The draft, introduced after months of mediation in Doha, was intended to build momentum toward ending the years-long conflict in eastern Democratic Republic of Congo. But according to an AFC/M23 representative who spoke to Reuters, the proposal is “not recent and has not been updated for over a month.”
The source further indicated that the proposal “takes more into account Kinshasa’s expectations” than the rebels’ own positions.
The talks, mediated by Qatar with backing from Washington and African leaders, have seen limited visible progress.
Some delegates from both camps have reportedly left Doha for consultations with their leadership, further casting doubt on the immediate trajectory of the process.
While one source briefed on the negotiations suggested the discussions had entered a “deeper phase,” with both parties engaging on the root causes of the conflict, voices within the AFC/M23 delegation remain sceptical.
Qatar moved to mediate the conflict between the rebels and President Félix Tshisekedi’s administration following the capture of large swathes of eastern DRC, including the cities of Bukavu and Goma.
The conflict has been ongoing for years. The rebels accuse the Congolese administration of poor governance, persecution, and the marginalisation of Kinyarwanda-speaking communities in the east.
While diplomatic ties were formally established in 1971, it was in 1995, following then Vice President Paul Kagame’s first official visit to China, that the relationship became more active across trade, political and investment fronts.
“It has been an exciting journey and we have seen a lot of results in many spheres of national life,” said Rwanda’s Ambassador to China, James Kimonyo, in a recent exclusive interview with IGIHE.
“Thanks to the excellent relations between Rwanda and China, we’ve moved from engagement to action,” he added.
That action is increasingly evident in the area of trade. In 2019, Rwanda was exporting only about $35 million worth of goods to China. By 2024, that number had jumped to nearly $160 million, an increase of over 350 percent in just five years.
The range of Rwandan products entering China has also diversified, from coffee and tea to chilli and other non-resource goods, all benefiting from China’s zero-tariff policy for least developed countries. China, meanwhile, continues to export close to $500 million worth of products to Rwanda annually, underscoring a growing but still imbalanced trade relationship.
But the real shift, according to Ambassador Kimonyo, is in direct investment. Between November 2023 and May 2024, more than 26 Chinese companies visited Rwanda, many of them returning with concrete investment proposals.
“The quick move by the companies is an indication that they are already weighing and they are so excited about the investment opportunities that Rwanda is presenting,” Kimonyo said.
He confirmed that China was the leading contributor to foreign direct investment in Rwanda last year, ahead of India and the United States.
“This all begins with what our government has done in terms of creating a very conducive, attractive environment for investment,” he said.
“The Chinese are very conscious, very aware and very excited, sometimes skeptical at first but once they see what’s on the ground, the interest becomes real.”
The surge in investor confidence aligns closely with China’s own evolving policy direction. During its recently concluded Two Sessions political meetings, an annual gathering similar in function to Rwanda’s Umushyikirano, China placed new emphasis on what it calls “high-quality development” and “new forces of production.” These themes center around environmentally sustainable growth powered by innovation and advanced technology.
“As much as China’s transformation has moved very fast, they want to make sure it does not come at the expense of the environment,” said Kimonyo. “So whether it is agriculture, it has to be climate-smart agriculture. If it is construction, the buildings have to be smart. In transport, there’s a big push toward electric vehicles. And in manufacturing, it must not damage the environment.”
For Rwanda, this vision offers not just a template but an opportunity to align national development goals with international investment standards.
“We stand to gain because of the innovations China has put in place,” Kimonyo said. “And the companies bringing those investments to Rwanda should also be able to ensure that what’s happening in China today in terms of high-quality development is what also happens in Rwanda.”
President Paul Kagame’s participation in the 2024 Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) Summit in Beijing underscored that alignment. During his visit, Kagame met with President Xi Jinping to review ongoing cooperation and discuss future collaboration in key sectors including infrastructure, agriculture, education, health and digital technology.
“The goal is to ensure our young people access cutting-edge education and that the skills they acquire here are going to be useful in our labor market,” Kimonyo said, referencing the education deals discussed during the summit.
