is why the end of the Macron era raises a serious question. Will the next French president preserve this relationship, deepen it, cool it down or reverse its symbolism?
The answer depends on who wins.
At this stage, the race appears fragmented. The far-right National Rally is in a strong position, while the centre is divided between former prime ministers Édouard Philippe and Gabriel Attal. Reuters has reported that Philippe and Attal are seen as the favoured figures to lead the centrist challenge, while polls have placed the National Rally in a leading position.
Gabriel Attal, the candidate of continuity
Gabriel Attal may represent the clearest continuation of the Macron line. He formally launched his presidential bid in May 2026, joining a crowded centrist race. He is young, ambitious and closely associated with Macron’s political family, even though he is trying to show that he has his own identity.
For Rwanda, an Attal presidency would likely mean continuity. There is no strong public record suggesting hostility toward Kigali. Having been part of the Macron era, he would probably preserve the main pillars of the reset: recognition of historical responsibility, diplomatic cooperation, cultural ties and pragmatic engagement with Africa.
However, Attal would also inherit France’s broader position on the conflict in eastern Democratic Republic of Congo. France has condemned the M23 offensive as being made possible by Rwanda’s active support, while also supporting diplomatic solutions.Rwanda has repeatedly refuted backing AFC/M23, arguing that the movement is made up of Congolese citizens with longstanding grievances against the Congolese state.
Therefore, under Attal, Rwanda-France relations would likely remain warm, but not without pressure on the DRC issue.
Gabriel Attal, who formally launched his presidential bid in May 2026, may represent the clearest continuation of the Macron line.
Édouard Philippe, the pragmatic centre-right option
Édouard Philippe is another major figure to watch. Macron’s former prime minister has spent years positioning himself as a credible successor, especially for voters of the centre and centre-right. Le Monde has described him as trying to establish himself as the natural successor to Macron, while also distancing himself from the current president.
For Rwanda, Philippe would probably mean continuity, but with less emotion and symbolism than Macron. He is likely to approach Rwanda through a pragmatic lens: diplomacy, economic interests, security, Europe-Africa relations and regional stability.
A Philippe presidency would probably not dismantle the reconciliation work achieved under Macron. But it might make the relationship less personal. Kigali could still count on serious engagement from Paris, but perhaps not the same level of symbolic investment that Macron brought to genocide memory and bilateral repair.
Macron’s former prime minister, Édouard Philippe, has spent years positioning himself as a credible successor, especially for voters of the centre and centre-right.
Jordan Bardella, the uncertain far-right alternative
Jordan Bardella may be the most important unknown. The president of the National Rally has emerged as one of the most serious contenders for 2027. A Reuters report in November 2025 said an Odoxa poll predicted that Bardella could win the next presidential election against any opponent tested at that time.
Bardella’s Rwanda policy is not clearly defined. He has not built his political identity around the Rwanda question. But he comes from a political family whose historic instinct has been sceptical, sometimes hostile, toward President Paul Kagame’s government and toward France’s language of historical responsibility.
This matters because the National Rally has traditionally defended the honour of the French army and rejected what it sees as excessive “repentance” in foreign policy. If Bardella becomes president, he may choose pragmatism, especially if he wants to appear presidential and internationally credible. But Rwanda should expect a colder, more cautious and less emotionally invested France.
The relationship would probably not collapse automatically under Bardella. France has interests in the Great Lakes region, and Rwanda has become too important diplomatically, economically and strategically to be ignored. But the warmth of the Macron-Kagame chapter would likely fade.
Jordan Bardella, the president of the National Rally, has emerged as one of the most serious contenders for 2027.
Marine Le Pen, the most difficult scenario for Kigali
Marine Le Pen would likely represent the most complicated scenario for Rwanda. Her record is far clearer than Bardella’s. In 2011, she strongly criticised Nicolas Sarkozy for receiving President Kagame in Paris. In that statement, she described Kagame as a dictator, defended the French army and Operation Turquoise, and accused Kigali of dishonouring the French army by accusing France of involvement in the genocide.
