The academy was launched on Monday, August 3, through a partnership between the Kigali-based African School of Governance (ASG), the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the African Union Commission (AUC) and the African Women Leaders Network (AWLN).
The initiative seeks to develop a new generation of women political leaders through structured learning, mentorship and peer-to-peer exchanges, while creating a lasting network of women committed to advancing inclusive governance across the continent.
Speaking at the launch, ASG President Francis Gatare said the academy aligns with the institution’s mission of developing leaders committed to ethical governance and public service.
“Our mandate is to create a generation of African leaders who are ethical, who have a transformative mindset and have a commitment to the pursuit of excellence in the service of their communities and their countries,” he said.
Gatare noted that while several African countries have made progress in increasing women’s representation in political institutions, women remain underrepresented in leadership and decision-making spaces across much of the continent.
He said the academy is designed as a long-term platform that will continue beyond the initial training programme by connecting participants through a permanent network.
“This initiative is called an academy because it implies a certain permanence. What we are hoping to achieve is to create a permanent network between participating cohort members,” he remarked.
The inaugural cohort comprises 40 women leaders selected from more than 1,300 applicants across 28 countries. The participants include ministers, members of parliament, speakers, mayors, political party leaders and representatives from government institutions, African Union agencies and civil society organisations.
The four-week blended programme combines virtual learning with a residential convening in Kigali, covering areas such as governance, political communication, campaign strategy, political financing, ethical leadership and resilience-building.
Participants will also benefit from mentorship provided by senior members of the African Women Leaders Network and become part of ASG’s alumni community to support continued collaboration and peer learning after completing the programme.
Jide Martins Okeke, Director of the Regional Programme for Africa at UNDP, said the academy represents a shift from policy commitments on women’s political participation to practical efforts that build leadership capacity.
He commended Rwanda for having the world’s highest representation of women in parliament, but said achieving gender parity requires more than legislation.
“This academy represents that shift from formulation to implementation. More fundamentally, it’s going to provide the capabilities, the networks, the sisterhood that is needed to advance women’s representation in political decision-making across the African continent,” he stressed.
Okeke added that addressing gender inequality requires a broader transformation of social attitudes, including engaging men through positive masculinity approaches to challenge patriarchal systems.
Former Ethiopian President and African Women Leaders Network Elder Sahle-Work Zewde said the academy goes beyond preparing women to contest elections, focusing instead on building leaders capable of strengthening institutions and driving meaningful change.
She said the initiative also institutionalises a culture of women supporting and learning from one another.
The academy was first launched on the margins of the African Union Heads of State and Government Summit in February 2025 and is part of a broader continental initiative aimed at increasing women’s influence and sustained representation in political decision-making.
Following the high-level launch, the inaugural cohort begins a five-day residential stay in Kigali as part of their four-week blended programme, participating in experiential learning, leadership dialogues, and mentorship sessions that mark the beginning of the academy’s regional rollout.
The academy was launched on Monday, August 3, through a partnership between the Kigali-based African School of Governance (ASG), the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the African Union Commission (AUC) and the African Women Leaders Network (AWLN).ASG President Francis Gatare and UNDP Regional Director for Africa Jide Martins Okeke signed the MoU formalising the partnership that established the academy.
Former Ethiopian President and African Women Leaders Network Elder Sahle-Work Zewde said the academy goes beyond preparing women to contest elections, focusing instead on building leaders capable of strengthening institutions and driving meaningful change.The initiative seeks to develop a new generation of women political leaders through structured learning, mentorship and peer-to-peer exchanges, while creating a lasting network of women committed to advancing inclusive governance across the continent.
The artist shared the plans while speaking to journalists after the final concert of his two-night BK Arena celebration.
He said the overwhelming response to the concerts made him realize that many supporters from different parts of the country had hoped to attend but were unable to make the trip to Kigali.
According to King James, the idea of performing across the country was inspired by his recent tour of community radio stations, where he thanked fans for standing by him throughout his 20-year music career.
Responding to a question on whether the anniversary concerts could become an annual tradition, the singer said he was not ready to make such a commitment but left the possibility open.
“No, I don’t like making promises I can’t keep. But it is possible. As you know, I recently toured community radio stations across the provinces to thank fans who have supported me throughout these 20 years in music. I believe we can celebrate together in another way, and we’ll announce those plans in the coming days,” he said.
Beyond Rwanda, King James also invited Rwandans and music lovers living abroad to attend the international concerts he is preparing.
