The arrest follows his controversial declaration of martial law in December, which was quickly reversed by the National Assembly.
Reports indicate that Yoon was taken into custody at 10:33 a.m. local time (0133 GMT) by a joint investigation team from the Corruption Investigation Office for High-ranking Officials (CIO), the National Office of Investigation (NOI), and the defense ministry’s investigative unit.
TV footage showed Yoon being transported in a black vehicle to the CIO office in Gwacheon, south of Seoul, before being moved to the Seoul Detention Center in Uiwang, located just 5 km away.
The CIO now has 48 hours to decide whether to request an additional warrant for Yoon’s detention, which could last up to 20 days for further questioning or if he will be released.
Yoon’s arrest follows an earlier failed attempt on January 3, when his security forces prevented the execution of the arrest warrant.
On January 7, a Seoul court approved an extension of the warrant.
This action comes after Yoon repeatedly ignored calls from investigators to voluntarily appear for questioning.
In a pre-recorded statement, Yoon condemned the arrest, claiming the warrant was illegal and executed through force.
He stated that his acceptance of the procedure was to prevent further conflict.
The arrest took place after Yoon’s supporters, legal team, and ruling party lawmakers blocked investigators for over two hours at the main gate of the presidential residence.
Despite this, the investigators from the CIO and NOI were able to break through the security cordons.
The martial law declaration on December 3, which was swiftly revoked by the National Assembly hours later, led to charges of insurrection against Yoon.
Following the martial law incident, the National Assembly voted to impeach the president on December 14, and the case is now under review by the constitutional court, which has up to 180 days to deliberate.
Yoon’s impeachment trial began with its first formal hearing on January 14, but it lasted only four minutes as Yoon failed to appear.
A new justice, appointed by the opposition Democratic Party, was included in the hearings despite Yoon’s objection.
With two out of three vacancies filled on the nine-member bench, there is increasing speculation that Yoon’s impeachment could be upheld.
For Yoon to be removed from office, at least six justices must support the motion.
The court is scheduled to hold further hearings on January 16, 21, 23, and February 4.
From economic strategies to security concerns, Trump’s policies impacted African nations in ways that left some leaders hopeful for continuity while others are more cautious.
Now, as Trump prepares to re-enter the political arena, African leaders—particularly from Rwanda, South Africa, and other key nations—are closely monitoring the shifts they expect in U.S. engagement with the continent.
{{A shift in approach?}}
Among the most notable African leaders expressing cautious optimism is Rwanda’s President Paul Kagame, who has pointed out that while the political transformation in the U.S. is significant, it is likely to bring changes in the approach to African affairs.
Speaking at a press conference on January 9, 2025, Kagame expressed hope that the new administration would take a more nuanced approach to regional conflicts, particularly in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC).
President Kagame acknowledged that U.S. foreign policy would inevitably evolve, with potential shifts in how the U.S. handles African geopolitical issues.
Kagame’s remarks reflect a broader sense of anticipation across the continent. After Trump’s first term, which many African leaders felt was marked by a lack of meaningful engagement, there is now a renewed hope that his second term could recalibrate U.S. policy toward Africa.
While concerns linger about U.S. interventionism, leaders are hopeful that Trump will focus on diplomatic efforts to resolve conflicts and enhance economic partnerships, particularly in countries experiencing unrest, like the DRC.
President Kagame has consistently emphasized that Rwanda is not the cause of the ongoing insecurity in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). He points to historical events, particularly the drawing of boundaries and the FDLR terrorist group’s presence in Congo, as the major contributors to the current conflict.
Kagame has often expressed concerns about the DRC’s internal governance, which has led to the persecution of Congolese Tutsis, the rise of the M23 rebel group, and refugee flows into neighbouring countries, including Rwanda. He argues that such internal issues within the DRC contribute to regional instability.
Additionally, the Head of State has raised concerns about the security threat posed by the FDLR terrorist group, which comprises remnants of those who participated in the 1994 Genocide against the Tutsi and fled to the neighbouring DRC. Kagame insists that the group, now collaborating with the Congolese government, continue to be a source of instability despite ongoing mediation efforts.