That language is not a small detail. It reflects a political view of Rwanda that is fundamentally different from Macron’s. Where Macron chose recognition, Le Pen has historically chosen defence of France’s military record and confrontation with Kigali’s accusations.
Her candidacy is also legally uncertain. Reuters reported in January 2026 that Le Pen had been barred from public office for five years over a conviction for misusing EU funds, and that her appeal would determine whether she could run in 2027. If she cannot run, Bardella is expected to stand for the National Rally.
If Le Pen were elected, Rwanda-France relations would likely cool sharply. The risk would not only be diplomatic distance, but also a symbolic reversal of Macron’s reconciliation work.
Marine Le Pen would likely represent the most complicated scenario for Rwanda.
Raphaël Glucksmann, sympathetic on memory but demanding on politics
Raphaël Glucksmann presents a different kind of complexity. On the history of the Genocide against the Tutsi, he may be among the French political figures most aware of the depth of the issue. He co-directed Tuez-les tous !, a documentary on the genocide and the role of France, which examined the international failure to stop the killings and the controversy surrounding French policy at the time.
This background could make him sympathetic to Rwanda’s long-standing position on historical truth. A Glucksmann presidency would probably not reverse Macron’s recognition of France’s responsibility. On memory, he could even go further than some centrist politicians.
But Glucksmann is also a strong human-rights advocate. His relationship with Kigali would likely remain respectful on historical issues while placing greater emphasis on governance, human rights and regional security, including the conflict in eastern DRC. These issues would likely feature more prominently in bilateral engagement.
Raphaël Glucksmann brings a nuanced understanding of the Genocide against the Tutsi’s history and legacy.
Jean-Luc Mélenchon, recognition of France’s responsibility but strong criticism of Kagame
Jean-Luc Mélenchon would also bring a mixed approach. He supports France recognising its responsibility in Rwanda, and has criticised those who dismiss that process as repentance. But he has also described Paul Kagame’s government as authoritarian and has linked Rwanda to mass violence in the DRC.
His political movement, La France Insoumise, has taken an even harder line on the DRC conflict. In January 2025, it called for strong sanctions against Rwandan political and military leaders and a total embargo on Rwandan mineral exports.
A Mélenchon presidency would therefore be difficult for Kigali. It would not be hostile to Rwanda because of genocide memory. On that point, Mélenchon is closer to historical recognition. But it would probably be very confrontational on the DRC, human rights and Kagame’s rule.
Jean-Luc Mélenchon takes a mixed position: supporting France’s responsibility over Rwanda while criticising Kagame’s government.
Bruno Retailleau, cautious conservatism
Bruno Retailleau, the candidate of the traditional right, is harder to assess on Rwanda specifically. He does not have the same visible Rwanda record as Le Pen, Macron or Mélenchon. His approach would likely be conservative, state-oriented and security-focused.
For Kigali, this would probably mean a cooler but manageable relationship. Retailleau would not necessarily seek confrontation with Rwanda, but he would be unlikely to invest heavily in the symbolic dimension of reconciliation. The relationship could become more administrative, less presidential and more dependent on regional developments in the Great Lakes.
Bruno Retailleau, the candidate of the traditional right, is harder to assess on Rwanda specifically.
The DRC question could shape everything
Whoever replaces Macron will inherit one sensitive file: the conflict in eastern DRC. This issue now sits at the centre of how many Western capitals view Rwanda. France has taken a firm position at the United Nations, including condemning the M23 offensive as supported by Rwanda. At the same time, Macron has also warned against isolating Rwanda and has argued for continued dialogue rather than purely punitive measures.
This balance may not survive intact under Macron’s successor. A centrist president may keep the same careful line: pressure on security issues, but continued engagement with Kigali. A far-right president may cool the historical reconciliation agenda. A left-wing president may maintain recognition of France’s responsibility in 1994 while becoming tougher on Rwanda’s current regional policy.
