The newly brokered Washington Accord, a peace agreement between Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), aims to de-escalate the ongoing tensions that have plagued the eastern region of the DRC and strained relations between Kigali and Kinshasa for decades.
At first glance, the Agreement is sound—a significant diplomatic feat and a welcome effort by Washington to reinvest in African security architecture. Yet, beneath its laudable intentions lie questions Rwanda cannot afford to ignore.
It would be prudent for President Paul Kagame to adopt a cautious yet constructive posture: endorse the Agreement, yes—but subject to essential caveats and guarantees that safeguard Rwanda’s security interests.
{{The security dilemma}}
Rwanda’s primary concern remains the continued threat posed by the FDLR, a remnant genocidaire force entrenched in eastern DRC. The question that must be answered before any final commitment is: Does FARDC—the Congolese military—possess both the will and the capability to neutralize the FDLR when Rwanda lifts its defensive measures? Evidence to date suggests otherwise.
Without clear enforcement mechanisms and robust disarmament strategies, lifting security measures risks exposing Rwanda to cross-border insecurity. Kigali’s security interests must not be an afterthought.
{{Commitments that may prove fleeting}}
History tempers optimism. The Kinshasa government has shifted positions on peace commitments before. What, then, ensures that this time is different? The Agreement’s Section 8, Clause 2—permitting either party to unilaterally terminate the pact—undermines long-term stability. This provision not only introduces strategic ambiguity but also weakens the Joint Oversight Committee’s authority. Why invest in a monitoring mechanism only to simultaneously make it irrelevant?
{{No peace without all parties}}
Another omission threatens the practicality of the Accord: the absence of key non-state actors—most notably, the M23/AFC movement. Peace in the Kivus cannot be sustained by state actors alone. Excluding powerful non-state groups from the peace architecture may render the Agreement toothless on the ground, where allegiances and control are fluid. If the goal is genuine peace, rather than diplomatic optics, then all relevant stakeholders must be engaged, not sidelined.
{{Rwanda must calculate its risks}}
The Kagame administration must also develop a clear fallback plan. What if Kinshasa reneges? What if the U.S. loses interest—as it has in the past in other regions? Rwanda must preserve its strategic autonomy and avoid being caught in a one-sided peace that could morph into a strategic trap.
{{Washington’s role cannot end at the signing table}}
If the U.S. is serious about restoring peace in one of Africa’s most volatile corridors, it must stay engaged beyond photo ops and press statements. Washington must play an active role in the implementation and verification stages, ensuring that parties abide by their commitments and that bad-faith actors are held accountable.
{{A provisional path forward}}
Ultimately, this Agreement represents a step in the right direction. But Rwanda must not be rushed into ratification without solidifying the fine print. Rwanda should endorse the Washington Accord, but only with conditions that guarantee Rwanda’s national security, address historical inconsistencies in DRC’s commitments, and integrate all actors who command influence on the ground.
In diplomacy, as in security, the devil is always in the details. Rwanda cannot afford to sign away its leverage in exchange for vague promises. Peace, to be enduring, must be anchored in realism—not rhetoric.
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