As part of the long-term strategy, Rwanda is seeking both public and private investment from China. Public partnerships are being pursued in areas like health and energy, while the private sector is expected to drive growth in manufacturing, agriculture, and digital services.
“We know Rwanda has embraced the private-led growth philosophy,” Kimonyo said. “So engaging with the private sector and increasing the number of companies investing in Rwanda is going to be very critical for us going forward.”
People-to-people exchange is another pillar of the relationship. Before the COVID-19 pandemic, Rwanda had around 2,000 students in China. While that number dipped during the global shutdowns, it has since rebounded to nearly 1,000 today, most of them pursuing advanced education. A smaller group is active in private business or employed by local Chinese companies, contributing further to the economic link between the two nations.
Looking ahead, Ambassador Kimonyo believes the next phase of Rwanda–China cooperation will be defined by smart partnerships and shared values around innovation and sustainability. He emphasized that as China refines its economic model to address climate and efficiency concerns, Rwanda is positioning itself to absorb the best of that experience.
The celebration commemorates the story of Prophet Ibrahim, whom God commanded to sacrifice his son Ismail. At the last moment, God provided a ram to be sacrificed instead.
The national Eid al-Adha prayer was held at Kigali Pele Stadium in Nyamirambo, beginning at 6 am. The event was well-attended by Muslims from different parts of the country, who joined in the communal prayer.
Eid al-Adha is traditionally marked by a special prayer followed by the ritual slaughtering of animals such as goats, sheep, cows, or camels. The meat from the animals is divided into three portions: one for the family, one for neighbours, and one for those in need, reflecting the festival’s emphasis on charity and community sharing.
Minani Hemedi, who celebrated the festival in Nyamirambo, told IGIHE that for them, Eid al-Adha is like a harvest festival and a time to come together with others.
“It’s the day our forefather, the Prophet Ibrahim, was commanded to offer a sacrifice. As he prepared to offer his son, he was given a ram to sacrifice instead. Muslims, wherever they are, are called to slaughter animals — starting with small livestock like goats or sheep, as well as cattle or camels,” he revealed.
The celebration typically lasts for three days, during which families come together to pray, share meals, and extend support to the less fortunate.
The festival is a time for Muslims to express their faith, gratitude, and commitment to helping others, regardless of their neighbours’ beliefs or backgrounds.
President Idriss Deby announced the decision in a Facebook post on Thursday, June 5, declaring the suspension a matter of national dignity.
“I have instructed the government to act in accordance with the principles of reciprocity and suspend the issuance of visas to U.S. citizens,” Deby wrote.
“Chad has no planes to offer, no billions of dollars to give, but Chad has its dignity and pride,” he added.
The announcement comes in response to Trump’s recent order reinstating and expanding travel restrictions on foreign nationals from 19 countries, including Chad, citing national security threats, terrorism risks, and poor cooperation on immigration enforcement.
Chad was placed under a full travel ban, meaning most of its citizens are barred from entering the United States. Other African nations under similar restrictions include Somalia, Sudan, Eritrea, Libya, the Republic of the Congo, and Equatorial Guinea. An additional three—Burundi, Sierra Leone, and Togo—face partial bans targeting tourist, student, and business visas.
The U.S. administration cited high visa overstay rates and poor vetting infrastructure in Chad as reasons for its inclusion. According to the Department of Homeland Security, certain visa categories from Chad had overstay rates exceeding 50 percent.
President Trump, in a video statement, said the bans were necessary to protect the U.S. from “foreign terrorists and other threats,” citing a recent terror incident in Boulder, Colorado.
“We don’t want them,” Trump said bluntly, referring to migrants from countries flagged in the executive order.
“We cannot have open migration from any country where we cannot safely and reliably vet and screen those who seek to enter the United States.”
The escalating feud marks a stunning turn in a relationship that once saw the world’s richest man play a key role in Trump’s second-term administration and re-election effort. But what had been an uneasy partnership imploded this week in public, with blistering criticism exchanged across press conferences and social media platforms.