For Rwanda, the lesson is clear. The relationship with France has improved significantly, but it should not be taken for granted. Much of its current warmth was built around Macron’s personal political choice to confront France’s past and rebuild trust with Kigali. Institutions, trade, culture and diplomacy may preserve the relationship, but personalities will shape its temperature.
The most favourable scenarios for Rwanda would likely be Attal or Philippe. Both would probably maintain continuity, although with different levels of enthusiasm. Glucksmann would be constructive on genocide memory but more demanding politically. Bardella would be uncertain and colder. Le Pen would be the most difficult. Mélenchon would be confrontational, especially in the DRC.
After Macron, Rwanda-France relations are unlikely to return to the deep hostility of the past. Too much has changed. But the exceptional warmth of the Macron-Kagame years may not be automatic. The next phase will depend on whether France’s new president sees Rwanda as a strategic African partner, a historical responsibility, a regional problem or all three at once.
Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani, who ruled Qatar from 1995 to 2013 before handing over power to his son, died at the age of 74. His death was announced in an official statement released on Sunday.
In its message of condolence, AFC/M23 conveyed sympathy to Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani, the Qatari royal family, the government, and the people of Qatar following the passing of the former Emir.
“His Highness Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani will be remembered as an exceptional statesman and visionary who, through his leadership, transformed Qatar into a respected global actor committed to peace, dialogue, development, and international cooperation,” the statement read.
AFC/M23 said the legacy of Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani would continue to inspire future generations in Qatar and far beyond
The movement added that, as one of the parties involved in the mediation talks facilitated by Qatar between AFC/M23 and the Government of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), it had witnessed Qatar’s commitment to encouraging dialogue, peaceful conflict resolution, and efforts aimed at achieving lasting peace and stability.
“These efforts reflect the values and vision that His Highness the Father Amir helped to establish and promote,” AFC/M23 added.
As Qatar continues to mourn the former Emir, AFC/M23 said it stands in solidarity with Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani, the royal family, the government, and citizens of Qatar during this period of loss.
Since early 2025, Qatar has been leading mediation efforts aimed at facilitating dialogue between the Democratic Republic of Congo and AFC/M23 in an effort to find a peaceful solution to the conflict in eastern DRC.
AFC/M23 has accused the Congolese government of repeatedly failing to respect commitments made during the negotiations, while alleging that violence and human rights abuses have continued, particularly affecting communities of Congolese Tutsi origin.
Former Qatar leader Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani died at the age of 74.AFC/M23 conveyed sympathy to Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani, the Qatari royal family, the government, and the people of Qatar following the passing of the former Emir.
The advisory, released by the United Kingdom Maritime Trade Operations, cited additional information from the U.S. Naval Forces Central Command (NAVCENT), which said the Strait of Hormuz is an international waterway and is not subject to coercion or control by any single nation.
“Despite Iran’s claims that the Strait is closed, U.S. forces are prepared to maintain freedom of navigation and safeguard lawful commerce,” NAVCENT said, adding that the southern route through the Strait remains open.
According to the advisory, the maritime security threat level in the Strait of Hormuz remains “severe.” It also warned mariners to remain aware of a mine danger area within the traditional Traffic Separation Scheme(TSS).
Following the outbreak of the U.S.-Israel-Iran conflict, the traditional TSS in the Strait of Hormuz became unsuitable for navigation due to the mine threat.
Following the signing of an MoU between the United States and Iran, two alternative transit routes effectively emerged: a northern route controlled by Iran and a southern route along the Omani coast, where U.S. forces provide navigation support and coordination.
Data compiled by multiple maritime information platforms show that vessel traffic through the Strait has dropped sharply in recent days following attacks on ships near the southern route.
Most vessels have transited via the northern route, while only a limited number have continued to use the southern route.
