Delegations from both countries had worked tirelessly, day and night. Everything was in order; all that remained was to put pen to paper. But on October 3, 2025, when the day finally arrived, everything changed.
In an unexpected turn of events, President Félix Antoine Tshisekedi instructed his delegation not to sign the agreement with a precondition of “withdrawal of 90% of Rwandan troops.”
Rwanda has repeatedly denied the Kinshasa administration’s claims of troops in the DRC, insisting that its defensive posture along the border is necessary due to the security threat posed by the DRC-backed FDLR militia, formed by the perpetrators of the 1994 Genocide against the Tutsi.
Meanwhile, Rwanda was stunned by President Tshisekedi’s U-turn. Throughout all the previous discussions, not once had the issue of troops been raised. What was meant to be a historic step towards peace and cooperation suddenly became a story for another day.
Rwanda’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, Ambassador Olivier Nduhungirehe, said, “They [the delegations] were ready to initial the document the following morning, but President Tshisekedi instructed, at the last minute, his delegation NOT to sign, fearing the negative reaction of his internal public opinion.
Ambassador Nduhungirehe added that the agreement was purely economic and did not touch on security matters.
“Indeed, negotiations on the REIF are purely economic and don’t consider security matters, which are handled by the Joint Security Coordination Mechanism (JSCM),” the minister added.
He explained that the DRC’s last-minute decision caused confusion after months of intense mediation efforts led by Massad Boulos and the U.S. Department of State, who had worked tirelessly to ensure both sides reached an understanding.
Minister Nduhungirehe recalled that in September 2024, it was again Tshisekedi who prevented his Foreign Minister from signing an agreement on dismantling the FDLR militia group and lifting Rwanda’s defensive measures, even though the military representatives of both countries had already agreed on those terms.
{{President Kagame had foreseen it}}
Those closely following Rwanda–DRC relations were quick to recall President Paul Kagame’s remarks during his interview with Mario Nawfal in March 2025 after witnessing Tshisekedi’s latest behaviour.
President Kagame revealed that he had held several discussions with President Tshisekedi since the latter assumed office, but found it difficult to reach a lasting understanding with him, as Tshisekedi often went back on their agreements.
“I have no problem speaking with President Tshisekedi, but making deals is the most difficult thing. You agree on something, but once he steps out of the room, it’s completely different—either forgotten, changed, or he’ll say we never said that,” President Kagame stated.
When asked what he would tell President Tshisekedi if they were sitting together at that very moment, President Kagame responded: “I would tell him I wish he wasn’t president of that good country,” he responded when asked what he would tell the DRC Head of State if they met.
“Next time I meet him, I will tell him that,” he added.
Tshisekedi’s sudden reversal on the agreement has now left many questioning whether he genuinely intends to honour the commitments made under the Washington peace accord between Rwanda and the DRC.
At a time when the world had placed its hopes on this deal as the dawn of a new era of cooperation, President Tshisekedi’s decision has once again cast a shadow of uncertainty over relations between the two nations.
Speaking at a high-level meeting on R2P held on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly in New York on September 23, Rwanda’s Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation, Olivier Nduhungirehe, stressed that unchecked hate speech in eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) is laying dangerous ground for mass violence.
“These exchanges are not merely academic, they are part of our collective responsibility to prevent genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity,” he said.
Nduhungirehe’s intervention comes amid escalating threats against Tutsi communities in eastern DRC, where armed groups, including the FDLR—formed by remnants of the perpetrators of the 1994 Genocide against the Tutsi—continue to operate with backing from Kinshasa. He said the current patterns of ethnic incitement bear troubling similarities to the build-up to the genocide in Rwanda.
“Rwanda knows more than most the cost of inaction,” he warned. “Yet in the Great Lakes region today, we see once again the rise of hate speech, identity-based violence and a fast-spreading genocide ideology—warning signs we cannot afford to ignore.”
The Rwandan minister underscored that while the R2P framework, adopted in 2005, tasked states with protecting their citizens and empowered the international community to intervene when they failed, implementation has fallen short.
He criticised the selective application of the doctrine, saying that ignoring structural injustices and “buying into fabricated narratives that invert the roles of victims and perpetrators” undermines the UN’s moral authority.
