Category: Politics

Dr Migiro succeeds Dr Emmanuel Nchimbi, who has been nominated to run alongside President Samia Suluhu Hassan as her vice-presidential candidate in the upcoming October general election.

The announcement of Migiro’s appointment was made by CCM’s Secretary for Ideology, Publicity and Training, Amos Makalla, after a round of nomination meetings chaired by President Samia in her capacity as party chair.

At 69, Dr Migiro brings to the role decades of political, diplomatic and academic experience. She is best known globally for serving as the United Nations Deputy Secretary-General from 2007 to 2012 under Ban Ki-moon, the first Tanzanian and only the third person ever to hold the post.

Her political career at home has been equally trailblazing. She became Tanzania’s first female Minister of Foreign Affairs in 2006, after five years leading the Ministry of Community Development, Gender and Children. In those roles, she was at the forefront of regional diplomacy, chairing the Great Lakes Region peace process and guiding Southern African Development Community (SADC) efforts to support elections in countries emerging from conflict.

{{From academia to politics
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Dr Migiro began her career in academia, teaching law at the University of Dar es Salaam and later heading key departments in the Faculty of Law. She also served on Tanzania’s Law Reform Commission and the UN Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women before fully venturing into politics.

Her path within CCM has been steady, starting at grassroots ward leadership level in the 1990s before rising through the regional structures. Although she unsuccessfully sought the party’s presidential nomination in 2015, she later represented Tanzania abroad as High Commissioner to the United Kingdom.

{{A historic first for CCM
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Founded in 1977, CCM has been the dominant political force in Tanzania since independence, but leadership at its highest ranks has long been male-dominated. Dr Migiro’s elevation to Secretary-General marks a milestone for the party and is seen as further cementing President Samia Suluhu Hassan’s push to open more leadership spaces for women.

Born in Songea in 1956, Dr Migiro studied law at the University of Dar es Salaam before earning a doctorate in Germany. She is married to Professor Cleophas Migiro and is a mother of two. In addition to Kiswahili and English, she speaks basic French and German.

According to multiple security sources, the dispute has intensified in recent weeks, with Ndayishimiye reportedly weighing the possibility of removing Niyongabo from his post — a move insiders say would be politically risky given the president’s weakening grip on power.

The latest flashpoint came on August 5, when Gen. Niyongabo dispatched soldiers to Mpimba prison in Bujumbura to forcibly free two detained colonels. The officers had been arrested under presidential orders on accusations of smuggling minerals from South Kivu into Burundi, as well as using army logistics vehicles to transport fuel and textiles.

Rather than face further investigation, they were swiftly sent back to eastern DRC under the army chief’s protection, without Ndayishimiye’s approval.

Military and local sources in Uvira, South Kivu, claim that Burundian army convoys routinely ferry food, weapons, and equipment into the DRC, returning at night loaded with minerals. A senior intelligence officer intimated that the president views Niyongabo as a key player in this illicit trade.

The tension is rooted in a lucrative arrangement signed in August 2023 between Ndayishimiye and Congolese President Félix Tshisekedi. The deal deployed around 20,000 Burundian troops to fight alongside Congolese forces against the M23 rebellion, with reports indicating that Tshisekedi pays $5,000 per soldier per month directly to Ndayishimiye. Soldiers, however, receive only their standard pay — about $70 for lower ranks and $100 for officers.

While the president has allegedly kept these earnings to himself, insiders say Niyongabo now wants a share of the spoils, creating a dangerous split at the top of Burundi’s military command.

The deployment has come at a high cost. Hundreds of Burundian soldiers have reportedly been killed in North Kivu over the past year. Morale is sinking, and resistance is growing — in January, 48 soldiers from the 20th Battalion refused to redeploy, leading to their arrest on charges of mutiny.

