The raids targeted 38 suspects tied to the Gulen movement, the Ankara Chief Public Prosecutor’s Office said in a statement, without specifying the time frame of the operations.
The Turkish government has blamed the movement for a 2016 coup attempt and has classified it as a terrorist organization since then.
The prosecutor’s office said that 20 of those detained are active public sector employees and that efforts to locate and arrest five other suspects were ongoing.
The suspects allegedly sought to nest in the General Directorate of Security (or Turkish National Police), recruiting and coding police personnel under their internal system while monitoring their loyalty to the group.
According to President Donald Trump’s senior advisor for Africa, Massad Boulos, these agreements will pave the way for billions of dollars in investments from American and Western companies into both countries.
“When we sign the peace agreement … the minerals deal with the DRC [Democratic Republic of Congo] will be signed on that day, and then a similar package, but of a different size, will be signed on that day with Rwanda,” Massad Boulos told Reuters recently during an interview in Doha, the capital of Qatar.
However, the path to signing these agreements involves preconditions. For instance, the DRC is requested to address security threats that affect Rwanda, particularly neutralizing the FDLR militia.
On Rwanda’s side, the conditions involve the request to end alleged support for the M23 rebel group, claims Rwanda has repeatedly denied.
At the same time, the DRC is expected to implement domestic reforms that ensure equitable resource distribution across its regions and promote decentralized governance.
Once these steps are completed, the U.S. will proceed with bilateral economic agreements focused on trade and investment.
Since Donald Trump returned to office, business-driven diplomacy has been at the heart of his foreign policy, with his Senior Advisor on African Affairs, Massad Boulos, leading negotiations.
While the DRC, with its vast natural wealth, will be the principal recipient of U.S. investments, Rwanda is not overlooked. The U.S. has acknowledged Rwanda’s mineral reserves, technical expertise in extraction and refining, and its efficient global export systems.
“The [agreement] with the D.R.C. is at a much bigger scale, because it’s a much bigger country and it has much more resources, but Rwanda also has a lot of resources and capacities and potential in the area of mining as well … not just the upstream, but also midstream and downstream to processing and refining and trading,” Boulos said.
According to Boulos, U.S. companies will invest in both countries. Some firms are already in talks to invest at least $1.5 billion in the DRC’s mining sector. Oversight of the U.S. contribution to these partnerships will be handled by the U.S. International Development Finance Corporation (DFC).
{{Infrastructure and energy at the center}}
A major component of the negotiations has been infrastructure. The U.S. believes the DRC’s mineral wealth cannot be fully tapped without better transport and energy systems.
This includes the Lobito Corridor, a 1,300-kilometer railway linking Angola, the DRC, and Zambia. The project is expected to expand and protect critical mineral supply chains, increase rail transport capacity, and reduce freight transit times and costs.
The United States has pledged funding for the infrastructure project, which is expected to be completed by 2029.
Another high-priority project is the Ruzizi III Hydropower Plant, a regional energy initiative expected to produce 147 megawatts (MW) of electricity.
Funded by the World Bank, European Union, and African Development Bank (AfDB), the $450 million project was launched in 2016 but delayed, with completion now expected by 2030.
Once operational, Rwanda will receive 47 MW, with the remaining energy shared between the DRC and Burundi.
{{Rwanda’s role in mineral processing}}
A particularly notable topic is the possibility of processing DRC’s minerals in Rwanda.
Rwanda already has well-established refining facilities, including Gasabo Gold Refinery, Power X Refinery (tantalum), and LuNa Smelter (tin).
Exporting raw minerals often results in lost economic value. For instance, when coltan is processed, it yields tantalum—but also produces valuable by-products such as niobium (used in steel and electronics) and phosphate (used in fertilizer).
When countries export unprocessed coltan, they lose all potential gains from these by-products, which are only extracted in refineries.
Gold refined in Rwanda reaches 99% purity, and its tailings—silver—is a valuable metal commonly used in jewelry.
Because Rwanda processes these materials locally, it avoids refinery charges and captures revenue from every by-product.
This dual benefit, saving costs and adding value,is a strategic advantage that Rwanda is set to expand.