“Sovereignty must be understood as a responsibility, not a shield for inaction,” he said. “When states fail to protect their own populations, the legitimacy of international action should not be in question. Lives lost because of our hesitation in the name of sovereignty are lives betrayed by the very UN Charter we swore to uphold.”
Nduhungirehe urged the UN to shift from statements to concrete preventive measures, calling for early warning systems to translate into early action and for clear accountability mechanisms against incitement.
“Hate speech is not free speech when it lays the foundation for genocide,” he said, stressing that actors who fuel violence should face institutional consequences and lose international support.
While acknowledging progress such as the creation of the UN Office on Genocide Prevention and early warning tools, he insisted that gaps remain, particularly in the consistency and timeliness of responses.
“R2P will be judged not by the eloquence of our debate, but by whether it prevents the next mass atrocity. Rwanda, therefore, proposes concrete actions,” he said, adding that the doctrine must be rooted in the historical realities of the Great Lakes region, where land disputes, exclusion and historical injustice continue to drive conflict.
At the beginning of 2025, the Belgian government spearheaded a campaign urging European Union member states and other wealthy nations to impose sanctions on Rwanda, accusing Kigali of supporting M23.
Prévot, who also serves as Deputy Prime Minister, argued at the time that sanctions would pressure Rwanda to “withdraw its troops” from eastern Congo. In his view, such punitive measures, which also extended to some leaders of the AFC/M23, could end the decades-long conflict in the DRC once and for all.
This stance led Rwanda in March 2025 to sever ties with Belgium, accusing the former colonial power of pitiful attempts to sustain its neocolonial delusions.
However, in a recent interview with Jeune Afrique, Minister Prévot acknowledged that dialogue is the only path to resolving the conflict. This position echoes Rwanda’s consistent call for the Congolese government to engage in direct talks with M23 instead of shifting the blame.
Asked why his government no longer views sanctions as a viable solution, Prévot explained that although they may exert pressure on targeted individuals or entities, sanctions are not a “miracle cure” for ending conflicts like the one in eastern Congo.
“What seems important to us is to be able to respond to the humanitarian emergency, knowing that the diplomatic resolution of the conflict is now in the hands of Qatar and the
United States,” he stated.
The Belgian minister added that his country would not interfere with the peace initiative led by the United States and Qatar. He warned, however, that if fighting resumes in the DRC and more cities fall, Belgium could renew its call for punitive measures.
“These are processes that we must support, not interfere with. Only if they were to fail or if military logic took over again, with, for example, new captures of cities, could the question of sanctions arise again,” he added.
The 17-page draft outlines measures for regulatory reforms, third-party oversight of mining operations, the creation of cross-border special economic zones, and safeguards to ensure that each country retains full sovereign control over its natural resources.
Sources familiar with the matter told Reuters that the draft builds on principles agreed in August, covering cooperation in energy development, infrastructure, mineral exploitation, national parks, tourism, and public health. It also outlines implementation measures, coordination mechanisms, and annual high-level summits to monitor progress, alongside technical working groups and steering committees.
Under the draft, Rwanda and the DRC would work with the United States and other international partners to develop regulations and reforms aimed at reducing risks for private investors, curbing illicit trade, and increasing transparency. The agreement calls for third-party inspections of mining sites and collaboration with the private sector to create cross-border special economic zones.
In a framework agreed upon last month, both countries reaffirmed their “full, sovereign control” over the exploitation, processing, and export of natural resources while committing to ensure that mineral revenues do not fund armed groups. The draft also seeks to establish a world-class industrial mining sector and improve interoperability of mineral supply chains across borders.
Although the draft is a cornerstone of the June peace deal brokered in Washington under U.S. President Donald Trump, its implementation faces major security hurdles. The peace accord stipulated the neutralisation of the FDLR militia group linked to the 1994 Genocide against the Tutsi, followed by the lifting of Rwanda’s defensive measures.
The plan to dismantle the FDLR and remove Rwandan security measures was initially given a 90-day timeframe. However, there is currently no certainty that it will begin soon, as the DRC government continues to delay.