“The FDLR question has to be answered,” he said in a past address, urging the international community and the media to be objective and not to view the crisis through biased lenses.
{{Economic and trade relations}}
One of the areas of greatest interest to African nations is the future of U.S.-Africa trade relations. Trump’s first term saw a push for renegotiated trade agreements, including the U.S.-Kenya Free Trade Agreement (FTA), which was part of a broader strategy to encourage trade over aid.
The Prosper Africa initiative, launched in 2018, sought to increase trade and investment flows between the U.S. and African nations. While these policies were seen as a move away from traditional aid and toward economic partnerships, African leaders are watching to see whether these trends will continue.
Under the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), African countries benefit from preferential trade access to the U.S. However, concerns remain about Trump’s “America First” rhetoric, which could impact trade flows.
With rising economic challenges across the continent, African leaders are keen to ensure that U.S. policies do not disrupt vital trade ties. African leaders hope that Trump’s second term will foster an environment that promotes mutually beneficial economic growth, including foreign direct investment in key sectors like infrastructure and technology.
{{Security and counterterrorism}}
Security remains a primary concern for many African nations, especially in regions plagued by terrorism and insurgency. Trump’s first term was marked by a sustained U.S. military presence in Africa, particularly in the Horn and Sahel regions, where the U.S. played a significant role in counterterrorism efforts.
The Trump administration supported African military forces, especially in countries like Somalia, where the Al-Shabaab militant group has been a persistent threat. U.S. military involvement included intelligence-sharing, direct strikes, and training African security forces to combat extremist groups.
Africa’s leaders will be closely monitoring whether Trump maintains or strengthens these security commitments during his second term. Leaders from the East African Community and the Sahel region, will be watching to see if the U.S. continues its counterterrorism efforts and assists African countries with the resources needed to fight groups like Al-Shabaab, Boko Haram, and ISIS affiliates.
Given the ongoing instability in places like Somalia and Mali, African nations are keen to ensure that Trump’s foreign policy continues to prioritize regional security.
{{Health and humanitarian policy}}
Trump’s “America First” stance extended to foreign aid policy, with significant cuts proposed for U.S. development assistance during his first term. His administration’s approach to health aid, particularly the continuation of the President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR), was scrutinized, with critics worried that the U.S. might pull back support for vital health programs across Africa. The global gag rule, which restricts U.S. foreign aid funding for organizations that provide or advocate for abortion services, remains a point of concern for many African nations.
As Trump begins his second term, African leaders, especially those from countries with pressing health challenges, are apprehensive about the continuation or expansion of the global gag rule and whether Trump will reduce U.S. aid further. The implications of such policies on maternal health, HIV/AIDS treatment, and overall healthcare could have serious consequences for African nations already facing health crises.
{{Climate change and international cooperation}}
Trump’s scepticism toward climate change and his decision to withdraw from the Paris Agreement during his first term raised alarms, particularly in Africa, where the effects of climate change—such as droughts, floods, and food insecurity—are increasingly pronounced.
African leaders are concerned that a continuation of Trump’s climate policies could further undermine global efforts to address climate challenges. As many African nations are heavily reliant on international partnerships for climate funding and adaptation, Trump’s approach to environmental issues will be closely scrutinized.
In addition to climate concerns, African leaders are paying attention to how Trump will handle international cooperation on global challenges. The growing influence of China in Africa, particularly in terms of infrastructure development and investment, adds another layer of complexity.
Many African countries are navigating a delicate balancing act between U.S. foreign policy, Chinese investments, and their own aspirations for economic development. Trump’s stance on global alliances and international agreements will likely have a significant impact on the way African countries engage with both the U.S. and China.
As President Kagame mentioned in his recent press conference, Africa finds itself at a moment of global flux, with changes occurring at a rapid pace.
While African leaders, including Kagame, remain hopeful that Trump’s second term will bring about meaningful engagement on key issues, they are also pragmatic. The real test will be in the tangible actions the Trump administration takes in relation to Africa.
Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro was sworn in for a third six-year term on Friday, following a contentious election marked by claims of voter fraud.