As part of the upcoming trade agreements with the U.S., Rwanda is positioned to become a regional hub for mineral transformation.
This means minerals extracted from the DRC may increasingly be transported to Rwanda for processing, before being exported to global markets under Rwandan trade infrastructure.
The U.S. has also recognized Rwanda’s efforts to create industrial zones dedicated to mineral processing.
These zones could soon host new facilities built to handle imports from countries including the DRC.
He made the disclosure on May 4, 2025, in an interview with the Rwanda Broadcasting Agency (RBA).
Minister Nduhungirehe confirmed that diplomatic talks are ongoing and noted that whenever he meets his Burundian counterpart, both sides express a shared willingness to address their differences and strengthen bilateral relations.
“The problem we face is that, sometimes, the President of Burundi gives interviews to international media accusing Rwanda, and this jeopardizes the progress we are trying to make. It’s not just Rwandans—Burundians too want to see good relations between our two countries,” he stated.
He specifically referred to recent interviews where President Ndayishimiye accused Rwanda of attempting to invade Burundi—an allegation that Rwanda has repeatedly denied as baseless.
“These kinds of statements delay our efforts,” Nduhungirehe said, “but they will not discourage us from continuing to pursue peace and a renewed relationship with Burundi.”
To move forward, Minister Nduhungirehe emphasized that Rwanda is ready to continue security cooperation with Burundi but stressed the need for reduced inflammatory statements.
“These accusations are not based on facts. When someone says that Rwanda is planning to invade Burundi, it’s simply not true—and even Burundians know that. We hope these kinds of comments decrease, especially from the Burundian side, so that we can continue working together and restore relations in the right time.”
On March 10, 2025, intelligence delegations from both nations met in Burundi’s Kirundo Province to address security issues, including the reopening of borders closed by Burundi in January 2024.
The closure followed Ndayishimiye’s 2023 year-end speech, where he had suggested Rwanda supported the RED Tabara rebel group—a claim Rwanda rejects, noting the group’s activities occur far from its border.
Despite the border closure, Ndayishimiye has continued to accuse Rwanda of destabilizing Burundi, allegations Rwanda refutes.
The first group, consisting of 57 soldiers and 13 military vehicles, departed eastern DRC on April 29, 2025, to prepare for the remaining forces’ withdrawal.
The second group left Rubavu, at the Rwanda-DRC border, on May 4, 2025, with a convoy of approximately 34 vehicles, mostly carrying military equipment, observed by IGIHE. The first truck, loaded with SADC military equipment, reached Mahoko around 19:20 p.m.
South African Army Chief Gen Rudzani Maphwanya, speaking to the press on May 4, 2025, confirmed that the first group had arrived at the Tanzania assembly point.
He noted that all SADC troops exiting the DRC will travel by land through Rwanda to Tanzania, a journey initially expected to be lengthy but now achievable in one day.
Gen Maphwanya expressed satisfaction with the troops’ conduct during their deployment in eastern DRC and stated that the withdrawal would be completed by the end of May 2025.
However, critics have highlighted that the mission faced challenges, with troops confined to bases guarded by the M23 rebel group—whom they were intended to confront—for nearly four months.
Upon reaching Tanzania, troops will be repatriated. South Africa plans to airlift its soldiers while shipping equipment by sea. Tanzanian troops will return to local bases, and Malawi is yet to confirm its repatriation method.
His comments follow Belgium’s Foreign Minister Maxime Prévot’s recent regional tour, which included visits to Uganda, Burundi, and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC).
During his stop in Uganda, Prévot reportedly asked President Yoweri Museveni to mediate reconciliation between Belgium and Rwanda, according to media reports.
Speaking to the Rwanda Broadcasting Agency (RBA) on Sunday, Nduhungirehe said Rwanda was not officially informed of this request.
“We saw the reports in the press — we were never contacted by the Ugandan government or any other party,” he clarified.
He stressed that Rwanda’s current focus is addressing the conflict in eastern DRC, with Belgium-related matters to be handled later.
“Our priority is resolving the serious conflict in eastern DRC. That’s where our efforts are directed. Issues with Belgium will be addressed at a later time,” he said.