He announced that the first show will take place in Belgium on August 22, 2026, adding that more engagements across Europe will be unveiled in the coming days while he is on the continent.
The singer also disclosed plans to perform for fans in the United States and Canada, saying discussions are ongoing to organize concerts in several African countries as part of a broader international tour.
King James has revealed plans to take his performances beyond Kigali following his two historic concerts at BK Arena.King James thrilled a packed BK Arena as both nights of his anniversary concerts sold out, filling the 10,000-capacity venue.He said the overwhelming response to the concerts made him realize that many supporters from different parts of the country had hoped to attend but were unable to make the trip to Kigali.
Communication Minister and government spokesperson René Emmanuel Sadi said on Sunday that the 93-year-old leader was expected back soon, dismissing rumours surrounding his prolonged stay abroad.
“The president is alive. There is no power vacuum,” Sadi said in an interview with Radio France Internationale (RFI), without providing details on when Biya would return.
Biya has not been seen publicly since June 7, when he left Cameroon for what officials described as a “brief private stay” in Switzerland. The absence, which has now lasted more than 50 days, has renewed questions about the health of the world’s oldest serving head of state.
The government has repeatedly rejected reports suggesting that Biya is seriously ill. Sadi previously said the president was in good health and continuing to work from Geneva, where he has spent extended periods in recent years.
“Reports claiming otherwise are pure fantasy and malicious manipulation aimed at destabilising opinion,” Sadi said.
Other senior officials have also defended Biya’s absence. Higher Education Minister Jacques Fame Ndongo said the president had continued to follow government matters through documents submitted by his aides.
Labour Minister Grégoire Owona offered a different explanation, describing Biya’s absence as annual leave and arguing that the president, like any other citizen, had the right to take time off.
“Paul Biya, elected by the Cameroonian people and paid by them, is a worker who has the right to annual leave,” Owona said.
However, opposition figures have criticised the lack of clarity surrounding the president’s whereabouts and the extended nature of his stay abroad.
Mamadou Mota, vice-president of the opposition Cameroon Renaissance Movement, said Biya’s absence had created an “institutional vacuum”, arguing that the country could not be governed remotely while facing major social and economic challenges.
Concerns have also grown because Biya has yet to appoint a new government after being sworn in for his eighth consecutive seven-year term in November 2025. The presidential election that secured his latest mandate was disputed by opposition groups, which alleged irregularities and voter suppression.
Cameroon’s authorities banned public discussion of Biya’s health in October 2024 after another prolonged absence, but speculation has continued online, with social media users reviving jokes describing him as a “remote-work president”.
The debate has also raised questions about succession arrangements. Parliament restored the office of vice-president in April as part of constitutional reforms, but the position remains vacant, leaving no designated deputy should the president become temporarily or permanently unable to perform his duties.
Meanwhile, political tensions have intensified within the ruling Cameroon People’s Democratic Movement (CPDM), with senior party officials recently holding a rare meeting described only as an “important working session”.
Biya, who first became president in 1982, has increasingly spent time outside Cameroon in recent years, particularly in Switzerland. His long absences have become a recurring source of debate over governance.
President Paul Biya has not been seen publicly since June 7, when he left Cameroon for what officials described as a “brief private stay” in Switzerland.
His remarks come after the government of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) announced that it had reached an agreement with the FDLR aimed at dismantling the group through a non-military process.
According to Congolese authorities, the agreement stems from a document prepared by FDLR president Victor Byiringiro, signed on May 30, 2026, and submitted to President Félix Tshisekedi.
The DRC government says the arrangement provides for the FDLR to lay down its arms, have its fighters placed in secured transit centres, and later be reintegrated into civilian life.
The FDLR has proposed that fighters who do not wish to return to Rwanda should be assisted in resettling in third countries.
Rwanda has rejected the agreement, arguing that it is not provided for under the peace agreement signed in Washington in 2025. Kigali has maintained that the FDLR should instead be dismantled in line with the commitments contained in that accord.
In a recent interview with BBC Gahuza, FDLR political spokesperson Cure Ngoma was asked whether the group had agreed on a timeline for implementing the agreement, including disarmament and the reintegration of its fighters. He said no timetable had been set.
“We have not established a timeline because there are also conditions we have raised that must first be addressed,” Ngoma said.