Ndayishimiye’s political standing has also been eroded by economic hardship at home and criticism over a recent cabinet reshuffle seen as driven by loyalty rather than competence. Within the CNDD-FDD ruling party, both the president and the army chief are losing popularity, with Niyongabo increasingly cast as a businessman in uniform and Ndayishimiye accused of putting personal profit above national interest.

For now, the confrontation between the two men remains behind closed doors, but observers warn that the standoff could escalate, destabilising Burundi’s already fragile political and security landscape — and complicating its role in the volatile Great Lakes region.

Ndirakobuca was one of two senators recently elected to represent the ruling CNDD-FDD party in Bujumbura Province, and he was elected with 100% of the votes cast by the Senate.

In the same session, Générose Ngendanganya was elected as First Vice President of the Senate, and Clotilde Kampimbare was elected as Second Vice President.

Known by his nickname “Ndakugarika,” Ndirakobuca has held several key roles in the Burundian government, including Head of the National Intelligence Service (SNR) and Deputy Chief of Police.

From June 2020 to September 2022, he served as Minister of Internal Security, before being appointed Prime Minister, succeeding Alain Guillaume Bunyoni.

In May 2025, President Évariste Ndayishimiye formally retired Ndirakobuca from the Burundi National Police, where he held the rank of Lieutenant General. This opened the path for his candidacy in the Senate, representing CNDD-FDD in Bujumbura.

Ndirakobuca replaces Emmanuel Sinzohagera, who previously held a dual role as President of the Senate and head of the United Methodist Church in Burundi and Rwanda.

The internal vote, held on August 1 under the supervision of CCM Deputy Secretary General John Mongella, saw Jesca secure 391 votes, placing her second on the Mainland list, just behind outgoing legislator Ng’wasi Kamani, who garnered 409 votes.

The results mark a crucial step in Jesca’s bid to enter Parliament, a path once taken by her father nearly three decades ago.

Raised in Chato, Geita region, Jesca has embraced the values her father championed.

At the recent event, she told supporters: “I was raised on the principles of hard work, integrity, and self-reliance. My main mission is to defend, collaborate, but most importantly, to speak out loudly in the political, economic, and developmental journey.

“I have the intention and vision to ensure that the manifesto of our CCM party for the years 2020-2025, with the slogan ‘Work and Integrity, We Move Forward,’ is implemented for the broad interests of our nation, Tanzania.”

John Magufuli began his own political journey in 1995 when he was elected as a Member of Parliament for Chato district. His reputation as a firm and efficient leader grew during his long ministerial career, particularly in the Ministry of Works, where he earned the nickname “The Bulldozer” for his aggressive push on infrastructure projects.

From 1995 to 2015, he held key portfolios, including Minister of Lands, Livestock, and ultimately Works, roles that laid the foundation for his nomination as CCM’s presidential candidate in 2015.

After securing 58% of the national vote in the general election, he was sworn in as Tanzania’s fifth president in November 2015. His presidency was characterised by strong anti-corruption rhetoric, infrastructure expansion, and a focus on public sector discipline, a legacy that continues to shape Tanzanian politics.

Jesca’s rise in the CCM Youth Wing polls now positions her as one of the party’s promising young figures, seeking to contribute to national leadership from within Parliament.

While she has yet to secure the seat officially, the final list still awaits ratification by the party’s top organs. Her strong showing signals both personal ambition and a symbolic continuation of her family’s political legacy.

If successful, Jesca Magufuli will join a new generation of leaders stepping into the political spotlight, and she’ll do so by walking a path first paved by her father.

His tenure from 2015 to 2023 was defined by bold initiatives, regional diplomacy, and domestic challenges with continental implications. While he earned praise for his leadership in regional security and anti-corruption efforts, Buhari also faced criticism over economic protectionism, suppression of dissent, and a perceived reluctance to engage in wider African affairs fully.