Rwanda’s Ambassador to the United Nations, Martin Ngoga, recently told the Security Council that the DRC government did not agree to launch the operational plan to dismantle the FDLR during a joint security-level meeting held in Ethiopia early August.
Frequent setbacks in the Doha process, which mediates between Kinshasa and the M23 rebels, further complicate the situation.
Meanwhile, the draft is currently under review by Rwanda, the DRC, and other stakeholders. Representatives of both countries are expected to meet in early October 2025 to finalise the agreement. Unless changes occur, the economic cooperation pact will be signed by the end of that month, marking the final component of the Washington-brokered peace deal.
U.S. officials have indicated that the agreement is critical for linking peace and economic development in the region and for attracting billions of dollars in Western investment in cobalt, tantalum, copper, lithium, and gold.
Dr Migiro succeeds Dr Emmanuel Nchimbi, who has been nominated to run alongside President Samia Suluhu Hassan as her vice-presidential candidate in the upcoming October general election.
The announcement of Migiro’s appointment was made by CCM’s Secretary for Ideology, Publicity and Training, Amos Makalla, after a round of nomination meetings chaired by President Samia in her capacity as party chair.
At 69, Dr Migiro brings to the role decades of political, diplomatic and academic experience. She is best known globally for serving as the United Nations Deputy Secretary-General from 2007 to 2012 under Ban Ki-moon, the first Tanzanian and only the third person ever to hold the post.
Her political career at home has been equally trailblazing. She became Tanzania’s first female Minister of Foreign Affairs in 2006, after five years leading the Ministry of Community Development, Gender and Children. In those roles, she was at the forefront of regional diplomacy, chairing the Great Lakes Region peace process and guiding Southern African Development Community (SADC) efforts to support elections in countries emerging from conflict.
{{From academia to politics
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Dr Migiro began her career in academia, teaching law at the University of Dar es Salaam and later heading key departments in the Faculty of Law. She also served on Tanzania’s Law Reform Commission and the UN Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women before fully venturing into politics.
Her path within CCM has been steady, starting at grassroots ward leadership level in the 1990s before rising through the regional structures. Although she unsuccessfully sought the party’s presidential nomination in 2015, she later represented Tanzania abroad as High Commissioner to the United Kingdom.
{{A historic first for CCM
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Founded in 1977, CCM has been the dominant political force in Tanzania since independence, but leadership at its highest ranks has long been male-dominated. Dr Migiro’s elevation to Secretary-General marks a milestone for the party and is seen as further cementing President Samia Suluhu Hassan’s push to open more leadership spaces for women.
Born in Songea in 1956, Dr Migiro studied law at the University of Dar es Salaam before earning a doctorate in Germany. She is married to Professor Cleophas Migiro and is a mother of two. In addition to Kiswahili and English, she speaks basic French and German.
What began as a cautiously hopeful initiative to end years of conflict has instead become a chronicle of setbacks, highlighting the complex dynamics that continue to frustrate efforts for peace in eastern Congo.
The Doha talks were deemed urgent following renewed hostilities between the rebels and government forces earlier this year, which dramatically reshaped the region’s fragile security landscape.
The M23 rebel group, which accuses the Kinshasa administration of marginalisation and persecution of Kinyarwanda-speaking communities in the east, launched a rapid offensive, seizing several key cities in North and South Kivu, including strategic hubs such as Goma and Bukavu.
The resurgence had a significant impact, even prompting the withdrawal of Southern African Development Community (SADC) troops, who had been deployed in December 2023 to help neutralise the group.
Rising fatalities in clashes between M23 and Kinshasa-allied forces —Burundi, and local militias such as the FDLR and Wazalendo—heightened calls for a ceasefire in a region long plagued by conflict. Previous interventions, whether led by the United Nations or through the Nairobi and Luanda peace processes, had repeatedly faltered, failing to bring an end to the war.
Amid this turmoil, diplomatic efforts intensified. In April 2025, a high-level meeting between DRC President Félix Tshisekedi and Rwandan President Paul Kagame in Qatar provided the catalyst for renewed dialogue.
While the details of their discussions remained largely confidential, a key outcome was the commitment of both leaders to prevent further escalation and to pursue a negotiated political settlement with M23.