The United States has launched multiple rounds of strikes against Iran, saying they were in response to Iranian attacks on commercial vessels.
Early on Sunday, Iran’s Islamic Revolution Guard Corps announced that the Strait of Hormuz would be closed until further notice and “until the end of U.S. interference in this region.”
The U.S.-led Joint Maritime Information Center said on Sunday that despite Iran announcing the closure of the Strait of Hormuz, the southern route along the Omani coast remains available and has been expanded to accommodate two-way traffic.
Graham’s office confirmed his death on Sunday, saying he passed away following a “brief and sudden illness.”
In the region, Graham was among U.S. politicians who argued that lasting peace in eastern DRC required political dialogue and addressing the underlying causes of the conflict, rather than relying solely on punitive measures.
He drew attention in Rwanda for opposing proposals for U.S. sanctions targeting the country over the conflict in eastern DRC.
A report by The Wall Street Journal said that as Washington considered sanctions against Rwanda, Graham played a role in efforts to block the measures. According to the report, Graham told U.S. officials that Rwanda was an important security partner and warned that sanctions could undermine diplomatic efforts aimed at resolving the conflict.
He argued that punishing Rwanda would not provide a solution and could complicate efforts to bring parties involved in the conflict to the negotiating table. The proposed sanctions were later shelved.
Graham’s role in Great Lakes diplomacy
Graham’s engagement with Great Lakes issues stretched back more than a decade.
In 2013, he was part of a bipartisan delegation of six U.S. senators that visited the region to assess the conflict and humanitarian crisis linked to the M23 rebellion in eastern DRC.
During the visit, Graham said the region’s challenges could not be solved through military intervention or the deployment of international forces alone. He argued that a political solution involving the Congolese government, neighbouring countries and communities in the region was necessary.
During the visit, Graham said that lasting peace in eastern DRC would require addressing the underlying causes of the conflict and the concerns of affected communities.
Graham said the United Nations could play an important role in supporting stability, but that a lasting solution had to come through dialogue among regional stakeholders.
In his later years, Graham continued following developments in eastern DRC, particularly the conflict between government forces and the AFC/M23 coalition.
In December 2025, he welcomed AFC/M23’s decision to withdraw from Uvira, a strategic town in South Kivu, describing the move as a confidence-building step under the Doha peace process.
However, he expressed concern over reports that AFC/M23 forces were being attacked during the withdrawal.
“I am pleased to see reports of M23 troops withdrawing from Uvira in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. However, I am disheartened to hear these withdrawing troops are being attacked,” Graham said in a post on X at the time.
He called for continued diplomatic efforts to bring the opposing sides back to negotiations, arguing that dialogue was essential for achieving lasting peace and economic development in the Great Lakes region.
Graham also welcomed the Rwanda-DRC peace agreement signed in Washington last year, describing it as a significant achievement after years of conflict.
“What an amazing day and experience at the White House, with President Trump, Vice President JD Vance, U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio and President Trump’s Africa adviser Massad Boulos, along with the presidents of Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of Congo, solidifying what has been an elusive peace deal between the two countries,” he wrote on December 4, 2025.
He added that reaching the agreement with President Paul Kagame and President Félix Tshisekedi was something he would remember given the region’s long history of conflict.
“Watching President Trump close this deal with President Kagame and President Tshisekedi was an experience I’ll remember for the rest of my life. For those who have been following this region and conflict, today seemed almost impossible to dream of but now it is a reality,” he added.
U.S. Senator Lindsey Graham died on Saturday at the age of 71.
Rwanda-U.S. relations
Beyond his comments on the DRC conflict, Graham maintained engagement with Rwanda, which he described as an important partner for the United States in East Africa.
In December 2025, during Kagame’s visit to Washington for activities related to the Rwanda-DRC peace agreement, Graham and Kagame discussed strengthening Rwanda-U.S. cooperation in strategic areas, including conservation, security and economic partnerships.