Here are 11 key achievements and controversies that shaped Buhari’s African legacy:

{{Achievements
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{{1. Leadership in Regional Security (ECOWAS Interventions)
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Buhari’s legacy in West African diplomacy is perhaps best illustrated by his active role in preserving constitutional order within the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). His government was instrumental in resolving The Gambia’s 2016–2017 political crisis, in which long-time ruler Yahya Jammeh refused to step down after losing elections.

Nigeria, under Buhari’s leadership, mobilised diplomatic and military pressure alongside other ECOWAS states to ensure a peaceful transfer of power to Adama Barrow. Buhari’s insistence on a peaceful resolution, without plunging the region into violence, was widely hailed.

This leadership was replicated in Mali, where Buhari and Nigeria took a stand following the 2020 military coup. Though not leading ECOWAS at the time, Buhari used Nigeria’s influence to push for the restoration of civilian governance, even as the regional body tried to mediate with the coup leaders. His position reflected an understanding that instability in Mali could spill across borders and threaten regional peace.

More broadly, Buhari consistently advocated for regional cooperation in responding to political instability and security threats. While some critics felt his approach lacked aggressive follow-through, Buhari’s willingness to position Nigeria as a stabilising force reflected Nigeria’s traditional role as a regional hegemon. His tenure reaffirmed Nigeria’s commitment to peacekeeping, democracy, and ECOWAS protocols.

{{2. Counterterrorism collaboration through the MNJTF
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One of Buhari’s top priorities after assuming office was counterterrorism, especially the containment and rollback of Boko Haram and Islamic State in West Africa Province (ISWAP).

Recognising that terrorism respects no borders, Buhari revived and strengthened the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) with Cameroon, Chad, Niger, and Benin. The task force conducted joint operations that weakened Boko Haram’s territorial control in Nigeria’s northeast and bordering countries.

This regional collaboration marked a turning point. Whereas earlier efforts under previous administrations were more nationally focused, Buhari’s security strategy acknowledged that Nigeria could not succeed alone. He personally engaged regional leaders to share intelligence, coordinate border patrols, and mobilise funding and logistics for counterinsurgency.

Despite ongoing attacks, particularly in Borno State and Lake Chad regions, the MNJTF under Buhari’s tenure successfully reclaimed territory and disrupted major insurgent operations. The Buhari government’s leadership in the MNJTF model is now seen as a framework for regional responses to insurgencies elsewhere in Africa, such as the Sahel.

{{3. The P&ID legal victory
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In a landmark moment for Nigeria’s sovereignty and anti-corruption drive, Buhari’s government successfully challenged a $10 billion arbitration award in a UK court.

The P&ID legal victory culminated in October 2023 when a UK High Court ruled in favour of Nigeria, overturning the massive arbitration award against Process & Industrial Developments Ltd. (P&ID). The dispute stemmed from a failed 2010 gas processing contract, which led to the hefty claim due to alleged non-compliance.

Under President Buhari, Nigeria aggressively challenged the arbitration, presenting evidence that P&ID engaged in corrupt practices, including bribery and manipulation of the contract and arbitration process. The UK court found these allegations credible and ruled that enforcing the award would violate public policy, effectively nullifying the payout.

This legal victory significantly boosted Buhari’s anti-corruption agenda and Nigeria’s national sovereignty, preventing a potentially crippling financial loss. Beyond Nigeria, the case resonated across Africa as a precedent highlighting vulnerabilities in international arbitration, encouraging greater vigilance and reform in contract negotiations and enforcement.

{{4. Promotion of African self-sufficiency through agriculture
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Buhari’s agricultural reforms, including the Anchor Borrowers’ Programme (ABP) and the Presidential Fertiliser Initiative, sought to boost Nigeria’s food production and reduce dependence on imports.

Though domestically focused, these initiatives aligned with broader African Union goals for self-reliance and food security. His government empowered smallholder farmers with access to credit and inputs, helping revive key staples like rice and maize.

