In a statement issued on Tuesday, October 28, the rebel group claimed that government forces launched a “comprehensive offensive across all front lines” at around 3:00 a.m., targeting densely populated areas in Kibati, Bibwe, Nyabiondo, Bukombo, and surrounding localities.
“The Kinshasa regime has escalated its flagrant violations of the ceasefire, operating with impunity both along and beyond the front lines,” read the communiqué signed by AFC/M23’s Spokesperson Laurence Kanyuka.
The group accused the Congolese army of “criminal barbarism” and “orchestrated massacres,” adding that heavy artillery and combat drones were deliberately aimed at civilian areas.
According to the statement, the attacks have resulted in civilian deaths, including women and children, and triggered mass displacement.
“By sabotaging all international peace efforts, Kinshasa has made its intentions clear: it is waging a war against the Congolese people,” Kanyuka said, asserting that the group would “exercise its right to self-defence” to protect civilians.
The allegations come just two weeks after representatives from both the DRC government and the AFC/M23 signed an agreement in Doha establishing a joint ceasefire monitoring and verification mechanism. The accord, facilitated by the State of Qatar, was hailed as a major step toward consolidating peace in the DRC’s restive eastern provinces.
The Doha mechanism, signed on October 14, builds on the Doha Declaration of Principles of July 19, 2025. It outlines a structured process to monitor compliance with the permanent ceasefire, investigate alleged violations, and engage stakeholders to prevent renewed hostilities.
Tuesday’s accusations now raise concerns about the fragility of the peace process and the durability of recent diplomatic gains. There are growing fears that renewed hostilities could derail ongoing international efforts to stabilise eastern DRC, where the AFC/M23 accuses the Kinshasa administration of marginalising and persecuting Kinyarwanda-speaking communities.
The Kenya Civil Aviation Authority (KCAA) confirmed that the plane, registration number 5Y-CCA, was en route from Diani to Kichwa Tembo, a popular airstrip serving lodges in the world-famous Masai Mara National Reserve, when it went down early Tuesday morning. The crash occurred around 07:30 CAT in the Tsimba-Matuga area of Matuga Constituency.
“Government authorities have already arrived at the scene to determine the cause of the crash and its consequences,” said KCAA Director General Emile Arao in a statement.
According to reports by Kenya’s Citizen TV, the aircraft burst into flames upon impact, leaving debris scattered across the crash site. Photos shared from the scene showed parts of the aircraft smouldering as emergency teams worked amid difficult weather conditions.
Rescue and recovery operations were immediately launched, though officials noted that poor weather was hampering efforts. Police and other government agencies have secured the area as investigators begin probing the cause of the crash.
Mombasa Air Safari said there were 10 passengers on board, eight Hungarians, two Germans, and the captain.
“Sadly, there are no survivors. Our hearts and prayers are with all those affected by this tragic event,” said the travel agency in a statement.
The Masai Mara, located in southwest Kenya, is one of Africa’s most visited safari destinations, attracting thousands of tourists annually for its rich wildlife and spectacular Great Migration.
The launch, however, came after a brief delay, with Musk explaining that the team needed additional time to “purge out the propaganda.”
At its initial release, GrokPedia featured over 885,000 articles, though technical issues caused the site to briefly go offline. The platform returned later the same day, showcasing a dark-themed homepage with a single search bar and font styling reminiscent of both Wikipedia and the Grok chatbot.
Labeled as “version v0.1,” the site is still in early beta, with a significant gap compared to Wikipedia’s more than seven million English-language articles.
Unlike Wikipedia, GrokPedia is entirely AI-driven. Content is managed and fact-checked by Grok rather than edited by users. Corrections can only be suggested through a form, which the system then reviews.
Each entry includes subheadings and citations, reflecting Wikipedia’s familiar structure. Much of GrokPedia’s content is adapted from Wikipedia itself under the Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 4.0 license, allowing reuse with proper credit.
Lauren Dickinson, a spokesperson for the Wikimedia Foundation, said, “Wikipedia’s knowledge is and always will be human. Through open collaboration and consensus, people from all backgrounds build a neutral, living record of human understanding… even GrokPedia needs Wikipedia to exist.”
{{Musk’s motivation
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Musk has long accused Wikipedia of holding a left-wing bias, claiming the platform gives unfair treatment to conservative viewpoints and relies heavily on liberal-leaning sources. In 2019, he called his own Wikipedia page a “war zone with a zillion edits” on X. Earlier this year, he urged followers to “defund Wikipedia until balance is restored.”