His opponent, Edmundo González, had declared victory in the July election, alleging widespread irregularities.
Maduro’s inauguration defied mounting international pressure and sanctions, particularly from the United States, which has recognized González as the winner of the presidential race.
“May this new presidential term be a period of peace, of prosperity, of equality and the new democracy,” Maduro declared, pledging to uphold the laws of Venezuela.
The swearing-in ceremony came a day after a rare public appearance by opposition leader María Corina Machado, who led a protest against Maduro’s rule.
According to Machado’s team, she was briefly detained during the demonstration, adding to the ongoing tensions.
Maduro, a former bus driver, rose to power following the death of left-wing leader Hugo Chávez in 2013.
His leadership has been plagued by accusations of authoritarianism, along with severe economic and political crises that have deeply affected the country.
The July 28 presidential election sparked widespread protests, with many Venezuelans contesting the results.
However, a heavy-handed government response quickly quelled the demonstrations. During the unrest, an estimated 2,000 people were arrested, and at least 25 lost their lives.
The conflict, which erupted in April 2023, involves the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF), both of which are battling for control amid a power struggle. The war has triggered one of the world’s worst humanitarian crises, with millions displaced and widespread hunger.
At a United Nations meeting, U.S. Ambassador Linda Thomas-Greenfield directly accused Russia of playing both sides in the conflict to advance its geopolitical goals.
“Russia chose obstruction: standing alone as it voted to imperil civilians while funding both sides of the conflict – yes, that’s what I said: both sides,” she told the UN Security Council.
The comments marked a significant escalation from the U.S.’s earlier position, which suggested that Moscow was manipulating the situation to further its own interests.
Thomas-Greenfield’s comments followed Russia’s veto in November of a UN Security Council resolution that called for an immediate ceasefire in Sudan and the delivery of humanitarian aid.
The other 14 members of the council voted in favour of the resolution, highlighting Russia’s isolation on the issue.
When asked for more details, a U.S. spokesperson elaborated, claiming that Russia’s involvement in Sudan’s gold trade played a key role in funding the warring factions.
“We believe Sudanese authorities’ gold mining cooperation with sanctioned Russian entities and individuals could prove inimical to Sudan’s long-term interests and the aspirations of the Sudanese people for an end to the war,” the spokesperson said.
Washington condemned any form of material support to the fighters, whether through illicit trade or military assistance.
In response, Russia’s Deputy Ambassador Dmitry Polyanskiy rejected the U.S. claims, accusing America of hypocrisy.
“It’s obvious that in the Pax Americana which our American colleagues try to preserve at any price, relations with other countries are built only on their exploitation and criminal schemes aimed at U.S. enrichment,” Polyanskiy said.
Russia’s UN Ambassador, Vassily Nebenzia, had earlier dismissed similar accusations in December, labelling them “fabrications” and accusing Western nations of distorting the truth for political gain.
As the meeting concluded, Thomas-Greenfield, who is nearing the end of her tenure, expressed her emotional disappointment over the lack of meaningful action in Sudan.
“For all the disappointment that I couldn’t do more, that we – all of us – didn’t do more – I still remain hopeful,” she said, adding that she was hopeful future UN representatives would continue their efforts to resolve the crisis.
The Uganda Law Society confirmed the new development on Monday, January 6, 2025, following a previously unsuccessful attempt by Karua to secure the crucial document in December last year.
The decision by the council came after an appeal lodged through the Uganda Law Society.
“FINALLY: The Law Council has granted a temporary Practicing Certificate to Hon. Martha Karua, following her reapplication through the Uganda Law Society,” the society said in a post on X.
The Uganda Law Council had initially declined Karua’s application to represent Besigye and his close associate Obeid Lutale at the General Court Martial, citing incomplete documentation and questioning the necessity of Karua’s involvement in the trial.
Both the Uganda Law Society and the Law Society of Kenya strongly protested the Uganda Law Council’s decision to deny Karua the document.
In a statement issued on December 10, 2024, Kenya’s premier bar association described the decision as a setback for regional cooperation in legal practice.