“The easiest way to save money in our Budget, Billions and Billions of Dollars, is to terminate Elon’s Governmental Subsidies and Contracts,” Trump wrote on his Truth Social platform.
Trump’s threat came as tensions boiled over following Musk’s vocal opposition to a sweeping tax and spending bill championed by the president.
Musk, who previously led Trump’s Department of Government Efficiency (DOGE) and donated nearly $300 million to support his campaign and GOP allies in 2024, responded sharply.
Just minutes after markets closed, following a staggering 14% drop in Tesla stock that erased over $150 billion in value, Musk replied “Yes” to a post on his platform X that called for Trump’s impeachment.
It was a previously unthinkable gesture, given the Republican Party’s control of both chambers of Congress.
The rift had been building. Days earlier, Musk denounced Trump’s legislation as a “disgusting abomination” that would dangerously inflate the national debt, now at $36.2 trillion.
While Trump initially refrained from responding, he broke his silence Thursday during a press appearance with German Chancellor Friedrich Merz, expressing “very disappointed” feelings about Musk.
“Look, Elon and I had a great relationship. I don’t know if we will anymore,” Trump told reporters.
As the president spoke, Musk hit back on X, asserting: “Without me, Trump would have lost the election.” He also accused Trump of “ingratitude” and warned that the president’s economic policies, including his signature tariffs, would push the U.S. into a recession.
Further inflaming tensions, Musk appeared to reference Trump’s name in connection with the Jeffrey Epstein files in a cryptic post on X.
The files refer to recently unsealed court documents from a long-running case involving Epstein, a disgraced financier accused of running a sex trafficking ring involving underage girls.
The documents list names of high-profile individuals alleged to have had ties to Epstein. While Musk did not elaborate, the implication that Trump may be connected to the scandal added fuel to an already volatile exchange.
Meanwhile, the clash sent shockwaves through financial markets and the political landscape. Tesla’s historic single-day stock plunge rattled investors, while lawmakers expressed concern about how the feud could impact the Republican Party’s cohesion ahead of the midterms.
“Musk was a major player in the ground game last cycle,” one GOP strategist told Reuters. “If he sits out the midterms—or worse, turns on us—it’s a huge problem.”
Musk’s threats to decommission key assets from SpaceX, including the Dragon spacecraft used in NASA missions, also alarmed government agencies. Though he later walked back that statement, the uncertainty underscored how deeply intertwined Musk’s companies are with federal operations.
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Just last week, Trump had given Musk a ceremonial Oval Office send-off after his resignation from the Department of Government Efficiency. Yet behind the scenes, tensions had been growing, particularly after Trump rescinded the nomination of Musk ally Jared Isaacman to lead NASA.
According to White House aides, Musk had begun to lose influence within the administration even before the public fallout, as senior officials worked to curtail his control over staffing and budgeting.
While Trump now insists that Elon “was wearing thin,” Musk’s team has stayed mostly silent. A White House statement called the split “an unfortunate episode from Elon, who is unhappy with the One Big Beautiful Bill because it does not include the policies he wanted.”
Still, the damage may be lasting. Musk has hinted at launching a new political movement and pledged to withhold future campaign donations. On Tuesday, he warned voters to oust any politicians who “betrayed the American people.”
Whether this political divorce is permanent or merely a prelude to a truce or part of Musk’s plan to distance himself from Trump’s controversial reforms remains to be seen.
Speaking to international journalists recently, Professor Zheng Qi of the Central Party School (National Academy of Governance) outlined how the Party is rising to this challenge—not just through reforms or digital campaigns, but through a strategic effort rooted in ideological education, historical consciousness, and theoretical innovation.
During a recent exchange program in Beijing, international journalists were hosted at the Central Party School, a top-tier institution under the CPC Central Committee that plays a critical role in shaping the ideological direction of the Party and its governance capacity.