Buhari’s push for agricultural transformation sparked interest among other African nations, particularly in West Africa. Countries such as Ghana and Senegal examined Nigeria’s policy tools as templates for improving their own rural economies. Nigeria’s food import bill dropped significantly between 2016 and 2020, and Buhari regularly promoted these achievements in regional and AU fora as evidence that Africa could feed itself.

However, challenges such as poor post-harvest infrastructure, inflation, and insecurity limited long-term gains. Still, Buhari’s push for agriculture laid an ideological marker: that Africa’s prosperity depends less on aid and more on domestic productivity. That message resonated with many African leaders confronting similar food security challenges.

{{5. Combating corruption on a continental scale
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Buhari’s reputation as a corruption fighter extended beyond Nigeria’s borders. In 2018, he was named African Union Anti-Corruption Champion, a symbolic nod to his high-profile campaigns against graft. He promoted measures such as Nigeria’s Treasury Single Account (TSA) and pursued asset recovery from overseas, including the repatriation of over $300 million in “Abacha loot” from Switzerland and Jersey.

These actions resonated continentally. Buhari used regional and international platforms, including the African Union summits, to call for cooperation in asset recovery, transparency in public service, and international banking reforms to block illicit flows. His rhetoric found favour among African youth disillusioned by kleptocratic elites and governance decay.

Yet, Buhari’s anti-corruption stance was not just rhetorical. His administration worked with other African governments to tighten financial regulations and encourage whistleblower policies. Though critics at home questioned the consistency of his enforcement, his image as a corruption fighter elevated Nigeria’s soft power among reform-minded leaders and civil society actors across the continent.

6. Support for AfCFTA and pan-African economic integration

Initially hesitant, Buhari signed the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) agreement in 2019 after extensive domestic consultations. Though Nigeria was the last major economy to join, its signature was crucial: without Nigeria’s participation, AfCFTA would have lacked continental weight. Buhari’s eventual support was seen as a commitment to Africa’s collective economic future.

Before signing, Buhari expressed concern about potential job losses and trade imbalances, fears shared by many African countries. His caution sparked useful debate on how to design AfCFTA to protect weaker economies. After joining, Nigeria took part in technical discussions and policy frameworks that sought to balance trade liberalisation with economic fairness.

Buhari’s endorsement of AfCFTA added momentum to the idea of “African solutions to African problems”, not just politically but economically. By the time he left office, Nigeria was positioning itself as a future trade hub, with a growing emphasis on infrastructure, border digitisation, and export-led growth aligned with the AfCFTA vision.

{{Controversies}}

1. Persistent insecurity and expansion of non-state actors

Despite gains against Boko Haram, Nigeria remained plagued by widespread insecurity during Buhari’s presidency. Kidnappings, banditry, and violent clashes between farmers and herders spread from the northeast to the north-central and southern regions. The rise of non-state actors created a climate of fear and lawlessness, undermining national and regional stability.

Buhari’s critics argued that his administration was reactive rather than proactive in dealing with security threats. While the military launched offensives, they were often under-resourced or hampered by poor coordination. In many rural areas, local populations felt abandoned, leading to the emergence of vigilante groups and further erosion of state authority.

Regionally, Nigeria’s instability had cross-border consequences. Armed groups and displaced persons moved into Niger and Cameroon, straining diplomatic and humanitarian capacities. Observers feared that Buhari’s failure to resolve Nigeria’s internal security crisis weakened his credibility as a regional security anchor.

{{2. Human rights concerns and police brutality (EndSARS)
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The October 2020 #EndSARS protests, sparked by police brutality, especially by the notorious Special Anti-Robbery Squad (SARS), marked a turning point in Buhari’s international image. Though initially praised for allowing youth protests, the violent crackdown at the Lekki Toll Gate, where security forces allegedly opened fire on peaceful demonstrators, triggered global outrage.