In April 2019, Graham was part of a high-level U.S. congressional delegation hosted by President Kagame and First Lady Jeannette Kagame. The discussions focused on issues of mutual interest between Rwanda and the United States.
A veteran U.S. politician
Graham’s political career spanned more than three decades. Before joining the Senate, he served in the U.S. House of Representatives from 1995 to 2003 and previously served in the U.S. Air Force, Air Force Reserve and South Carolina Air National Guard, retiring as a colonel in 2015.
Over more than three decades in Congress, he became one of America’s most influential voices on defense, national security and foreign policy. He chaired key Senate committees, including the Senate Judiciary Committee and the Senate Budget Committee, and was a major figure in Republican foreign policy debates.
Graham was also a close political ally of President Donald Trump. Although he initially criticized Trump during the 2016 Republican presidential primary, the two later developed a close working relationship, with Graham becoming one of Trump’s most prominent supporters in Congress.
Shortly before his death, Graham traveled to Kyiv, Ukraine, where he met President Volodymyr Zelenskyy amid the ongoing war between Ukraine and Russia.
His death marks the loss of a major figure in U.S. politics and a politician who had become a familiar voice in discussions around global security, defense strategy, and international alliances.
Senator Graham, pictured here with President Paul Kagame, was widely regarded as one of Rwanda’s strongest supporters in the U.S. Congress, consistently advocating for closer Rwanda-U.S. relations.
Graham’s office confirmed his death early Sunday, saying the senator died Saturday night “from a brief and sudden illness.”
“Senator Graham’s family appreciates prayers at this time and asks for privacy during this incredibly difficult period,” his office said in a statement.
President Donald Trump led tributes to Graham, describing him as “one of the greatest people and Senators I have ever known” and a “true American Patriot.”
Graham, who represented South Carolina in the U.S. Senate since 2003, was one of the most recognised figures in the chamber and served as chairman of the Senate Budget Committee. He was also a leading Republican voice on defence and international affairs, particularly issues involving Ukraine, Iran and America’s role in global security.
In Africa’s Great Lakes region, Graham became known for his public comments on the conflict in eastern DR Congo, where he argued that lasting peace required political engagement, dialogue between the opposing sides, and addressing the root causes of the conflict.
In December 2025, he welcomed AFC/M23’s decision to withdraw from the strategic town of Uvira in South Kivu, as part of a confidence-building step toward advancing the Doha peace process and achieving a lasting solution to the conflict.
However, he expressed concern over reports that AFC/M23 forces were being attacked as they withdrew from the city.
“I am pleased to see reports of M23 troops withdrawing from Uvira in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. However, I am disheartened to hear these withdrawing troops are being attacked,” Graham said in a post on X at the time.
He argued that negotiations between the opposing sides were essential and aligned with President Donald Trump’s vision of bringing lasting peace and economic development to the Great Lakes region.
Graham had engaged with regional security issues for more than a decade. In 2013, he was part of a bipartisan delegation of six U.S. senators that visited the Great Lakes region to assess the conflict between M23 rebels and government forces in eastern DR Congo.
During the visit, Graham said the presence of United Nations forces was important but stressed that the region’s challenges could not ultimately be solved by the UN alone.
On December 3, 2025, Graham also met with President Paul Kagame, with their discussions centred on strengthening Rwanda-U.S. cooperation in strategic areas including conservation, security and economic partnerships.
Beyond his engagement with the Great Lakes region, Graham was fresh off a trip to Kyiv, Ukraine, where he met President Volodymyr Zelenskyy on Friday to discuss Ukraine’s urgent air defence needs and efforts to increase pressure on Russia.
Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu also paid tribute to Graham, saying he understood that “the security of Israel and America are inseparable,” while Senate Majority Leader John Thune described him as a strong advocate for the United States and freedom around the world.