Following the summit, Qatar offered to mediate talks between Kinshasa and M23 in Doha, bringing together international observers to support a roadmap toward lasting peace.
The stakes were high. M23’s territorial gains, the humanitarian crisis from mass displacement, and the fragile credibility of regional peacekeeping efforts made the need for effective dialogue more urgent than ever.
From the outset, however, the talks were challenged by a complex web of mistrust, preconditions, and differing interpretations of agreements, a combination that would soon set the stage for repeated setbacks.
From this tense backdrop, the Doha negotiations officially began, carrying the weight of both hope and scepticism.
{{June 5, 2025: M23’s initial withdrawal
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The first major disruption came early in the Doha talks. On June 5, 2025, M23 officially withdrew its delegation before any agreements were signed. The rebels cited a “lack of progress” and accused the DRC government of insufficient political will, pointing to ongoing ceasefire violations by the Congolese army (FARDC) and the failure to address their demand for a definitive political solution.
Analysts suggest that this withdrawal was not merely a protest but a calculated move to apply pressure on Kinshasa, signalling that M23 could halt dialogue if its core concerns were ignored.
This early rupture highlighted a longstanding challenge in the negotiations. The M23 group has consistently insisted on recognition and guarantees that go beyond a mere cessation of hostilities. For the Congolese government, which has historically been reluctant to grant political legitimacy to armed groups, this created an immediate tension that would shape subsequent talks.
{{July 19, 2025: Signing the “Declaration of Principles”
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Despite the rocky start, both sides returned to Doha and, in a surprising development, signed a preliminary “Declaration of Principles” on July 19, 2025. The agreement was hailed by Qatar, the United Nations, and other international observers as a milestone. It outlined a roadmap towards a final peace agreement and included several key provisions.
The declaration called for a permanent ceasefire, mandating an immediate and binding cessation of all military actions and provocations.
It also established a framework for the restoration of state authority, envisioning a phased return of M23-held territories to Congolese civilian control.
Confidence-building measures were also included, committing both sides to exchange prisoners and refrain from making inflammatory statements in public.
Finally, the declaration set an ambitious negotiation timeline. Talks for a final peace deal were scheduled to begin no later than August 8, 2025, with the goal of signing a comprehensive agreement by August 18, 2025.
Even as the declaration was signed, fundamental disagreements lingered. Kinshasa interpreted the document as necessitating an “unconditional withdrawal” of M23 forces, while the rebels insisted that the agreement focused on mechanisms to strengthen state authority, not on withdrawal. This divergence in interpretation would soon resurface as a key source of tension.
{{July 25, 2025: M23 sets conditions and threatens to pull out
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Barely a week after signing the declaration, M23 escalated the standoff. Benjamin Mbonimpa, representing the group, held a press conference in Goma, issuing an ultimatum that if Kinshasa did not release their 700 prisoners by July 27, M23 would see “no reason to return to Doha.”
This move underscored the fragility of the declaration and revealed that the rebels viewed key preconditions as non-negotiable. For M23, the release of prisoners was a core component of trust-building and a symbolic assertion of their leverage.
{{August 8 & August 17, 2025: Missed deadlines
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The ambitious timeline set in July unravelled quickly. By August 8, the scheduled start of the next round of negotiations had passed without a single meeting. The stalemate was caused by persistent disagreements over prisoner releases, ongoing accusations of ceasefire violations, and logistical issues, including the absence of delegations in the same city. Kinshasa insists the prisoners will only be freed after a final peace deal is signed.
The situation worsened on August 17, the day before the planned signing of a final peace deal. M23 confirmed that its representatives would not attend the ceremony in Doha, sending a clear message that, despite the high-profile declarations and international attention, the rebels were not willing to compromise on their core demands.
{{August 19, 2025: AFC/M23 agrees to send delegation to Doha
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The rebel coalition confirmed it would send delegations to Qatar to assess progress on the principles agreement they signed on July 19, 2025.
AFC/M23’s deputy coordinator, Bertrand Bisimwa, confirmed that his group’s delegation would focus on key issues, including a permanent ceasefire and the release of prisoners.