Buhari’s delayed response and refusal to acknowledge the alleged shootings intensified tensions. International bodies, including the United Nations and African Union, expressed concern over human rights abuses and shrinking civic space in Nigeria. The government’s dismissal of some reports and reliance on state media narratives further deepened public mistrust.

Across Africa, the EndSARS movement resonated with youth confronting similar police abuses. Buhari’s perceived mishandling of the crisis stained his reputation as a democratic leader and empowered regional autocrats to justify harsh crackdowns on dissent by citing security concerns.

{{3. Protectionist border closure and trade fallout
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In 2019, Buhari controversially closed Nigeria’s land borders to curb smuggling and protect local producers. The move, lasting over a year, was meant to enforce customs regulations and encourage self-reliance. However, it had negative consequences for neighbouring countries like Benin, Togo, and Ghana, who relied on Nigeria’s market.

ECOWAS protocols promoting free movement and regional integration were effectively suspended by Nigeria’s unilateral action. Small traders and transporters across West Africa bore the brunt, as border communities plunged into economic distress. Critics argued that the closure contradicted Buhari’s commitment to AfCFTA and regional cooperation.

Though Buhari eventually reopened the borders in late 2020, the policy left a bitter aftertaste. It showcased how Nigeria’s domestic economic decisions could upend regional stability. Buhari’s border closure is now frequently cited in discussions on the need for continental trade rules that balance national interests with regional obligations.

{{4. Twitter ban and digital repression
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In June 2021, Buhari’s government banned Twitter after the platform deleted a tweet deemed inciting violence. The ban lasted for seven months and was condemned globally as an attack on freedom of expression and digital rights. Nigeria’s youth, entrepreneurs, and activists—many of whom relied on Twitter for work, advocacy, and mobilisation—were most affected.

The government justified the ban by accusing Twitter of undermining Nigeria’s sovereignty and threatening national unity. It demanded that the platform register locally and comply with Nigerian laws. Though eventually lifted in January 2022 after negotiations, the ban raised fears of increasing digital authoritarianism.

Other African governments took note. Zimbabwe, Uganda, and Ethiopia, among others, would later invoke “national security” to justify internet shutdowns and censorship. Buhari’s digital crackdown thus unintentionally set a precedent for state-led internet repression in Africa’s fledgling democracies.

{{5. Selective anti-corruption enforcement
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While Buhari’s anti-corruption rhetoric won praise, critics frequently pointed to selective enforcement. High-profile opposition figures were often investigated, arrested, or prosecuted, while alleged corruption within the ruling party appeared overlooked. This dual standard raised questions about the true impartiality of his campaign.

Several corruption scandals involving Buhari’s appointees, such as the mismanagement of funds in the Niger Delta Development Commission (NDDC) and the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC), drew public ire. Yet, accountability for those within the president’s political camp was inconsistent.

This perceived bias undermined Buhari’s message of reform. Regionally, while some countries admired his stance, others pointed to the flaws as justification for inaction. His legacy, therefore, remains one of aspirational anti-corruption leadership—inspiring, but not entirely credible in execution.

After the Liberation Struggle and halting the Genocide, Rwanda embarked on a development path characterized by sustained peace and security; improved living standards and public health; good governance and international cooperation; inclusive education and women’s empowerment; among other areas.

This journey has brought visible infrastructure development, including schools, health centres, modern buildings, progress in technology, healthcare, modern agriculture and livestock, and much more.

These changes are evident to every Rwandan and affirm the country’s full liberation, a process driven by Rwandans themselves.

Though the armed struggle ended, the country has spent the last 31 years in a different kind of battle: rebuilding and developing toward a dignified life for every citizen.

The Seventh Integrated Household Living Conditions Survey (EICV7) showed that poverty in Rwanda dropped from 39.8% in 2017 to 27.4% in 2024, while extreme poverty fell from 11.3% to 5.4% during the same period.

The data also shows that Rwandans now earn an average of $1,040 per person per year. According to the National Institute of Statistics of Rwanda (NISR), there have been major changes in the country’s economy.