He added that the FDLR wants what it describes as “Rwandan refugees” living in the DRC to be allowed to return home in a manner that guarantees both their dignity and security. Once those issues are resolved, he said, the group’s remaining objective would be to participate in Rwanda’s political process.
“The issue is ensuring that our refugees are guaranteed security and can return to the country with dignity. After that, we can compete on the political stage inside the country,” he said.
Speaking to IGIHE, Nduhungirehe dismissed the proposal for voluntary dissolution, insisting that no political space could be opened to the FDLR and reiterating Rwanda’s position that the group must be dismantled.
“No political platform can be opened to genocidaires. The FDLR must be dismantled, as stipulated in the Washington agreement. Its fighters should be repatriated to Rwanda without any further conditions,” he said.
Some FDLR combatants have in recent years voluntarily returned to Rwanda, where they are received at the Mutobo Reintegration Centre operated by the Rwanda Demobilization and Reintegration Commission (RDRC) in Musanze District.
At the centre, former combatants undergo civic education and reintegration programmes designed to prepare them for civilian life. They also receive vocational training and starter kits to help them establish livelihoods after returning to their communities.
Although the DRC government says its agreement with the FDLR is intended to dismantle the group, information obtained by IGIHE indicates that the two sides have continued military coordination against the AFC/M23 coalition, which controls large areas of North and South Kivu provinces.
According to the information, FDLR leaders held a series of meetings with officers of the Congolese army (FARDC) in June 2026, including in Rutshuru and Walikale territories. The discussions reportedly focused on integrating FDLR fighters into the government-backed Wazalendo militias.
The same information indicates that, despite the announced agreement, the Tshisekedi administration has continued to engage with Rwandan opposition figures based abroad, with meetings reportedly being organised between some of them and FDLR leaders.
Those involved include Jean-Luc Habyarimana, son of former Rwandan President Juvénal Habyarimana; former priest Thomas Nahimana; Fabien Singaye, a brother-in-law of Félicien Kabuga; and Thaddée Kwitonda, a former member of the FDLR leadership.
Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation Olivier Nduhungirehe dismissed the proposal for voluntary dissolution, insisting that no political space could be opened to the FDLR and reiterating Rwanda’s position that the group must be dismantled.
The monument was unveiled at the historic Old Entebbe Terminal by Uganda’s Chief of Defence Forces, Gen. Muhoozi Kainerugaba, at the site where Yoni Netanyahu, the elder brother of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, was fatally shot while leading Israel’s elite Sayeret Matkal commandos during Operation Entebbe.
Addressing guests at the ceremony on Saturday, Gen. Kainerugaba said the memorial serves not only to honour Netanyahu’s sacrifice but also to celebrate the values of courage, duty and protecting innocent lives.
“It is a great honour and privilege to join you at this historic site as we unveil this monument to Lieutenant Colonel Yonatan ‘Yoni’ Netanyahu, the courageous commander of the Israeli rescue force whose leadership and ultimate sacrifice during the Entebbe raid of 4th July 1976 has become an enduring symbol of courage, duty, and selfless service,” he said.
He added that the monument reflects more than a historical event, describing it as a tribute to universal military and humanitarian values.
“Monuments are more than stone and bronze. They preserve memory, teach history, and inspire future generations,” Gen. Kainerugaba said. “This monument, therefore, carries significance far beyond commemorating one brave individual.”
The Ugandan military chief also paid tribute to the civilian hostages who lost their lives during the crisis, including Jean-Jacques Maimoni, Pasco Cohen, Ida Borochovitch and Dora Bloch. He also acknowledged the Ugandan soldiers who died during the confrontation, while drawing a distinction between the present-day Ugandan state and the regime of former dictator Idi Amin.
“The events that unfolded here in July 1976 remain one of the most significant episodes in modern history,” he said. “Today, however, Uganda is a constitutional democracy committed to peaceful coexistence and constructive engagement with the international community.”
Gen. Kainerugaba reaffirmed Uganda’s commitment to strengthening ties with Israel, saying the relationship between the two countries is built on mutual respect and practical cooperation.
“As we look to the future, we remain committed to deepening our cooperation across all areas of mutual interest while working together to advance peace, security, innovation and sustainable development,” he said.
Representing the Israeli delegation, businessman Barack Orland thanked Gen. Kainerugaba for championing the construction of the memorial. He described the monument as a lasting symbol of friendship between Uganda and Israel and said it reflected the two nations’ shared commitment to future generations.