“It is inconceivable that the Law Council of Uganda would hold such little regard for Kenyan practitioners, especially a reputable and long-standing member of the Senior Counsel Bar,” LSK stated.
In its response, LSK expressed its intention to take immediate action to resolve the situation. The society called for urgent engagement with the Kenyan Attorney General to address the issue and ensure a fair, reciprocal agreement on cross-border legal practice.
LSK also threatened to suspend the admission of Ugandan lawyers to Kenya until Uganda demonstrates a commitment to fostering mutual legal cooperation.
“Kenya has been a leader in promoting regional cooperation in legal practice, but the lack of reciprocity from Uganda is unacceptable,” the LSK statement read.
“We must either find a mutually beneficial, reciprocal arrangement or withdraw from one-sided agreements that undermine the dignity of Kenyan legal practice.”
Karua, a former Justice Minister in Kenya and one of the senior lawyers in the country, had been appointed to lead a team of 50 lawyers in the case where Besigye and Lutale, face charges related to alleged activities undermining Uganda’s security and the illegal possession of firearms.
The two were apprehended in Nairobi, Kenya, on November 16, 2024, while attending the launch of a book by Karua. They spent Christmas and New Year festivities in custody and are expected to be arraigned in court tomorrow, January 7, 2025, for the mention of their case.
Tshisekedi, who had been informed about 10 hours earlier that Kagame would not be attending the Luanda meeting, decided to go to Angola on the scheduled day, even though he was aware the talks had been postponed. His intent was to create the impression that Rwanda’s president was unwilling to resolve the insecurity issues in eastern DRC and the region.
The leader of M23, Bertrand Bisimwa, told researcher Bojana Coulibaly that the DRC government aimed to defeat M23 fighters before the December 15 meeting. This, they believed, would pressure Rwanda into signing agreements favourable to Kinshasa.
Tshisekedi accuses Rwanda of supporting the M23 armed group, which Kigali denies, arguing instead that M23 is fighting for legitimate reasons and that the DRC needs to address its issues to prevent the group from remaining a persistent source of tension between the two nations. Every time M23 resurfaces, the DRC blames Rwanda.
Bisimwa stated, “The DRC government sought a victory before December 15. They put pressure on us, aiming for a success that would position them well to force Rwanda into signing Kinshasa’s terms or delaying the Luanda meeting. That was their goal.”
The DRC government allegedly devised a plan and deployed over 22,000 soldiers, supported by the FDLR (a rebel group) and Wazalendo militia, to launch attacks on M23. Bisimwa explained that M23 became aware of this and prepared adequately to defend itself.
Bisimwa noted that M23’s defensive operations stem from events starting in November 2021, when a coalition of government forces and militias attacked its positions in Lubero territory. M23 pushed them back and captured additional areas.
{{Rubaya was seized to prevent a looming threat
}}
In early May 2024, M23 announced it had seized Rubaya, an area rich in Coltan minerals, located in Masisi territory in North Kivu province.
Bisimwa explained that before taking Rubaya, M23 had learned that Burundian forces were training the Imbonerakure militia and other armed groups in the area, preparing them to attack civilians in regions under M23 control.
Initially, M23 had no plans to seize Rubaya, fearing it might be misconstrued as a bid for mineral wealth rather than protecting eastern DRC residents.
“We reported that Burundian forces were training Imbonerakure in Rubaya, teaching Congolese youth to use traditional weapons, intending to send them to areas we control to kill and cause suffering,” Bisimwa said. “When no action was taken to address the issue, we decided to intervene because the situation threatened to cause more harm than good.”
Upon taking Rubaya, M23 expelled all armed individuals operating in the mines, including children and pregnant women exploited in mining activities.
Bisimwa stated that no M23 fighters were allowed in the mines, which are now operated by the same mining companies active before May 2024.
{{The FDLR’s exploitation of Virunga park
}}
Virunga National Park, a UNESCO World Heritage Site, is currently under M23’s control in partnership with ICCN, a DRC government agency overseeing the park.
Bisimwa explained that M23 intervened because the FDLR rebel group was destroying the park by cutting down trees to produce charcoal, generating $100 million annually.
