Tag: Highlights – Home

Among the most notable appointments is that of Damien Murwanashyaka, who was named Minister of Infrastructure, a ministry that has recently been under scrutiny over delayed projects, including roads, dams, and buildings that have led to significant financial losses.

Murwanashyaka joins the government from the private sector, where he brings more than 15 years of experience in the construction industry. A Professional Civil Engineer and Associate Member of the Chartered Institute of Arbitrators, Murwanashyaka most recently served as the Managing Director of Preferred Contractors.

Before that, his senior leadership career included roles as the CEO of UDL, Chief Quantity Surveyor at Real Contractors Ltd, and Projects Manager at ROKO Construction Ltd. He also held consultant leadership roles at Century Engineering and Contractors Ltd and Gasabo 3D Design Ltd.

He graduated with a First Class Honors Degree in Civil Engineering and later earned an MBA from Oklahoma Christian University.

The Ministry of Infrastructure also welcomed Armand Zingiro as State Minister. Zingiro previously served as Chief Executive Officer of the Rwanda Energy Group (REG), a position he held since September 2023 after leading the Energy Utility Corporation Limited (EUCL) from 2020.

He was replaced at REG by Maximilien Byilingiro, who has been appointed the new Chief Executive Officer of the energy utility.

Another new entrant to the ministry is Col Claudien Bizimungu, who was appointed State Minister for Infrastructure. Since 2022, he has served as Deputy Commander of the Rwanda Defence Force’s Engineer Brigade. He was also part of a Rwandan military mission that assisted Jamaica in rebuilding infrastructure damaged by natural disasters.

In the Ministry of Trade and Industry, Marie Antoine Kajangwe was appointed Minister, replacing Prudence Sebahizi. Kajangwe is no stranger to the ministry, having served as Permanent Secretary since August 2024.

Prior to that, she was Director General in charge of Trade and Investment Promotion at the ministry.

Her former position as Permanent Secretary has been filled by Chantal Tuyishimire.

Meanwhile, Judith Uwizeye was appointed Minister of Public Service and Labour, replacing Ambassador Christine Nkulikiyinka. Uwizeye previously served as Minister in the Office of the President following the formation of a new Cabinet in July 2025.

This is not her first time leading the Public Service and Labour Ministry. She held the same portfolio between 2014 and 2017. A lawyer by training, Uwizeye graduated from the former National University of Rwanda in 2006 before earning a master’s degree in International Economic and Business Law from the University of Groningen in the Netherlands. She also taught in the university’s Faculty of Law.

The appointments also included several diplomatic and institutional changes. Lt Gen (Rtd) Karenzi Karake was appointed Rwanda’s Ambassador to China, while Emmanuel Bayingana was named Ambassador to Israel.

Jeannot Ruhunga was appointed Ambassador to Poland, and Christine Nkulikiyinka was named Ambassador to Spain.

Among others, Louise Kanyonga was appointed Chief Executive Officer of Zigama CSS, while Michelle Umurungi was named Deputy Chief Executive Officer in charge of Investments at RSSB at Rwanda Social Security Board.

The changes bring a mix of experienced public servants, private-sector professionals and security experts into leadership positions as the government seeks to strengthen service delivery across key sectors.

Speaking in an interview with B&B Kigali on June 10, 2026, Nduhungirehe said Rwanda remains willing to restore normal relations, but accused Burundi of repeatedly undermining efforts to stabilise bilateral ties.

Relations between the two neighbouring countries deteriorated significantly in 2015 following an attempted coup against then-President Pierre Nkurunziza. Several individuals involved in the attempt fled to Rwanda, after which Burundi closed its borders with Rwanda.

In 2022, both countries moved to normalise relations and reopened their borders. However, tensions resurfaced in late 2023 following an attack in the Gatumba area of Bujumbura Province by the armed group RED Tabara. Burundi subsequently closed its borders again in January 2024.

At the time, Burundi accused Rwanda of supporting RED Tabara, an allegation Kigali denied, insisting it does not cooperate with groups intent on destabilising neighbouring states.

Renewed tensions and diplomatic engagement

According to Nduhungirehe, further strain followed statements and developments in the region, including remarks made by regional leaders and renewed accusations exchanged between Kigali and Bujumbura.

He cited comments made in January 2024 in Kinshasa by Burundi’s President Évariste Ndayishimiye, who, during a visit to the Democratic Republic of the Congo, expressed support for efforts to mobilise Rwandan youth against the government.

The minister also referred to earlier remarks by the President of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Félix Tshisekedi, who in late 2023 said his country’s forces would act against Rwanda, describing this as part of a broader regional climate of hostility.

He argued that such statements contributed to worsening relations, particularly given the regional context and ongoing insecurity in eastern DR Congo.

Nduhungirehe further noted that Burundian troops deployed to eastern DR Congo were cooperating with the FDLR militia group, alongside Congolese forces.

He stated that while the Burundian deployment was officially framed as part of operations against armed groups, including RED Tabara, their activities instead indicated coordination with the FDLR.

“They were not deployed against RED Tabara. They were deployed to assist the Congolese army and the FDLR in the plan that President Tshisekedi mentioned during his campaign, and the same plan President Ndayishimiye spoke about in Kinshasa in January 2024,” he said.