The Congolese government also announced that it would send its own representatives, stressing that their mandate is to protect national interests during the discussions.
Qatar, acting as mediator, has acknowledged the setbacks but says it remains in close contact with both parties to encourage consensus.
According to multiple security sources, the dispute has intensified in recent weeks, with Ndayishimiye reportedly weighing the possibility of removing Niyongabo from his post — a move insiders say would be politically risky given the president’s weakening grip on power.
The latest flashpoint came on August 5, when Gen. Niyongabo dispatched soldiers to Mpimba prison in Bujumbura to forcibly free two detained colonels. The officers had been arrested under presidential orders on accusations of smuggling minerals from South Kivu into Burundi, as well as using army logistics vehicles to transport fuel and textiles.
Rather than face further investigation, they were swiftly sent back to eastern DRC under the army chief’s protection, without Ndayishimiye’s approval.
Military and local sources in Uvira, South Kivu, claim that Burundian army convoys routinely ferry food, weapons, and equipment into the DRC, returning at night loaded with minerals. A senior intelligence officer intimated that the president views Niyongabo as a key player in this illicit trade.
The tension is rooted in a lucrative arrangement signed in August 2023 between Ndayishimiye and Congolese President Félix Tshisekedi. The deal deployed around 20,000 Burundian troops to fight alongside Congolese forces against the M23 rebellion, with reports indicating that Tshisekedi pays $5,000 per soldier per month directly to Ndayishimiye. Soldiers, however, receive only their standard pay — about $70 for lower ranks and $100 for officers.
While the president has allegedly kept these earnings to himself, insiders say Niyongabo now wants a share of the spoils, creating a dangerous split at the top of Burundi’s military command.
The deployment has come at a high cost. Hundreds of Burundian soldiers have reportedly been killed in North Kivu over the past year. Morale is sinking, and resistance is growing — in January, 48 soldiers from the 20th Battalion refused to redeploy, leading to their arrest on charges of mutiny.
Ndayishimiye’s political standing has also been eroded by economic hardship at home and criticism over a recent cabinet reshuffle seen as driven by loyalty rather than competence. Within the CNDD-FDD ruling party, both the president and the army chief are losing popularity, with Niyongabo increasingly cast as a businessman in uniform and Ndayishimiye accused of putting personal profit above national interest.
For now, the confrontation between the two men remains behind closed doors, but observers warn that the standoff could escalate, destabilising Burundi’s already fragile political and security landscape — and complicating its role in the volatile Great Lakes region.
Ndirakobuca was one of two senators recently elected to represent the ruling CNDD-FDD party in Bujumbura Province, and he was elected with 100% of the votes cast by the Senate.
In the same session, Générose Ngendanganya was elected as First Vice President of the Senate, and Clotilde Kampimbare was elected as Second Vice President.
Known by his nickname “Ndakugarika,” Ndirakobuca has held several key roles in the Burundian government, including Head of the National Intelligence Service (SNR) and Deputy Chief of Police.
From June 2020 to September 2022, he served as Minister of Internal Security, before being appointed Prime Minister, succeeding Alain Guillaume Bunyoni.
In May 2025, President Évariste Ndayishimiye formally retired Ndirakobuca from the Burundi National Police, where he held the rank of Lieutenant General. This opened the path for his candidacy in the Senate, representing CNDD-FDD in Bujumbura.
Ndirakobuca replaces Emmanuel Sinzohagera, who previously held a dual role as President of the Senate and head of the United Methodist Church in Burundi and Rwanda.
The internal vote, held on August 1 under the supervision of CCM Deputy Secretary General John Mongella, saw Jesca secure 391 votes, placing her second on the Mainland list, just behind outgoing legislator Ng’wasi Kamani, who garnered 409 votes.
The results mark a crucial step in Jesca’s bid to enter Parliament, a path once taken by her father nearly three decades ago.
Raised in Chato, Geita region, Jesca has embraced the values her father championed.
At the recent event, she told supporters: “I was raised on the principles of hard work, integrity, and self-reliance. My main mission is to defend, collaborate, but most importantly, to speak out loudly in the political, economic, and developmental journey.