“Before our arrival, the FDLR controlled the park and engaged in charcoal production. A UN report confirmed they made $100 million annually from this illegal activity,” he said.
DRC soldiers and other armed groups also exploited the park, hunting its wildlife and felling trees. “Had they remained, the park would have been left barren,” Bisimwa noted.
Bisimwa told Coulibaly that local residents had begun encroaching on parkland, disrupting its ecosystems. In addition to securing the park, M23 educated residents on its conservation benefits.
“Now, we see wildlife returning, including hippos, antelope families, and gorillas. It’s a positive transformation,” Bisimwa said.
He added that, besides being a UNESCO heritage site, Virunga is a gift from God to the Congolese people, deserving of protection and preservation.
The United States was among the nations that voted to reduce the UN peacekeeping force in Rwanda during the genocide, significantly hampering the peacekeepers’ ability to effectively intervene and protect civilians.
The Genocide against the Tutsi began in April 1994, 13 years and two months after Jimmy Carter—who passed away on Sunday, December 29, 2024—had left office as President of the United States.
Despite the international community’s inaction during those dark days, Carter demonstrated through his organization, the Carter Center, that there was still a role to play in preventing similar atrocities.
Carter was among the influential Americans who led efforts to engage leaders from the Great Lakes region to address the plight of Rwandan refugees who fled during the genocide, as well as génocidaires operating near Rwanda’s borders and launching sporadic attacks.
In an article titled “Hope is Not Lost” published on the Carter Center’s website on September 19, 1995, Carter emphasized that, after abandoning the Tutsi, the international community needed to prioritize Rwanda’s challenges as much as those in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
He wrote that the world looked the other way the previous year when Rwandans died in the worst case of genocide since World War II.
Carter further stated that another 100,000 people had been killed in Burundi the year before.
“Instead of increasing its efforts to resolve this crisis, the international peace-keeping force is being withdrawn,” he noted.
“Two million exiles, mostly Hutus, now live in crowded camps in Zaire and Tanzania. They are restive and afraid—and a few are armed and aggressive. Militant Hutu refugees conduct night raids into Rwanda and return to their camps in Zaire before daybreak.”
Post-genocide security concerns in Rwanda, as well as ongoing violence in Burundi, prompted Carter to hold talks with leaders from the countries and mediators to seek solutions.
On October 8, 2024, Vince Farley, Carter’s Africa advisor, recounted Carter’s diplomatic efforts in the Great Lakes region. In November 1995, Carter visited Goma, a city hosting many Rwandan refugees.
Farley explained that the purpose of Carter’s visit was to meet with representatives of Rwandan refugees, including those based in the city and others from Europe.
During a meeting in a refugee camp, Carter addressed the Rwandans, explaining the Carter Center’s role in resolving conflicts in the Great Lakes region and recounting his visit to Rwanda, where he toured genocide memorial sites.
Farley recalled that, after outlining these efforts, Carter turned to the refugees and stated that some individuals in the room were architects of the Genocide against the Tutsi, warning them that justice would catch up with them.
Carter said to the génocidaires: “I know many of the leaders of this genocide are in this room, and I want to assure you that you will be brought to justice.”
His words, though seemingly delayed, eventually came to fruition as many génocidaires were apprehended through the efforts of international bodies, including Interpol, and brought to justice. However, more than 1,000 génocidaires remain in hiding worldwide to this day.
The 39th President of the United States, who served from 1977 to 1981, passed away at his home in Plains, Georgia, at the age of 100.
Carter, born in 1924, had a diverse career as a naval officer, farmer, and governor of Georgia before serving as president from 1977 to 1981.
While the exact cause of his death has not been publicly disclosed, it is understood that his passing was due to natural causes associated with his advanced age and ongoing health issues.
He had in February 2023 opted to receive hospice care at his home following a series of health challenges, including a 2015 diagnosis of melanoma that had metastasized to his brain and liver.
During his election campaign two years ago, Ruto criticized the previous administration of President Uhuru Kenyatta for alleged abductions and extrajudicial killings, vowing to end such practices. However, recent events have raised concerns about the fulfilment of the pledge.