When asked if Rwanda would consider re-engaging with Belgium if approached sincerely, Nduhungirehe responded, “That time has not yet come. We are focused on pressing regional issues. When the time comes for those other matters, we will decide then.”
In March 2025, Rwanda cut diplomatic ties with Belgium, ordering all Belgian diplomats to leave within 24 hours.
The move accompanied the suspension of over €95 million in Belgian development projects and a ban on all NGOs, faith-based organizations, and public-interest groups in Rwanda from cooperating with Belgium or its affiliates.
Rwanda’s actions were in response to Belgium’s calls for international sanctions against Rwanda, accusing it of supporting the M23 armed group in the DRC.
Rwanda has consistently denied these allegations, condemning Belgium for what it calls a “historically harmful role” in the Great Lakes region since the colonial period.
He made the statement during an appearance on RBA’s talk show on Sunday.
Ambassador Nduhungirehe noted that these talks align with Rwanda’s broader commitment to supporting global efforts to address migration challenges.
“These reports are accurate — we are indeed in discussions with the United States,” he said. “As you may recall, we have previously engaged in similar talks with the United Kingdom. This is not new to us. In fact, beyond the UK, many are aware of the role we played in receiving migrants who had been detained in Libya.”
He emphasized that Rwanda’s approach is rooted in providing renewed opportunities for vulnerable migrants facing difficult circumstances around the world.
“We are in ongoing discussions with the U.S. government, but they are still in the initial phases. It’s too early to say how things will proceed but the conversations are happening,” stated Amb. Nduhungirehe.
His confirmation follows reports in several Western media outlets suggesting that Rwanda may soon begin receiving migrants from the U.S., particularly under potential future policy shifts.
The topic has reignited political debate in the United Kingdom, where former Home Secretary Suella Braverman criticized Prime Minister Keir Starmer for allegedly abandoning the UK’s migration deal with Rwanda — a move she argues could now benefit former U.S. President Donald Trump.
In November 2024, sources close to Trump’s campaign revealed that his team was reviewing options to deport undocumented migrants to third countries, with Rwanda being among the nations under consideration.
Minister Nduhungirehe reiterated that while the conversations with the U.S. are ongoing, they remain in the early stages and no final decisions have been made.
The Deputy Inspector General of Police (DIGP) in Charge of Administration and Personnel, DCG Jeanne Chantal Ujeneza, presided over the send-off ceremony of the junior and Non-commissioned Officers, at the RNP General Headquarters in Kacyiru.
She thanked them for serving their country with dedication, discipline and without reservation in the execution of their duties.
DIGP Ujeneza also thanked their families for the unwavering support throughout their service journey, enduring long periods apart due to the nature of their work.
“As you transition into the new life, the duty to fight any threats to national security continues. We will maintain close collaboration to enhance efforts in ensuring national security and your well-being,” DIGP Ujeneza said.
She urged then to maintain the same spirit of patriotism, discipline, and dedication adding that the RNP will continue to draw strength from their contributions to national security and development.
CIP (rtd) Bernard Gahonzire, who spoke on behalf of the retirees, expressed gratitude to His Excellency Paul Kagame, the President of the Republic, for granting them a well-deserved send-off.
He further thanked the RNP leadership for the unwavering support, which was instrumental in fulfilling their responsibilities effectively.
“Throughout our time in service, we have embarked on a long journey filled with valuable lessons that will accompany us in our future endeavors, as we continue to embody the values instilled in us,” Gahonzire said.
As they embark on another life out of active service, he reiterated their steadfast commitment to nation-building, and ready to serve when called for.
The swearing-in ceremony took place on Saturday, May 3, 2025, at Stade de l’Amitié in Libreville and drew high-level delegations from across the continent.
Among the attending heads of state were Umaro Sissoco Embaló of Guinea-Bissau, Mamadi Doumbouya of the Republic of Guinea, Adama Barrow of The Gambia, Ismaïl Omar Guelleh of Djibouti, Bassirou Diomaye Faye of Senegal, and Teodoro Obiang Nguema Mbasogo of Equatorial Guinea.
