They identified Augustin Bizimungu, who had led the Ex-FAR before the country’s liberation, as the most capable figure to command their military efforts. Meanwhile, Agathe Kanziga, the wife of Habyarimana, continued leading diplomatic efforts to secure external support.
Many members of the inner circle known as “Akazu” were based in Kenya, where numerous meetings were held to plan their return, especially focusing on acquiring weapons for Ex-FAR and Interahamwe forces based in then Zaïre.
However, heavy pressure from the United Nations on Mobutu Sese Seko, who had been supporting these forces, forced him to expel some Rwandan refugees in a move seen as a diversion tactic.
Fearing that Ex-FAR and Interahamwe fighters might be disarmed or repatriated to Rwanda, thus collapsing their plan, members of the Akazu decided to bribe Zaïrean soldiers to allow their fighters to remain in camps with their weapons intact.
According to Andrew Wallis in his book Stepp’d in Blood: Akazu and the Architects of the Rwandan Genocide Against the Tutsi, Félicien Kabuga sent $35,000 to Gen Bizimungu to bribe Zaïrean troops so they would allow Ex-FAR and Interahamwe fighters to keep their weapons in camps near the border.
At one point, a Zaïrean officer demanded $60,000 to ignore continued arms deliveries to camps such as Mugunga, near Goma. Kabuga and his associates in Nairobi mobilized additional funds to meet these demands.
On November 4, 1995, several Akazu members met at the home of Gratien Kabiligi in Nairobi to raise more funds. Contributions included a cheque from Kabuga, $340 from Protais Zigiranyirazo (Habyarimana’s brother-in-law), and $1,500 from Aloys Ntabakuze, a former commando leader. A total of $17,000 was collected that day.
Despite continued fundraising efforts, morale declined among Akazu members, who grew frustrated with Bizimungu’s delay in launching military operations despite the availability of resources. Contributions dropped sharply—from $20 to as little as $1.
Kabuga, however, insisted he would continue giving everything he had to restore their power, even declaring he would return to Kigali “with nothing,” if necessary.
Internal mistrust deepened within the group. Some members suspected others of prioritizing personal interests, such as securing visas to Europe or starting businesses in Nairobi, while others struggled with financial hardship.
Criticism also mounted against Bizimungu, with accusations that he spent time socializing with Kabuga in Kenya rather than advancing their military plans.
Despite these divisions, the government of Jacques Chirac, which came to power in May 1995, reportedly supported efforts to arm and train Ex-FAR and Interahamwe forces.
In early December 1995, a high-level meeting was held in Zaïre involving Kanziga, Mobutu, senior Zaïrean generals, Bizimungu, Kabiligi, Seraphin Bararengana (a relative of Habyarimana), and Augustin Ngirabatware.
Senior French officers, led by Gilbert Canovas, also attended, alongside Christian Refalo, who had previously trained Ex-FAR troops in the 1990s. The meeting focused on refining plans to attack Rwanda.
They agreed on a military route entering through Gisenyi, advancing through Kibuye and Gikongoro, with support from French mercenaries using British passports.
Mobutu reportedly promised Kanziga $6 million if they succeeded in capturing Cyangugu Airport.
Meanwhile, Théoneste Bagosora, despite disagreements with Bizimungu, independently sought weapons from South Africa and Seychelles, reportedly acquiring 360 tonnes of arms, many originating from Bulgaria, with travel expenses allegedly covered by the Chirac administration.
Muammar Gaddafi’s Libya was also said to have pledged weapons, including AK-47 rifles, ammunition, mortars, rockets, and grenades.
Additional expected support included modern rifles and landmines from South Africa, and mortars from Hosni Mubarak’s Egypt.
By late December 1995, Ex-FAR and Interahamwe forces were estimated at around 49,000 fighters, many of them newly recruited. However, indiscipline became a major issue—some soldiers sold weapons to locals, while others engaged in misconduct, including activities that led to the spread of HIV/AIDS.
Wallis notes that Akazu leaders had planned for an attack on Rwanda by the end of December 1995. However, growing divisions within both military and political ranks ultimately derailed the plan.
At one point, Bizimungu informed Kanziga by phone that he had told Mobutu he could not proceed with the invasion to overthrow Rwanda’s government. He indicated he would soon appoint a replacement to lead their forces, referring vaguely to “resolving the Rwanda problem.”
Ultimately, internal conflicts within the Akazu network, divisions within Ex-FAR, and international pressure against arms proliferation led to the collapse of the plan to regain power.
Instead, Ex-FAR and Interahamwe shifted to launching cross-border insurgent attacks, particularly in border regions, resulting in the deaths of many Rwandan civilians.
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