Since the Gen-Z-led protests in June, which forced the government to shelve plans to introduce additional taxes, dozens of young people have been reported missing, with human rights groups accusing the police of being behind their disappearances. The police continue to deny these claims.
In the latest wave of abductions, some of which have been captured on camera by witnesses and surveillance footage, at least three young people were recently abducted after sharing AI-generated images of Ruto in a casket that some considered offensive.
Among those abducted is popular cartoonist Kibet Bull, whose real name is Gideon Kibet. His images of the president went viral.
Kibet disappeared after meeting opposition senator Okiya Omtatah on Christmas Eve.
Kibet’s younger brother, Ronny Kiplangat, who has also been missing for several days, is believed by their family to have been used as bait by security forces to lure Kibet.
“(Kibet) boarded a matatu after my driver dropped him off in the city centre. As they have done with others, they must have blocked the matatu and snatched him from it,” said Omtatah, who harbours presidential ambitions for the 2027 elections.
“If you look at the attitude of the police, they know what is happening. The state is simply allowing it or acquiescing to it.”
Like many young Kenyans, Kibet was once an ardent supporter of President Ruto but has, in recent years, become a critic of the government, accusing it of corruption, failing to address unemployment, and not fulfilling its promises to turn around the economy.
Both the National Police Service and the Directorate of Criminal Investigations (DCI) have denied abducting or arresting the trio. However, former Deputy President Rigathi Gachagua, who was impeached in October for allegedly sabotaging President Ruto’s administration, insists the government is behind the abductions.
Addressing the press in Nairobi on Friday, Gachagua claimed that the abductions were being carried out by a secret unit, not under the command of the Inspector General of Police.
According to Gachagua, the unit, with officers drawn from various departments, operates from a building in Nairobi’s Central Business District.
“There’s a building in Nairobi, the 21st floor in the city centre, where the unit operates from, led by a certain Mr. Abel. Abel is a cousin to a very senior official in this government,” Gachagua revealed.
The former Deputy President threatened to expose more details about the secret unit if the abducted individuals are not released.
He added that Kenyan citizens are angry with Ruto’s administration, saying, “Killing our children will not quell the anger of the Kenyan people.”
“Abducting young people is not a solution; you must address the cause of discontent. Why are people aggrieved with this administration?”
A few hours later, President Ruto, accompanied by opposition leader Raila Odinga—whose allies have joined Ruto’s Cabinet in a broad-based government formed after the Gen-Z protests—promised to end the abductions.
Odinga had criticized the state-linked abductions of critics, saying the country cannot tolerate a “gangster state.”
Widely recognized as Kenya’s second liberation hero, Odinga was a victim of the brutal regime of the late President Daniel Arap Moi during the fight for multiparty democracy in the 90s. He warned that allowing the abductions to continue could risk taking the country back to the dark days of “Nyayo Torture Chambers”.
Ruto acknowledged the concerns but also warned the youth to be “disciplined.”
“What has been said about abductions, we will stop them so Kenyan youth can live in peace, but they should have discipline and be polite so that we can build Kenya together,” Ruto said at a stadium in Homa Bay, in the west of the country.
In addition to the abductions of young Kenyans, the abduction of Uganda’s opposition chief Kizza Besigye in Nairobi by Ugandan security agents recently also drew widespread condemnation.
Besigye and his close associate Hajj Obeid Lutale were picked up in Nairobi while attending the launch of a book written by former justice minister Martha Karua and whisked back home, where they were locked up in a military facility before being produced in a martial court.
The duo faces charges of undermining national security and illegal possession of firearms.
Various rights groups and lawyers have criticized Kenya’s complicity in the abductions, saying it tarnishes Kenya’s image as a democratic safe haven. They accuse its authorities of failing to prevent or investigate the incident, thereby jeopardizing regional stability and the rule of law.
This comes against the backdrop of the postponement of a meeting between President Paul Kagame and his DRC counterpart Félix Tshisekedi, which was expected to culminate in the signing of an agreement to help end the conflict in the troubled region of eastern DRC.