Yoni Netanyahu was the commander of Israel’s elite Sayeret Matkal unit during Operation Entebbe, a daring mission launched after Air France Flight 139 was hijacked by Palestinian and German militants in June 1976 and diverted to Uganda with the backing of Idi Amin’s regime.
Israeli commandos flew more than 2,500 miles to Entebbe under cover of darkness, stormed the old terminal building and rescued 102 hostages. Netanyahu was the only Israeli soldier killed during the operation after being struck by gunfire as the assault began.
The mission was later officially renamed Operation Yonatan in his honour and remains one of the most celebrated hostage rescue operations in military history.
The monument was unveiled at the historic Old Entebbe Terminal by Uganda’s Chief of Defence Forces, Gen. Muhoozi Kainerugaba, at the site where Yoni Netanyahu, the elder brother of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, was fatally shot while leading Israel’s elite Sayeret Matkal commandos during Operation Entebbe.
The regulator announced on August 2, 2026, that the action followed regulatory inspections and compliance assessments, with the measures being taken “in the interest of public health.”
Rwanda FDA said it had closed the affected manufacturing facilities, revoked their licences and ordered the withdrawal of all products from the market.
Among the affected companies is Ingufu Gin Ltd, whose products listed for recall include Red Waragi, Rabiant Gin, Ngufu Gin, King’s Vodka, Royal Castle Gin, Medal Gin, G&S Rum, New House Potable Spirit, Club Potable Spirit and Hometown Potable Spirit.
NBG Ltd was also ordered to halt production, with products including United Flavoured Gin, Bombastic Coconut Flavoured Gin, Ingwe Flavoured Gin, Amerikaan Flavoured Gin, Maguma Gin and Fimbo Blended Banana Brandy subject to recall.
Other manufacturers affected include SKY Drop Industries Ltd, Africana Buffalo Ltd, NOPA Company Ltd, Roots Investment Group Ltd, Rugali Agro-processing Company and Zhonglu Industrial Liability Company Ltd.
The recalled products from the companies include various brands of gin, whisky, vodka, rum, brandy and other flavoured alcoholic beverages.
Rwanda FDA instructed the manufacturers to immediately begin a full recall process and direct their distributors to collect the listed products from clients and return existing stock to the manufacturers’ premises.
The manufacturers have been given three working days to submit recall reports to the regulator.
Distributors and retailers were also directed to immediately stop selling or distributing the affected products and return remaining quantities to their suppliers, distributors or manufacturers.
“Non-compliance with all the above will result in measures under applicable regulatory provisions,” Rwanda FDA warned.
The authority further urged consumers to immediately stop consuming the listed alcoholic beverages.
Rwanda FDA said additional affected manufacturing facilities will be announced in due course as regulatory enforcement continues.
Rwanda FDA said it had closed the affected manufacturing facilities, revoked their licences and ordered the withdrawal of all products from the market.
As of Thursday, the DRC had reported 3,605 confirmed cases of Ebola disease caused by the Bundibugyo virus, including 1,587 deaths, representing a case fatality rate of 44 percent, the WHO said in its latest disease outbreak report.
The previous largest outbreak, which struck the country’s east between 2018 and 2020, recorded 3,317 confirmed cases.
The current outbreak, initially confined to the Mongbwalu health zone in the province of Ituri, has spread over the past two months to 49 health zones across five provinces: Ituri, North Kivu, South Kivu, Haut-Uele and Tshopo.
The outbreak has also taken a growing toll on health workers, with 151 infections and 44 deaths reported so far, highlighting persistent gaps in infection prevention and control at health facilities, the WHO said.
The agency warned that insecurity, population displacement, high mobility and cross-border movements were hampering surveillance and response operations, raising the risk of further spread.
The outbreak is unfolding in conflict-affected areas where access to health care, clean water, food and shelter remains limited. Attacks on health facilities have restricted access for response teams and increased the risk of transmission going undetected.
Assessing the risk within the DRC as “very high,” the WHO said a substantial expansion of surveillance, testing, clinical care, infection control, community engagement and logistics was needed to get ahead of the outbreak.
The current outbreak, initially confined to the Mongbwalu health zone in the province of Ituri, has spread over the past two months to 49 health zones across five provinces: Ituri, North Kivu, South Kivu, Haut-Uele and Tshopo.