Graham’s political career spanned more than three decades. Before joining the Senate, he served in the U.S. House of Representatives from 1995 to 2003 and previously served in the U.S. Air Force, Air Force Reserve and South Carolina Air National Guard, retiring as a colonel in 2015.
He first won his Senate seat in 2002, succeeding longtime South Carolina senator Strom Thurmond, and went on to become one of the Republican Party’s most influential voices on foreign policy.
South Carolina Governor Henry McMaster is expected to appoint a replacement to serve until a special election is held to fill Graham’s seat.
Graham’s office confirmed his death early Sunday, saying the senator died Saturday night “from a brief and sudden illness.”On December 3, 2025, Graham met with President Paul Kagame, with their discussions centred on strengthening Rwanda-U.S. cooperation in strategic areas including conservation, security and economic partnerships.
The exchange comes as Russia and Ukraine continue a war that has raged since early 2022, with diplomatic tensions increasingly spilling into Africa, where both countries have sought to strengthen political partnerships.
Lavrov made the remarks on Friday, July 10, 2026, during a working visit to Burundi, where he held talks with Burundian Foreign Affairs Minister Edouard Bizimana before meeting Burundian President Évariste Ndayishimiye, who currently serves as Chairperson of the African Union.
During his visit, Lavrov accused Ukraine of supporting armed groups opposed to governments friendly to Moscow, including the M23 movement in eastern DRC.
“We are seeing instances of gross external interference in African affairs, including in the situation where the legitimate Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, with the support of Burundi, is overcoming an aggression carried out against it by the M23 movement supported by foreign representatives, including Ukrainians. We know it, and so do our friends.”
He further alleged: “Basically, Ukrainians are trying to side with forces, which oppose legitimate governments in too many conflicts on the African continent, just to establish themselves as a ‘political factor’ in the region. And the main thing for them is to create trouble for countries, which are friendly to Russia.”
Lavrov departed Burundi later Friday after concluding his visit.
Ukraine rejects allegations
Responding to the remarks, Ukraine’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs categorically denied the accusations.
Foreign Ministry spokesperson Heorhii Tykhyi said: “Lavrov’s claims that Ukraine backs M23 in eastern DR Congo are Kremlin disinformation, unsupported by evidence. We officially refute and reject such accusations.”
He added: “Ukraine doesn’t meddle in African conflicts. Russia does – arming groups in breach of sanctions, fueling instability, and recruiting nationals of African states to fight in its war against Ukraine.”
The spokesperson continued: “Moscow accusing others of what it does itself, nothing new.”
According to Tykhyi, Russia’s accusations are intended to shift attention away from its own actions.
“Russia’s objective is clear: to undermine US mediation efforts in the Great Lakes region and to distract from Russia’s own destructive actions that obstruct the peace process.”
Wider regional context
The exchange comes against the backdrop of the long-running conflict in eastern DRC, where M23 says it is fighting to protect the rights and security of Congolese Tutsi communities, arguing that successive Congolese governments failed to implement previous peace agreements that guaranteed their protection and political inclusion as Congolese citizens.
The DRC government, however, has relied on a coalition of forces to fight the M23 rebel group. Besides the Congolese army (FARDC), the coalition has included Burundian troops deployed under bilateral security arrangements between Kinshasa and Gitega (the capital of Burundi), local militia groups known as Wazalendo, and the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR).
The FDLR was founded by individuals linked to the perpetrators of the 1994 Genocide against the Tutsi in Rwanda.
Rwanda has repeatedly accused the group of continuing to threaten its security, while Congolese Tutsi communities have also accused the FDLR of carrying out attacks against them in eastern DRC.
The conflict has also drawn in private military contractors. Following M23’s capture of Goma in early 2025, more than 200 foreign mercenaries, most of them Romanian nationals fighting alongside Congolese government forces, were captured by M23.
They were later transferred through Rwanda and repatriated to their home countries under arrangements involving regional and international actors.