Professor Zheng Qi, from the Party Building Teaching and Research Department, addressed the group, detailing how the school is adapting its methods to resonate with a younger, globally minded Chinese population.
She explained that the CPC is not only addressing internal challenges such as corruption and governance capacity but is also focused on securing the support of the country’s youth. With this in mind, the Central Party School—once mainly responsible for training senior cadres—is now producing short video courses, hosting ideological outreach, and organising history education campaigns aimed squarely at younger audiences.
Founded in 1933 as the Marxist Communist School and renamed the Party School of the CPC Central Committee in 1935, the institution has played a central role in maintaining the ideological integrity of the CPC.
It trained generations of revolutionary and post-1949 leaders and became the intellectual engine behind major theoretical innovations that have shaped China’s modernisation. Since 1978, the school has been instrumental in supporting the country’s reform and opening-up agenda.
In 1994, the establishment of the National Academy of Governance aimed to professionalise China’s civil service, focusing on training mid-level and senior civil servants in public administration and policy. The two institutions were merged in 2018, creating a single entity with dual designations: the Party School of the CPC Central Committee and the National Academy of Governance.
It now stands as the highest-level educational institution within the CPC—an elite school for training Party cadres and promoting ideological and theoretical development. Its unique nature is reflected in the fact that nearly all of its students, faculty, and administrators are CPC members.
Professor Zheng Qi revealed that the CPC’s strategy to engage young people hinges on connecting ideology with current realities and cultural traditions.
“First, we need to always keep pace with theoretical development,” she said.
“Because our ideals and convictions are connected with our cultural practices and fine traditions. And they keep developing. So, from the past theoretical developments to today’s Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era, we endeavour to address the problems at present.”
By doing so, the Party seeks to show that its political thought remains relevant and responsive to the real-world issues that younger generations care about.
Recognising that many young Chinese are looking beyond material success and striving for personal meaning, the CPC is providing platforms that align national development goals with individual ambition.
“Many young people today may no longer be content with just meeting their material needs. They also aspire to have self-realisation,” Zheng said, noting that opportunities such as university teaching support and rural development initiatives are designed to “contribute their due share to our national development” while allowing them to “realise their potential and their value.”
To bring these ideas closer to youth, the Central Party School has taken to modern communication platforms.
“We also convey our theories—political theories—in a way popular among young people. We have many micro party courses. And me and many of my colleagues have made 10-minute-long courses,” Zheng explained.
“Those videos have been posted onto the Chinese version of TikTok and other new media platforms. They have been visited or clicked by a large number of netizens. In this way, we can enable young people to learn about our Party’s theories and to form their own opinion.”
Historical education also plays a key role in this engagement strategy. Since the 18th CPC National Congress, the Party has prioritised campaigns that encourage young people to study the CPC’s and the nation’s past.
“General Secretary Xi also emphasised the importance of history,” said Zheng. “We have organized a study about Party history and our national history, by which we can draw inspiration and strength and show the important role of the CPC in China’s history.”
But this outreach to the younger generation is not taking place in isolation. Zheng underscored the broader internal challenges facing the CPC as it attempts to remain relevant and resilient.
“How can we continue to serve the people wholeheartedly or adopt a people-centred approach?” she asked, acknowledging that after over seven decades in power, the Party must remember “who we are and who we are for.”
She continued, “To govern such a country like China, we are facing so many arduous challenges of reform, which may be even more grave than when we just founded the PRC.”
Zheng noted that many of these reforms touch on entrenched interests and demand that the CPC constantly improve its governance capacity. She added, “This is attested to our leading capacity and governance level.”
Moreover, the CPC is grappling with the issue of corruption and the need to maintain the purity of its ranks—an issue Zheng said has contributed to the downfall of other political parties around the world.
“So, whether it’s in terms of resolve and our attitudes, as well as our reform measures, we can see that our Party has been committed to maintaining our purity,” she said. “People’s support rate or satisfaction rate for our combat against corruption is over 90%.”