“I have the intention and vision to ensure that the manifesto of our CCM party for the years 2020-2025, with the slogan ‘Work and Integrity, We Move Forward,’ is implemented for the broad interests of our nation, Tanzania.”
John Magufuli began his own political journey in 1995 when he was elected as a Member of Parliament for Chato district. His reputation as a firm and efficient leader grew during his long ministerial career, particularly in the Ministry of Works, where he earned the nickname “The Bulldozer” for his aggressive push on infrastructure projects.
From 1995 to 2015, he held key portfolios, including Minister of Lands, Livestock, and ultimately Works, roles that laid the foundation for his nomination as CCM’s presidential candidate in 2015.
After securing 58% of the national vote in the general election, he was sworn in as Tanzania’s fifth president in November 2015. His presidency was characterised by strong anti-corruption rhetoric, infrastructure expansion, and a focus on public sector discipline, a legacy that continues to shape Tanzanian politics.
Jesca’s rise in the CCM Youth Wing polls now positions her as one of the party’s promising young figures, seeking to contribute to national leadership from within Parliament.
While she has yet to secure the seat officially, the final list still awaits ratification by the party’s top organs. Her strong showing signals both personal ambition and a symbolic continuation of her family’s political legacy.
If successful, Jesca Magufuli will join a new generation of leaders stepping into the political spotlight, and she’ll do so by walking a path first paved by her father.
His tenure from 2015 to 2023 was defined by bold initiatives, regional diplomacy, and domestic challenges with continental implications. While he earned praise for his leadership in regional security and anti-corruption efforts, Buhari also faced criticism over economic protectionism, suppression of dissent, and a perceived reluctance to engage in wider African affairs fully.
Here are 11 key achievements and controversies that shaped Buhari’s African legacy:
{{Achievements
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{{1. Leadership in Regional Security (ECOWAS Interventions)
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Buhari’s legacy in West African diplomacy is perhaps best illustrated by his active role in preserving constitutional order within the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). His government was instrumental in resolving The Gambia’s 2016–2017 political crisis, in which long-time ruler Yahya Jammeh refused to step down after losing elections.
Nigeria, under Buhari’s leadership, mobilised diplomatic and military pressure alongside other ECOWAS states to ensure a peaceful transfer of power to Adama Barrow. Buhari’s insistence on a peaceful resolution, without plunging the region into violence, was widely hailed.
This leadership was replicated in Mali, where Buhari and Nigeria took a stand following the 2020 military coup. Though not leading ECOWAS at the time, Buhari used Nigeria’s influence to push for the restoration of civilian governance, even as the regional body tried to mediate with the coup leaders. His position reflected an understanding that instability in Mali could spill across borders and threaten regional peace.
More broadly, Buhari consistently advocated for regional cooperation in responding to political instability and security threats. While some critics felt his approach lacked aggressive follow-through, Buhari’s willingness to position Nigeria as a stabilising force reflected Nigeria’s traditional role as a regional hegemon. His tenure reaffirmed Nigeria’s commitment to peacekeeping, democracy, and ECOWAS protocols.
{{2. Counterterrorism collaboration through the MNJTF
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One of Buhari’s top priorities after assuming office was counterterrorism, especially the containment and rollback of Boko Haram and Islamic State in West Africa Province (ISWAP).
Recognising that terrorism respects no borders, Buhari revived and strengthened the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) with Cameroon, Chad, Niger, and Benin. The task force conducted joint operations that weakened Boko Haram’s territorial control in Nigeria’s northeast and bordering countries.
This regional collaboration marked a turning point. Whereas earlier efforts under previous administrations were more nationally focused, Buhari’s security strategy acknowledged that Nigeria could not succeed alone. He personally engaged regional leaders to share intelligence, coordinate border patrols, and mobilise funding and logistics for counterinsurgency.
Despite ongoing attacks, particularly in Borno State and Lake Chad regions, the MNJTF under Buhari’s tenure successfully reclaimed territory and disrupted major insurgent operations. The Buhari government’s leadership in the MNJTF model is now seen as a framework for regional responses to insurgencies elsewhere in Africa, such as the Sahel.
{{3. The P&ID legal victory
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In a landmark moment for Nigeria’s sovereignty and anti-corruption drive, Buhari’s government successfully challenged a $10 billion arbitration award in a UK court.