For example, the percentage of Rwandans with access to electricity increased from 11.1% in 2011 to 72% in 2024.

Those with access to clean water rose significantly as well — from 74.2% in 2011 to 89.7% in 2024.

Figures from the Rwanda Utilities Regulatory Authority (RURA) show that mobile phone users increased to 13,480,095 in September 2024, up from 12,538,106 in 2023.

The education sector has improved through the government’s commitment to universal access, though challenges remain in improving quality.

Tito Rutaremara, Chairperson of the Rwanda Elders’ Advisory Forum, noted that when the RPF-Inkotanyi launched the Liberation Struggle, it had clear goals for Rwanda and its people.

“The liberation struggle was just one step. We had a broader mission — ensuring national security, unity, building a democracy that suits our country, developing the economy, and establishing diplomatic relations based on mutual respect.”

He emphasized that in the 31 years since liberation, much has been achieved to improve Rwandans’ lives and that continued efforts will be needed to keep transforming those lives.

“We prioritized essential needs such as security for people and property, access to food and healthcare — and from there, we’ve continued building on those foundations.”

He stressed that, in today’s world, the country must fully embrace technology in all sectors to build a knowledge-based economy.

“We’ve reached a stage where we must integrate new innovations — technology and creative intelligence. That means embedding technology in every sector so that our economy and daily life are driven by both tech and ingenuity.”

In terms of service delivery, he noted that some improvements are still needed, particularly in digital transformation and speeding up access to public services.

Rutaremara added that Rwanda’s ongoing rebuilding efforts aim to ensure that every citizen can access the services they need, healthcare, education, and employment, without having to seek a better life elsewhere.

He projected that in the next 30 years, Rwanda should have reached this goal, in line with Vision 2050.

He concluded by emphasising the need to promote positive values and protect Rwanda’s cultural heritage so that other countries can learn from Rwanda’s experience.

Kabila, who had been living in exile since late 2023, returned to the rebel-controlled eastern region of the DRC in May 2025 and was received by the AFC/M23 leaders.

Over the last several weeks, he has been holding discussions in Goma with various Congolese groups, including religious leaders, politicians, and civil society members, listening to their ideas on how peace could be achieved in the DRC, particularly in the eastern region where AFC/M23 leaders accuse the Kinshasa administration of exclusion.

After spending more than a month in Goma, on June 24, 2025, Kabila travelled to Bukavu, where he plans to hold further consultations with the Congolese people.

As Kabila explained in a message delivered to the Congolese before his return to the DRC, his talks are based on 12 pillars that he believes will help the country achieve lasting peace.

The pillars include reconciliation among Congolese people, ending the war, improving relations between the DRC and neighbouring countries, dismantling armed groups, and ending authoritarian rule.

The DRC government, however, accuses Kabila’s activities in the eastern part of the country of fueling the conflict. It has initiated proceedings against him for charges including treason, involvement in an unauthorised armed group, war crimes, and crimes against humanity.

The 80-year-old leader is set to pick nomination papers this Saturday at the NRM Electoral Commission offices, aiming to retain his positions as NRM chairman and the party’s presidential flag bearer.

NRM Electoral Commission Chairman Dr. Tanga Odoi confirmed during a press conference that Museveni will personally express interest and collect nomination forms for both the party chairperson role and the presidential candidacy.

“Like other candidates, the President and National Chairman of NRM will express interest and also pick nomination forms by himself,” Dr. Tanga told journalists.

The process for expressing interest and collecting nomination forms for all NRM Central Executive Committee (CEC) positions will run from June 26 to July 1, with candidate nominations scheduled for July 4.

Meanwhile, the NRM and other parties are actively vetting and clearing candidates, including those for parliamentary and district chairperson positions, a process that entered its second week on Monday.

The January 2026 elections will see Ugandans vote for both the president and lawmakers. Museveni has led Uganda since 1986.