In light of these challenges, the Party’s efforts to engage young people through theoretical development, historical education, and media-savvy communication are not merely tactics—they are existential necessities. And institutions like the Central Party School are playing an outsized role in ensuring that the CPC’s ideological roots remain strong, relevant, and persuasive in a rapidly evolving society.
“In recent months, it has become increasingly apparent that former President Biden’s aides abused the power of Presidential signatures through the use of an autopen to conceal Biden’s cognitive decline,” Trump wrote in the memorandum.
“This conspiracy marks one of the most dangerous and concerning scandals in American history.”
The memorandum continued. “There are serious doubts as to the decision-making process and even the degree of Biden’s awareness of these actions being taken in his name,” it said.
The vast majority of Biden’s executive actions were signed using a mechanical signature pen, often called an autopen, as opposed to Biden’s own hand, it said.
The memorandum orders that the Counsel to the President, in consultation with the Attorney General and the head of any other relevant executive department or agency, investigate whether certain individuals conspired to deceive the public about Biden’s mental state and unconstitutionally exercise the authorities and responsibilities of the President.
In a statement late on Wednesday, Biden dismissed those suggestions.
“Let me be clear: I made the decisions during my presidency. I made the decisions about the pardons, executive orders, legislation, and proclamations. Any suggestion that I didn’t is ridiculous and false.”
Biden called the move “a distraction by Donald Trump and Congressional Republicans who are working to push disastrous legislation that would cut essential programs like Medicaid and raise costs on American families, all to pay for tax breaks for the ultra-wealthy and big corporations.”
The Republican-controlled U.S. House of Representatives narrowly passed a sweeping tax and spending bill, described by Trump as the “One, Big, Beautiful Bill.” The legislative package includes tax cuts and spending cuts, no tax on tips and overtime, increased child tax credits, and measures to reduce the federal deficit.
Led by Secretary General Benjamin Mbonimpa, the AFC/M23 delegation arrived in Doha in early May 2025 to engage in negotiations with representatives of the DRC government. The talks, facilitated by Qatari mediators, were part of a broader initiative launched in March 2025 to de-escalate fighting in eastern Congo and establish a framework for lasting peace.
Sources on the ground report that Mbonimpa and his team returned to Goma earlier this week, following a directive from the coalition’s senior leadership.
Neither AFC/M23 nor the DRC government has issued an official statement on the withdrawal, but insiders suggest that the two parties failed to reach a consensus on key issues, most notably, the confidence-building measures deemed essential to advancing the peace process.
At the heart of the impasse is the question of mutual trust. AFC/M23 had been asked to vacate territories under its control as a gesture of goodwill. In response, the group withdrew from the city of Walikale and nearby areas in early April.
In return, it presented the DRC government with a list of 700 detainees allegedly imprisoned for suspected affiliations with the movement, requesting their release. The government released only five individuals, none of whom appeared on the submitted list.
Despite high hopes for progress, a report by Africa Intelligence on May 15 indicated that Qatar had anticipated a preliminary agreement by May 10. The goal that was not realised, forcing talks to continue without resolution.
Recent developments in the conflict region have further strained the process. AFC/M23 has reportedly resumed military operations in several regions and is said to be attempting to seize the town of Pinga in Walikale territory. These actions have raised concerns that the group is losing faith in the negotiation track.
The fragile ceasefire agreement brokered at the end of April also failed to hold, with both sides accusing each other of violations. AFC/M23 has pointed to continued provocations by pro-government Wazalendo militias, which it claims are undermining the negotiation environment.
With its delegation now pulled from the Qatar talks, AFC/M23’s move casts doubt on the future of the peace process. Observers warn that without renewed diplomatic efforts and tangible steps from both parties, the conflict in eastern Congo could further escalate, undermining months of progress and risking a return to full-scale violence.
Speaking in a televised interview, Minister of Information, Communication and Technology Jerry Silaa confirmed that the restriction is a deliberate enforcement measure following what the government describes as the platform’s failure to comply with local online content regulations.