Rwanda’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs expressed frustration over the failure to reach a consensus, particularly regarding the involvement of the M23 rebel group in peace discussions, which led to the talks stalling on December 15, 2024.
The two sides had previously agreed on measures, such as dismantling the FDLR militia and addressing Rwanda’s security concerns. However, progress faltered midway through the discussions.
In an interview with IGIHE, various analysts stressed that meaningful dialogue is essential for lasting peace despite the DRC’s reluctance to engage with M23.
Ambassador Joseph Mutaboba pointed out that in negotiations aimed at resolving conflicts, all opposing sides must sit down and have frank discussions.
“Talking with M23 is a necessity in negotiations, in inter-country relations, and in governance. When there’s an issue in a household, the husband and wife must sit down to discuss it. Similarly, when it’s a family matter, such as between a father and child, they must have a conversation. At the community level, mediators may step in. Problems often need to be solved from the ground up,” he stated.
“If Congolese leaders fail to recognize M23 as their own citizens with grievances and a history that needs to be addressed, and if they refuse to sit down and resolve these issues, other, potentially less favourable, solutions may emerge,” he added.
Mutaboba emphasized that no external party could provide a solution if the DRC itself does not engage with M23 to find a lasting resolution.
“Rwanda, the region, and the world cannot impose solutions unless they begin at home. Sustainable answers must address the root of the problem, not just its symptoms,” Ambassador Mutoba reiterated.
He also suggested that certain individuals might benefit from the ongoing instability, explaining why Tshisekedi’s government continues to shift its stance on the issue. If dialogue fails, he warned, some may resort to military means to resolve the conflict.
“When words fail to bring peace, the sound of guns might take over, as some are accustomed to such approaches,” he noted.
Me Gasominari Jean Baptiste argued that the DRC’s refusal to engage with M23—a group of Congolese Tutsi fighting for their rights and against ongoing persecution—demonstrates its lack of will to address the security crisis.
“The DRC’s unwillingness to engage in dialogue with M23 shows a lack of commitment to resolving the security problem. They consider negotiations with M23 a red line they cannot cross. Yet, M23 currently controls nearly three-quarters of North Kivu province due to military strength. If the government can neither defeat them militarily nor engage in dialogue, what is their end goal?” he posed.
He suggested that the DRC might have hidden political or economic motives for maintaining instability in its eastern region.
“The DRC may not want to resolve the crisis in the east because it could serve other hidden interests. The government might also use the conflict as an excuse for failing to deliver on its promises to citizens,” Gasominari explained.
Instead of focusing on resolving the eastern security crisis, DRC leaders have been more focused on tarnishing Rwanda’s image on the international stage, he added.
The M23 movement was formed in 2012 by former CNDP members who accused the DRC government of failing to honour a 2009 peace agreement. Fighting erupted in 2012, halted in 2013, but resumed in November 2021.
In April 2022, M23 participated in peace talks in Nairobi with the DRC government and representatives of armed groups. However, they were later expelled from the negotiations and accused of reigniting the conflict.
The mercenaries, part of the Agemira group from Bulgaria and RALF from Romania, have been collaborating with DRC forces since 2022 to fight the M23 armed group in the volatile North Kivu province.
The DRC government insists that the fighters are not mercenaries but rather instructors training its army in various skills, including warfare and the use of modern weapons. Additionally, they are among those safeguarding the cities of Goma and Sake.
In a post on X on Monday, December 16, 2024, General Muhoozi threatened decisive action against the “white mercenaries”.
“I’m going to give only one warning to all white mercenaries operating in eastern DRC. From 2nd January 2025, we will attack all mercenaries in our area of operations.”
The Ugandan army general added, “In the name of Jesus Christ, the God of all Bachwezi, there shall not be left one white mercenary in DRC this time next year!”
Since November 2021, Ugandan forces have been conducting operations named “Shujaa” to combat the ADF terrorist group in North Kivu and Ituri provinces, in collaboration with DRC forces.
It is unclear whether the mercenaries operating in eastern DRC have reached areas controlled by Ugandan forces. However, reports by UN experts confirm that the mercenaries operate primarily in Goma and Sake.