The FDLR was formed by individuals involved in planning and carrying out the 1994 Genocide against the Tutsi, including former political leaders, members of the defeated Rwandan Armed Forces (Ex-FAR), and fighters from the Interahamwe militia. Despite years of military operations against it, the group continues to recruit new members, particularly young fighters.
Operating from eastern DRC, the FDLR has long been cited by Rwanda as a direct threat to its national security because of its presence near the shared border. The Congolese government, however, has often argued that defeating AFC/M23 should take precedence over military action against the FDLR.
The group’s presence has featured prominently in regional peace efforts, including mediation talks held in Pretoria more than two decades ago, negotiations in Luanda in 2022, and discussions in Washington beginning in early 2025.
The Washington Peace Agreement included commitments to dismantle the FDLR through measures outlined in the Concept of Operations (CONOPS). However, despite signing the agreement, the DRC has continued to send conflicting signals regarding how it intends to address the group.
From denial to acknowledgement
For years, officials in Kinshasa maintained that the FDLR no longer posed a meaningful threat to Rwanda, arguing that the movement had become too weak to destabilize the region.
Congolese authorities also accused Rwanda of exaggerating the threat in order to justify interference in the DRC’s internal affairs and gain access to the country’s mineral resources.
In March 2025, former Foreign Affairs Minister Christophe Lutundula questioned whether the group even existed.
“The time had come for us to eliminate those remaining FDLR fighters Rwanda keeps talking about, but I don’t believe they exist. I don’t even know who they are,” he said.
Lutundula, who consistently argued during his tenure as foreign minister that the FDLR was no longer a significant force, also suggested Rwanda itself had shifted its narrative.
“Is Rwanda still talking about the FDLR the way it used to? No. The real issue now is the economy,” he stated.
Following the signing of the Washington Peace Agreement in June 2025, DRC Minister for Foreign Trade Julien Paluku also dismissed the existence of the FDLR, describing it as a narrative created by Rwanda.
Paluku argued that references to the group had misled the international community for three decades and accused Rwanda of using the issue to justify military intervention and the exploitation of Congolese mineral resources.
“The real FDLR Rwanda is looking for in the DRC is Congo’s minerals,” he said.
Rwanda’s ambassador to Algeria, Vincent Karega, said such remarks were unsurprising given Paluku’s previous role as governor of North Kivu Province, where the FDLR has long operated, including in Virunga National Park.
Official acknowledgement
Despite these statements, the Congolese government had previously acknowledged both the existence of the FDLR and the threat it posed. On April 15, 2024, then FARDC spokesperson Maj. Gen. Sylvain Ekenge told Congolese state television that the FDLR was active in the country and had played a major role in violence against civilians.
“The FDLR attacks Congolese people and kills Congolese people. Of the more than 10 million people who have died over the past decade, the FDLR bears significant responsibility for those deaths,” he said.
On April 15, 2024, then FARDC spokesperson Maj. Gen. Sylvain Ekenge told Congolese state television that the FDLR was active in the country and had played a major role in violence against civilians.
Ekenge’s remarks carried particular weight because he had previously served in North Kivu Province as military spokesperson for operations in the region and later as acting military governor.
His comments marked a significant departure from years of inconsistent messaging by the Congolese government regarding the FDLR.
In October 2025, the Congolese army issued a directive ordering its troops to end all cooperation with the FDLR. It also called on the group’s fighters to lay down their arms, warning that those who refused would face military action.
Despite the announcement, cooperation between the FARDC and the FDLR continued. The armed group reportedly continued receiving weapons and ammunition, while the 90-day deadline for its dismantlement expired without any meaningful progress.
Shifting explanations
As pressure mounted over its failure to dismantle the FDLR, the Congolese government began advancing a different explanation. Officials argued that many of the group’s fighters were based in areas controlled by AFC/M23, making it difficult for the army to carry out operations against them.
In late March 2026, the FARDC announced in Kisangani that it had launched operations targeting the FDLR. Two days later, however, the army reportedly delivered weapons and ammunition to FDLR fighters in Pinga, Walikale Territory, where the group was fighting alongside government forces against AFC/M23.
A report by the UN Group of Experts, published in late June 2026, stated that the Congolese army had assured the FDLR it would not move to dismantle the group and that both sides would continue working together as strategic partners.
According to reports from eastern DRC, FDLR fighters based in government-controlled territory were advised to relocate to areas under AFC/M23 control, creating the impression that military operations against the group could not be carried out.