The P&ID legal victory culminated in October 2023 when a UK High Court ruled in favour of Nigeria, overturning the massive arbitration award against Process & Industrial Developments Ltd. (P&ID). The dispute stemmed from a failed 2010 gas processing contract, which led to the hefty claim due to alleged non-compliance.
Under President Buhari, Nigeria aggressively challenged the arbitration, presenting evidence that P&ID engaged in corrupt practices, including bribery and manipulation of the contract and arbitration process. The UK court found these allegations credible and ruled that enforcing the award would violate public policy, effectively nullifying the payout.
This legal victory significantly boosted Buhari’s anti-corruption agenda and Nigeria’s national sovereignty, preventing a potentially crippling financial loss. Beyond Nigeria, the case resonated across Africa as a precedent highlighting vulnerabilities in international arbitration, encouraging greater vigilance and reform in contract negotiations and enforcement.
{{4. Promotion of African self-sufficiency through agriculture
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Buhari’s agricultural reforms, including the Anchor Borrowers’ Programme (ABP) and the Presidential Fertiliser Initiative, sought to boost Nigeria’s food production and reduce dependence on imports.
Though domestically focused, these initiatives aligned with broader African Union goals for self-reliance and food security. His government empowered smallholder farmers with access to credit and inputs, helping revive key staples like rice and maize.
Buhari’s push for agricultural transformation sparked interest among other African nations, particularly in West Africa. Countries such as Ghana and Senegal examined Nigeria’s policy tools as templates for improving their own rural economies. Nigeria’s food import bill dropped significantly between 2016 and 2020, and Buhari regularly promoted these achievements in regional and AU fora as evidence that Africa could feed itself.
However, challenges such as poor post-harvest infrastructure, inflation, and insecurity limited long-term gains. Still, Buhari’s push for agriculture laid an ideological marker: that Africa’s prosperity depends less on aid and more on domestic productivity. That message resonated with many African leaders confronting similar food security challenges.
{{5. Combating corruption on a continental scale
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Buhari’s reputation as a corruption fighter extended beyond Nigeria’s borders. In 2018, he was named African Union Anti-Corruption Champion, a symbolic nod to his high-profile campaigns against graft. He promoted measures such as Nigeria’s Treasury Single Account (TSA) and pursued asset recovery from overseas, including the repatriation of over $300 million in “Abacha loot” from Switzerland and Jersey.
These actions resonated continentally. Buhari used regional and international platforms, including the African Union summits, to call for cooperation in asset recovery, transparency in public service, and international banking reforms to block illicit flows. His rhetoric found favour among African youth disillusioned by kleptocratic elites and governance decay.
Yet, Buhari’s anti-corruption stance was not just rhetorical. His administration worked with other African governments to tighten financial regulations and encourage whistleblower policies. Though critics at home questioned the consistency of his enforcement, his image as a corruption fighter elevated Nigeria’s soft power among reform-minded leaders and civil society actors across the continent.
6. Support for AfCFTA and pan-African economic integration
Initially hesitant, Buhari signed the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) agreement in 2019 after extensive domestic consultations. Though Nigeria was the last major economy to join, its signature was crucial: without Nigeria’s participation, AfCFTA would have lacked continental weight. Buhari’s eventual support was seen as a commitment to Africa’s collective economic future.
Before signing, Buhari expressed concern about potential job losses and trade imbalances, fears shared by many African countries. His caution sparked useful debate on how to design AfCFTA to protect weaker economies. After joining, Nigeria took part in technical discussions and policy frameworks that sought to balance trade liberalisation with economic fairness.
Buhari’s endorsement of AfCFTA added momentum to the idea of “African solutions to African problems”, not just politically but economically. By the time he left office, Nigeria was positioning itself as a future trade hub, with a growing emphasis on infrastructure, border digitisation, and export-led growth aligned with the AfCFTA vision.
{{Controversies}}
1. Persistent insecurity and expansion of non-state actors
Despite gains against Boko Haram, Nigeria remained plagued by widespread insecurity during Buhari’s presidency. Kidnappings, banditry, and violent clashes between farmers and herders spread from the northeast to the north-central and southern regions. The rise of non-state actors created a climate of fear and lawlessness, undermining national and regional stability.