He added that Burundian forces had operated in areas closer to the Rwandan border in North Kivu, despite RED Tabara being mainly active in South Kivu, suggesting, in his view, a different operational focus.

Attempts at dialogue

The minister noted that following the capture of Goma and Bukavu by the AFC/M23 coalition in early 2025, Burundi requested dialogue with Rwanda in an effort to ease tensions.

He said intelligence and security officials from both countries met at the border on three separate occasions and reached a number of understandings aimed at de-escalation.

However, he revealed that progress was later undermined by renewed public accusations from the Burundian leadership.

“What happened after that? After that, President Ndayishimiye went on BBC and France 24… accusing Rwanda of planning to attack Burundi. We then asked our Burundian counterparts what had changed, given that we had reached agreements,” he said.

He added that further meetings were facilitated by the United States after AFC/M23 captured Uvira in early December 2025, during which security officials from both countries again met twice at the border and reached additional understandings.

Nduhungirehe said that despite these engagements, Burundian forces remain present in eastern DR Congo and continue, in Rwanda’s view, to cooperate with elements of the FDLR.

He reiterated Rwanda’s position that it seeks peaceful relations with Burundi through dialogue, but argued that Bujumbura has not demonstrated sufficient commitment to sustaining diplomatic progress.

“Rwanda wants good relations with Burundi, dialogue, and resolution of outstanding issues, but Burundi does not show the willingness,” he said, calling on Burundi to end any cooperation with the FDLR militia group, which was formed by the perpetrators of the 1994 Genocide against the Tutsi.

As Mushikiwabo explained to the media in February 2026, her decision to seek re-election followed consultations with the Rwandan government.

In November 2025, she had received requests from several member states encouraging her to run again, citing the achievements recorded during her two terms in office.

Although observers believe the election, scheduled for November 2026 in Phnom Penh, may favor Mushikiwabo due to the support she has received from many member states, she has emphasized that the race will be competitive. She noted that all candidates possess the qualifications required for the role, but none has given her reason to doubt her own prospects.

Winning the position of OIF Secretary-General requires broad support from member states, a factor often influenced by a candidate’s accomplishments both at home and on the international stage, as well as within the organization itself.

When Mushikiwabo assumed office in January 2019, she pledged to strengthen the OIF’s role in global affairs, positioning it as a platform for dialogue among nations and a promoter of human values.

She stressed that solidarity and cooperation remain the organization’s most important principles.

At the time, the OIF comprised 88 states and governments, including 54 full members and 34 associate or observer members.

French speakers worldwide numbered around 300 million, more than half of whom lived in Africa.

Mushikiwabo inherited an organization facing significant financial challenges and internal tensions linked to concerns over financial management during the tenure of former Secretary-General Michaëlle Jean.

The former Canadian leader had faced criticism over spending that reportedly included $500,000 on renovations to her official residence in Paris and $20,000 on a piano.

One of Mushikiwabo’s first priorities was to reform the institution internally and restore cohesion within the organization.

However, the COVID-19 pandemic, which disrupted the global economy and international cooperation, affected many of the OIF’s planned initiatives.

Countries became increasingly focused on addressing domestic challenges as travel restrictions and the suspension of international meetings hampered collaboration.

Like many international organizations, the OIF also struggled with delayed or insufficient contributions from member states.

While operational needs continued to grow, particularly in areas such as youth empowerment, women’s development, and education, available resources often failed to keep pace.

During her second term, member states agreed to increase their contributions to strengthen the organization’s capacity to fulfill its mandate.

Outstanding arrears were reduced, while countries including Rwanda, Egypt, Vietnam, and Djibouti decided to double their annual contributions.

The increase in member contributions paved the way for a larger organizational budget.

During a ministerial meeting held in Yaoundé, Cameroon, in November 2023, ministers approved a gradual increase in the OIF budget, allocating €45.7 million for 2024, €46.1 million for 2025, €46.5 million for 2026, and €46.9 million thereafter.

At the OIF Ministerial Conference held in Kigali in November 2025, member states approved a substantial increase in the 2026 budget to €71.7 million to support expanded programming across the organization.

Despite the increase, Mushikiwabo noted that available resources still fall short of meeting all the organization’s ambitions.

As a result, member states granted her exceptional authority during the Kigali meeting to seek external funding from major international partners and corporations, including companies such as TotalEnergies.

Leveraging this mandate, the OIF has planned partnerships with institutions such as the African Development Bank to support digital skills training initiatives, including the D-Clic programme. The objective is to increase the number of young people benefiting from digital training from 20,000 to 100,000 by 2026.

According to the OIF’s annual report, 1.7 million people benefited from the organization’s programmes in 2025. Around 90,000 women across member states received capacity-building support, while 300 women-led projects were funded. In 2024 alone, 50 projects received support worth €3.7 million.

The number of states and governments within the OIF reached 90 in 2025. Meanwhile, the French-speaking population continues to expand, reinforcing the organization’s global influence. Today, more than 396 million people speak French worldwide, while over 170 million are learning the language.

As Mushikiwabo prepares to seek another mandate, supporters point to the transformation of an organization once facing financial strain and internal divisions into one with stronger finances, broader membership, and expanding development programmes across the Francophone world.