On July 30, 2026, FDLR political spokesperson Cure Ngoma claimed that the group’s fighters were now located exclusively in areas controlled by AFC/M23.
“We are based in eastern Congo, specifically in the areas occupied by M23 and Rwanda. That is where our forces are located,” he said.
However, discussions held under the Joint Security Coordination Mechanism (JSCM), which brings together representatives from Rwanda, the DRC and the United States, concluded that while some FDLR fighters were indeed present in AFC/M23-controlled areas, others remained in territory controlled by the Congolese government.
In June 2026, U.S. Senior Advisor for Africa Massad Boulos told the UN Security Council that the DRC had failed to fulfil its commitment to dismantle the FDLR, even in areas under its own control.
“Despite progress, the parties continue to fall short on their obligations. The DRC has not upheld obligations for the FDLR neutralization, at least in the areas that they control,” Boulos pointed out.
A new approach to the FDLR
In recent weeks, a document circulating in international media has added another dimension to the debate.
The document, reportedly signed by FDLR president Lt. Gen. Victor Byiringiro on May 30, 2026, and addressed to President Félix Tshisekedi, outlines a proposal for the group’s fighters to disarm, undergo reintegration, and be placed in secure, supervised facilities.
The proposal has been presented as a roadmap for the group’s voluntary dissolution.
Since July 13, DRC Minister for Regional Integration Floribert Anzuluni has circulated the document among governments in Africa and Europe, presenting it as evidence that Kinshasa had reached an agreement with the FDLR on voluntary disarmament.
Rwanda, however, maintains that such an arrangement falls outside the framework of the Washington Peace Agreement.
Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation Minister Ambassador Olivier Nduhungirehe has argued that the reported proposal is not provided for under the agreement, which requires the FDLR to be dismantled through the agreed CONOPS framework.
On July 29, Nduhungirehe reiterated that the FDLR was never a party to the Washington Peace Agreement but rather the security threat the agreement seeks to eliminate.
“The signing of this so-called “protocol” between the father (the Congolese government), the son (the FDLR), and the evil spirit (the genocide ideology) is in no way consistent with the Washington Peace Agreement, which makes no provision for such an arrangement. For good reason: the genocidal FDLR is not a party to the agreement; rather, it is the subject of it,” he stressed.
The following day, DRC government spokesperson Patrick Muyaya defended Kinshasa’s position, saying that if the FDLR had voluntarily agreed to disarm and enter a reintegration process, there would be no justification for launching military operations against it.
“You do not use force against people who have voluntarily chosen the path of peace,” Muyaya argued.
After years of downplaying the FDLR’s capabilities, Patrick Muyaya openly stated that the DRC government could not launch military action against the group because it had chosen the path of peace.
Political analyst Prof. Bob Kabamba of the University of Liège has cautioned that even if the FDLR were officially declared dissolved, the organisation could simply re-emerge under a different name.
Before becoming the FDLR, the movement previously operated as RDR and later ALiR, while its military command, political leadership and objectives remained largely unchanged.
The evolution of Kinshasa’s public position, from questioning the FDLR’s existence, to acknowledging it as a security threat, and more recently supporting a voluntary disarmament process rather than military dismantlement, has become one of the central points of contention in the implementation of the Washington Peace Agreement.
The DRC government has for years changed its narrative on the FDLR, at times denying the group’s existence and at other times portraying it as a weakened force made up of aging fighters.
Implementation means verifiable dismantlement, not theatre.
To understand why Rwanda’s position admits no softening, one must first be honest about what the FDLR is — because the entire case for “dialogue” rests on misdescribing it.
A project, not a party
The FDLR is not a rebel movement with grievances that negotiation could address. It is the organisational afterlife of the 1994 Genocide against the Tutsi. Founded in 2000 in the forests of eastern DR Congo, it gathered up the remnants of the ex-FAR — the army that planned and executed the genocide — and the Interahamwe militia that carried out the killing hill by hill. Its founding cadres did not flee Rwanda as dissidents; they fled as perpetrators, taking their command structures, their weapons and their ideology with them.
That ideology has never been retired. Senior FDLR officers have declared, repeatedly and on the record, that their return to Rwanda is conditioned on the country being “cleansed” of its Tutsi population. This is not an accusation inferred from conduct; it is the group’s own stated horizon. An organisation whose political programme is the completion of a genocide does not have a negotiating position. It has a confession.