Buhari’s critics argued that his administration was reactive rather than proactive in dealing with security threats. While the military launched offensives, they were often under-resourced or hampered by poor coordination. In many rural areas, local populations felt abandoned, leading to the emergence of vigilante groups and further erosion of state authority.
Regionally, Nigeria’s instability had cross-border consequences. Armed groups and displaced persons moved into Niger and Cameroon, straining diplomatic and humanitarian capacities. Observers feared that Buhari’s failure to resolve Nigeria’s internal security crisis weakened his credibility as a regional security anchor.
{{2. Human rights concerns and police brutality (EndSARS)
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The October 2020 #EndSARS protests, sparked by police brutality, especially by the notorious Special Anti-Robbery Squad (SARS), marked a turning point in Buhari’s international image. Though initially praised for allowing youth protests, the violent crackdown at the Lekki Toll Gate, where security forces allegedly opened fire on peaceful demonstrators, triggered global outrage.
Buhari’s delayed response and refusal to acknowledge the alleged shootings intensified tensions. International bodies, including the United Nations and African Union, expressed concern over human rights abuses and shrinking civic space in Nigeria. The government’s dismissal of some reports and reliance on state media narratives further deepened public mistrust.
Across Africa, the EndSARS movement resonated with youth confronting similar police abuses. Buhari’s perceived mishandling of the crisis stained his reputation as a democratic leader and empowered regional autocrats to justify harsh crackdowns on dissent by citing security concerns.
{{3. Protectionist border closure and trade fallout
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In 2019, Buhari controversially closed Nigeria’s land borders to curb smuggling and protect local producers. The move, lasting over a year, was meant to enforce customs regulations and encourage self-reliance. However, it had negative consequences for neighbouring countries like Benin, Togo, and Ghana, who relied on Nigeria’s market.
ECOWAS protocols promoting free movement and regional integration were effectively suspended by Nigeria’s unilateral action. Small traders and transporters across West Africa bore the brunt, as border communities plunged into economic distress. Critics argued that the closure contradicted Buhari’s commitment to AfCFTA and regional cooperation.
Though Buhari eventually reopened the borders in late 2020, the policy left a bitter aftertaste. It showcased how Nigeria’s domestic economic decisions could upend regional stability. Buhari’s border closure is now frequently cited in discussions on the need for continental trade rules that balance national interests with regional obligations.
{{4. Twitter ban and digital repression
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In June 2021, Buhari’s government banned Twitter after the platform deleted a tweet deemed inciting violence. The ban lasted for seven months and was condemned globally as an attack on freedom of expression and digital rights. Nigeria’s youth, entrepreneurs, and activists—many of whom relied on Twitter for work, advocacy, and mobilisation—were most affected.
The government justified the ban by accusing Twitter of undermining Nigeria’s sovereignty and threatening national unity. It demanded that the platform register locally and comply with Nigerian laws. Though eventually lifted in January 2022 after negotiations, the ban raised fears of increasing digital authoritarianism.
Other African governments took note. Zimbabwe, Uganda, and Ethiopia, among others, would later invoke “national security” to justify internet shutdowns and censorship. Buhari’s digital crackdown thus unintentionally set a precedent for state-led internet repression in Africa’s fledgling democracies.
{{5. Selective anti-corruption enforcement
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While Buhari’s anti-corruption rhetoric won praise, critics frequently pointed to selective enforcement. High-profile opposition figures were often investigated, arrested, or prosecuted, while alleged corruption within the ruling party appeared overlooked. This dual standard raised questions about the true impartiality of his campaign.
Several corruption scandals involving Buhari’s appointees, such as the mismanagement of funds in the Niger Delta Development Commission (NDDC) and the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC), drew public ire. Yet, accountability for those within the president’s political camp was inconsistent.
This perceived bias undermined Buhari’s message of reform. Regionally, while some countries admired his stance, others pointed to the flaws as justification for inaction. His legacy, therefore, remains one of aspirational anti-corruption leadership—inspiring, but not entirely credible in execution.