“Since X updated its content policies in May 2024, it has permitted explicit sexual material, including same-sex pornographic content, which directly contradicts Section 16 of our Online Content Regulations,” Silaa said, referring to legislation enacted in 2020.
“Such material is not only illegal under Tanzanian law but undermines our traditions, values, and cultural norms.”
Silaa emphasised the government’s responsibility in curating a digital environment that reflects the country’s ethical standards.
“Because the internet is like the sky—what you say here will be heard by Tanzanians, whether they like it or not. That’s why it’s important for the government to ensure online content aligns with national values and laws.”
The platform has reportedly become inaccessible across the country without the use of Virtual Private Networks (VPNs). The restriction comes amid broader digital surveillance efforts, with Silaa noting that other platforms, including YouTube, have also had content blocked as part of a nationwide crackdown on “illegal and harmful” digital media.
The restriction follows a recent wave of digital security breaches. On May 20, internet watchdog NetBlocks reported that X was blocked in Tanzania after pornographic content appeared on what was believed to be a hacked official police account.
The account also falsely claimed that President Samia Suluhu Hassan had died. Similar graphic content surfaced on the hacked YouTube account of the Tanzania Revenue Authority.
The platform restriction also coincides with the detention of opposition leader Tundu Lissu, who is facing a treason charge after threatening to boycott elections unless electoral reforms are enacted. Lissu denies the allegations, calling the charges politically motivated.
Tanzania was also in the spotlight after several prominent East African human rights activists who travelled to Tanzania in solidarity with Lissu were detained or deported.
Kenya’s former Justice Minister Martha Karua was turned back upon arrival, while Ugandan activist Agather Atuhaire, though initially allowed in, was detained for several days and later alleged that she was blindfolded, violently stripped, and sexually assaulted while in custody. Kenyan activist Boniface Mwangi was also briefly detained and reported experiencing torture and assault.
Executive Order 14161, titled “Protecting the United States from Foreign Terrorists and Other National Security and Public Safety Threats,” was signed on January 20, 2025, and follows a national security review by federal agencies.
The order imposes a full travel ban on seven African countries: Somalia, Sudan, Chad, Eritrea, Libya, the Republic of the Congo (Congo-Brazzaville), and Equatorial Guinea. Nationals from these countries are barred from entering the U.S. under most visa categories.
In addition, three other African nations—Burundi, Sierra Leone, and Togo—face partial restrictions that target immigrants and non-immigrants holding tourist, student, and business visas (B-1, B-2, F, M, and J categories).
In a video statement, Trump linked the move to national security concerns, referencing a recent terror attack in Boulder, Colorado.
“We don’t want them,” he said of individuals from high-risk nations. “We cannot have open migration from any country where we cannot safely and reliably vet and screen those who seek to enter the United States.”
According to a fact sheet released by the administration, countries targeted for a full suspension were found to have inadequate screening and vetting systems, high visa overstay rates, and in some cases, active terrorist organisations operating within their borders.
For example, Somalia was described as a “terrorist safe haven” with minimal government control and a history of refusing to repatriate its nationals. Chad and Equatorial Guinea had visa overstay rates exceeding 50 percent for certain visa categories. Eritrea lacks reliable documentation systems and refuses to accept deported nationals.
Other countries affected by the full travel ban include Afghanistan, Burma, Haiti, Iran, and Yemen.
Countries under partial restrictions, such as Burundi and Sierra Leone, were flagged for high overstay rates and lack of cooperation with U.S. immigration enforcement. Cuba, Laos, Turkmenistan, and Venezuela were also subject to partial bans, bringing the total number of affected countries to 19.
The Trump administration insisted that the bans are country-specific and designed to encourage foreign governments to improve information sharing and document security. Exceptions remain for green card holders, existing visa holders, and certain visa categories deemed in the U.S. national interest.
Trump defended the policy as a continuation of his first-term travel ban, which was upheld by the Supreme Court in Trump v. Hawaii.
The new restrictions are likely to draw condemnation from civil rights advocates, who have in the past accused the Trump administration of placing a heavy focus on African nations.