Dialogue, in any meaningful sense, requires a shared floor: each party recognises the other’s right to exist. The FDLR’s foundational premise is the denial of exactly that right to an entire people. You cannot split the difference with extermination. There is no halfway point between a population living and a population erased, and any mediator who pretends otherwise is not advancing peace — he is laundering genocide ideology into the vocabulary of politics.
The victims Kinshasa forgets are its own
Here is the element too often missing from this debate: the FDLR’s longest-suffering victims, after the Tutsi of Rwanda, are the Congolese themselves. For a quarter of a century this militia has fed on eastern DR Congo, taxing its minerals, burning its villages, and punishing its civilians for every military setback. United Nations investigators have documented its massacres of Congolese villagers and its campaigns of mass rape in the Kivus. UN Group of Experts reporting has likewise detailed the FDLR’s embedding within Congolese armed structures and its battlefield cooperation with Wazalendo militias, the very integration that makes announcements of “voluntary disarmament” ring hollow while its fighters remain on active front lines.
A Congolese official who offers the FDLR a seat at a political table is not merely offending Rwanda. He is telling the survivors of the militia’s Congolese atrocities that the men who did it have been promoted from criminals to counterparts.
Nor has the menace stayed on one side of the border. Over the years the FDLR has run incursions into Rwanda’s Western Province and been linked to grenade attacks that killed and maimed civilians in Kigali, each operation an attempt to export terror into a country that has spent three decades rebuilding itself from mass graves.
The law has already spoken
The second missing element is this: the question of what the FDLR is has already been answered, not by Kigali, but by the world’s courts and councils. The group and its leaders have sat under UN Security Council sanctions for some two decades. The International Criminal Court issued an arrest warrant for its supreme commander, Sylvestre Mudacumura, for war crimes. A German court in Stuttgart convicted its president, Ignace Murwanashyaka, for atrocities his organisation committed — a genocidaire leadership run, for years, from European soil, prosecuted under universal jurisdiction.
This is the legal reality a “political dialogue” would have to overturn. Negotiation confers standing; that is its nature. To seat the FDLR at a table is to walk back, by protocol, what sanctions committees, prosecutors and judges established by evidence: that this is not a political actor but a criminal enterprise animated by the gravest crime in international law.
The door that is already open
The third missing element demolishes the claim that Rwanda’s refusal leaves the FDLR’s fighters no way out. It leaves them exactly one, and thousands have taken it.
For more than twenty years, Rwanda has operated one of the most extensive demobilisation and reintegration programmes on the continent. Rank-and-file combatants who lay down their arms are received at the Mutobo demobilisation centre in Musanze, rehabilitated, and returned to their communities; many thousands of former fighters from armed groups in the DR Congo, the FDLR chief among them, have come home this way, alongside family members who followed them out of the forest. They were not negotiated with. They were welcomed, as individuals renouncing a criminal project, not as delegates of it.
That distinction is the whole argument. Disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration is a door for men. A political dialogue is a platform for an ideology. Rwanda has held the first open for two decades and will keep it open. The second it will never build, because the “cause” the FDLR’s leadership would bring to any table is the unfinished business of 1994.
What Washington actually requires
Which brings us back to the present moment. The peace framework the DR Congo and Rwanda signed in Washington in 2025 does not speak of accommodating the FDLR; it obligates its neutralisation, under a concept of operations both governments endorsed — irreversible, verifiable, and measured in dismantled command structures, not press conferences. A signed protocol with a militia that remains interwoven with the Congolese army and active in ongoing fighting is not neutralisation. It is choreography, and everyone in the region can tell the difference between a militia being dismantled and a militia being rebranded.
For that is the tactical truth beneath the diplomatic language: as military pressure and international scrutiny have shrunk its space, the FDLR has reached for the oldest trick of cornered armed movements — the costume change. Yesterday’s genocidaires present themselves as today’s “political opposition in exile,” hoping the world’s memory is shorter than its outrage. The rebranding must fail, and be seen to fail, because the precedent at stake reaches far beyond the Great Lakes. If an organisation founded on extermination can wait out the world and be repackaged as a dialogue partner, then every génocidaire on earth has been handed a strategy: survive, relocate, rename, negotiate.
The seat that is reserved
Rwanda’s three decades of recovery were built on a covenant with its dead and its survivors: unity, accountability, and the refusal to barter either. To trade that covenant for the political blackmail of a genocidal militia would betray more than a million victims of the Genocide against the Tutsi and gamble the security of the millions now living in the peace they were denied.