Félix Tshisekedi of the Democratic Republic of Congo and Évariste Ndayishimiye of Burundi were also present.
Brice Oligui Nguema secured his mandate in elections held on April 12, following 19 months as transitional president after seizing power in a coup that ousted Ali Bongo. Over 40,000 people attended the event.
President Oligui Nguema last visited Rwanda on August 10, 2024, to attend President Kagame’s inauguration. Earlier, in October 2023, he paid an official visit to Rwanda and held bilateral talks with Kagame.
Their discussions focused on Gabon’s transitional roadmap, regional security in Africa, the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), and opportunities for cooperation between Gabon and Rwanda.
Gabon is rich in oil, timber, and minerals, and shares economic ties with Rwanda, particularly through air transport. RwandAir, the national carrier, operates flights to Libreville, Gabon’s capital.
The two nations first signed cooperation agreements in 1976, which were later revised in 2010.
Many have since wondered how such a heavily fortified area fell so swiftly, especially with the presence of multiple armed forces—including a large contingent of FARDC troops, Burundian soldiers, SADC forces, fighters of FDLR terrorist group, Wazalendo militias, and foreign mercenaries.
Among those on the frontlines was Saddam Ukwishaka, who had joined the FDLR as a young boy and once served in its elite CRAP unit. In 2023, he was shot in the leg during a battle against M23 and taken for treatment at a FARDC-run hospital. Once healed, he returned to the battlefield.
Reflecting on the battle for Goma, Ukwishaka described it as one of the most intense and unforgettable fights, noting the tactical sophistication M23 used to claim victory.
“I fought in the battle for Goma at a place called Kilimanyoka,” he said. “When the gunfire intensified, I told myself: ‘If I didn’t die here on the battlefield, I won’t die in the city either.’ I immediately removed my uniform and abandoned my weapon. I decided to return home to Rwanda.”
He added: “We were stationed in Kilimanyoka under the command of Colonel Gaston. The day Goma was taken was a Sunday. We were caught completely off guard—the enemy had already reached deep into our defensive positions.”
Ukwishaka explained that many soldiers, overwhelmed by the M23 offensive, surrendered or fled in panic.
“That day, it was nearly impossible for anyone to even hold a weapon. Gunfire was erupting from every direction. It felt like the end of the world. Even high-ranking officers—colonels and above—after hearing the gunfire at Trois Antenne, said, ‘This is not a war we can fight,’ and fled.”
Faced with the collapse of their ranks, Ukwishaka decided to return to Rwanda despite fearing possible imprisonment or retaliation for having been part of the FDLR. He is now at Mutobo Demobilization and Reintegration Center, where he and 130 other former combatants are undergoing civic reorientation before rejoining society.
Another former fighter, Tumaine Idrissa, joined the FDLR at 17 and was one of the commanders stationed in Nyiragongo during the conflict. He said that after realizing Goma had fallen, he lost all hope in FDLR leadership’s promises of fighting their way into Rwanda and overthrowing the government.
He urged other youth still hiding in the forests of the DRC to return home rather than grow old in the jungle, warning that some FDLR leaders were exploiting the young fighters due to suspicions tied to their own involvement in the 1994 Genocide against the Tutsi.
According to FAO, prices increased for grains and cereals, dairy products, and meat, pushing its benchmark Food Price Index up by 1 percent compared to March, despite declines in the prices of sugar and vegetable oils.
The organization said the strongest impact of the U.S. tariff changes was observed in grains and cereals – the largest component of the FAO Food Price Index – although seasonal demand, reduced wheat exports from Russia, and a weaker U.S. dollar also played significant roles.
“Adjustments to the United States’ import tariff policies – including the exemption of Mexico, the leading importer of U.S. maize, and a 90-day suspension of tariffs above 10 percent for several other trading partners – further contributed to the upward price pressure,” the FAO noted in its monthly report.
Dairy prices climbed by 2.4 percent month-on-month and meat prices jumped 3.2 percent. In contrast, vegetable oil prices fell by 2.3 percent and sugar prices declined for the second straight month, dropping 3.5 percent from March, according to the report.