So let the record state Rwanda’s position without varnish. For fighters who abandon the FDLR, the road home through demobilisation remains open, as it has been for twenty years. For the organisation and the leaders who carry its exterminationist charter, there will be no concessions, no false symmetry, and no chair — not in Kigali, not in Kinshasa, not in any capital that takes the word “genocide” seriously.
A seat is, in fact, reserved for them. It is in the dock, facing their judges. It is the only table at which the FDLR has ever had anything legitimate to say.
The FDLR is not a rebel movement with grievances that negotiation could address. It is the organisational afterlife of the 1994 Genocide against the Tutsi.
The influx prompted Madrid to deploy military support, tighten border controls and enhance coordination with Rabat, while reigniting debate within the EU over how to manage migration at its external borders.
What’s special about Ceuta?
Ceuta is one of Spain’s two exclaves on the North African coast, alongside Melilla. Although geographically located in Africa, it forms part of the EU’s external border.
Its location has long made it one of Europe’s most sensitive migration gateways. For years, undocumented migrants have attempted to reach the enclave by climbing border fences or swimming around coastal barriers before trying to continue to mainland Spain and other parts of Europe.
Spain and Morocco have expanded cooperation in recent years on border control, migrant returns and efforts to combat human trafficking and smuggling networks.
As thousands gathered near the border, Moroccan security forces used batons and tear gas to push back crowds.
What triggered the surge?
In late June and early July, Spain’s Supreme Court ruled that migrants intercepted at sea near Ceuta and Melilla could not be summarily returned under the special “pushback” regime applied at land borders. Instead, they must go through standard legal procedures that provide access to legal assistance and the opportunity to apply for international protection.
The ruling was quickly distorted online into claims that anyone who reached Ceuta by sea would automatically be allowed to stay in Spain and eventually obtain legal residency. The narrative spread rapidly across various social media platforms, leading many to believe the route was effectively open.
Abdellah, a Moroccan who attempted to reach Ceuta but was later turned back by police, said videos circulating online had convinced him to make the journey.
Mohammed Zakaria Aboudahab, a professor of public law and political science at Mohammed V University in Morocco, said migrant-smuggling networks had deliberately amplified false information on social media, creating the impression that reaching Ceuta guaranteed legal status.
Spain and Morocco’s response
The latest influx saw more than 50,000 undocumented migrants enter Ceuta, many by swimming around the Tarajal border crossing or using makeshift flotation devices. At least 67 people died during the crossings, with the death toll expected to rise as search and recovery operations continue.
By August 1, more than 48,000 migrants had returned to Morocco. None were allowed to travel onward to mainland Spain under Ceuta’s special Schengen arrangements, and authorities said the immediate pressure at the border had largely eased.
Spain has since reinforced security by installing a new floating maritime barrier along Ceuta’s breakwater. The 500-meter inflatable barrier is designed to prevent migrants from bypassing land border controls by sea.
At the same time, Madrid and Rabat have intensified cooperation on returns and law enforcement while stepping up efforts against migrant-smuggling networks.
Moroccan authorities said they had arrested 70 people suspected of organizing or participating in violence linked to the mass crossing. Xinhua reporters in Rabat and Casablanca also observed tighter security at railway stations and bus terminals, where police were screening and, when necessary, turning back groups of young people heading toward northern Morocco.
Spanish Prime Minister Pedro Sanchez (C) observes the work of the Civil Guard in Spain’s North African enclave of Ceuta, on July 31, 2026.
EU and regional reactions
The crisis has once again exposed divisions within Europe over migration policy.
The European Commission reaffirmed that Ceuta forms part of the EU’s external border and said the bloc stands ready to support Spain through Frontex and other mechanisms while strengthening cooperation with Morocco.
Italy was among the first countries to criticize Spain’s migration policy. It later joined Denmark in leading a letter signed by 22 EU member states calling for an emergency ministerial meeting to discuss the crisis and the bloc’s external border management.
Spanish Prime Minister Pedro Sanchez responded by writing to European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen, expressing “serious concern” over what he described as “selfish,” politically motivated reactions from some governments that he said violated EU law, including proposals to suspend Schengen cooperation with Spain. He also called for an EU-wide ministerial meeting.
Ireland, which currently holds the rotating presidency of the Council of the EU, subsequently announced that EU interior ministers would hold a videoconference on Tuesday to discuss the Ceuta crisis.