In September, Musk described GrokPedia as a “massive improvement over Wikipedia” and “a necessary step towards the xAI goal of understanding the Universe.”
The launch follows Musk’s pattern of creating alternatives to mainstream platforms he perceives as politically slanted. Notably, Larry Sanger, one of Wikipedia’s cofounders, voiced support for GrokPedia’s creation.
{{How GrokPedia differs from Wikipedia
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Unlike Wikipedia, which relies on volunteers to edit and discuss entries, GrokPedia limits public editing to suggested corrections. While this is intended to reduce misinformation, it may slow updates to fast-changing topics.
As of the beta release, the platform lists under 900,000 entries, roughly an eighth of Wikipedia’s English total. Musk has stated that the AI will rapidly expand the database, though the project remains in early testing.
GrokPedia also highlights ideological differences. Users have noted stark contrasts in entries on politically and socially sensitive topics. For example, the AI entry on George Floyd positions him as an “American man with a lengthy criminal record,” while Wikipedia describes him as “an African American man who was murdered by a white police officer in Minneapolis, Minnesota, during an arrest.”
Critics argue that GrokPedia, rather than eliminating bias, appears to replace Wikipedia’s perceived left-leaning bias with a more conservative or “anti-woke” perspective. Controversial topics such as transgender issues, U.S. slavery, and Musk’s own biography have sparked debate over content framing and ideological slant.
{{AI limitations and plagiarism concerns
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Despite Musk positioning GrokPedia as a rival to Wikipedia, early analysis revealed instances of content nearly identical to Wikipedia, with only minor adaptations and a disclaimer noting its source. The AI model, like any large language model, is prone to hallucinations.
Additionally, GrokPedia lacks Wikipedia’s open editing history and decentralised moderation, making independent verification of information difficult. Critics argue that the AI-driven approach, intended to eliminate human bias, may instead reflect the ideological views of its creator and the training data used.
While GrokPedia remains in beta, Musk touts it as “the world’s largest and most accurate knowledge source without centralised control.” It aims to serve both human readers and artificial intelligence models. Whether GrokPedia will evolve into a credible alternative to Wikipedia or remain a controversial, AI-driven encyclopedia will depend on how its content, bias, and reliability are addressed in the coming months.
Albert Rudatsimburwa, a relative of Mukabayojo, confirmed her death, revealing that she passed away in Nairobi, Kenya.
“She passed away yesterday evening in Nairobi, and I learned of it then. We often spoke on the phone. She last came to Rwanda for the burial of her brother, King Kigeli,” he shared.
Rudatsimburwa explained that Mukabayojo was a close relative because ” my grandmother was the sister of Musinga.”
Mukabayojo was among the children who fled with King Musinga when he was exiled to Moba in Zaïre, (now the Democratic Republic of Congo).
King Musinga’s reign was marked by significant challenges in Rwanda’s history, as the foundational structures of the country were severely impacted during his time in power.
He was deposed by the Belgians, who stripped him of his authority, leaving him powerless unless sanctioned by them.
On November 12, 1931, Charles Voisin, the Governor of Ruanda-Urundi, went to see King Musinga in Nyanza, giving him 48 hours to leave the country.
The King was ordered to surrender national symbols, including Kalinga and other marks of the nation, to the Belgians who had been entrusted with Rwanda by the League of Nations.
On October 14, 1931, Musinga departed from Nyanza, along with his five wives, nine children, his mother Kanjogera, and other family members.
They were taken to a house prepared for them in Gihundwe, near Kamembe Airport. This marked the end of his 36-year reign.
Rudatsimburwa’s son, Mutijima Bryon, who was well acquainted with Mukabayojo, added, “Musinga’s daughters crossed with their great grandfather. They returned to Rwanda after Rudahigwa ascended the throne.”
Mukabayojo married Bideri in a wedding held in Nyanza. Together, they had six children, including Bideri Dieudonne, who passed away last year.
During the ‘1959 Revolution,’ marked by killings targeting Tutsis, Mukabayojo and her family fled to Kenya, where they lived until her last breath.
Mukabayojo’s last visit to Rwanda occurred as she came to bury her brother, King Kigeli V Ndahindurwa, who was laid to rest in Mwima, near the place of his coronation in 1959, close to the final resting place of their older brother, King Mutara III Rudahigwa.
While 17 candidates have been cleared to contest the presidency, the race is widely seen as uncompetitive, with President Samia Suluhu Hassan facing only minor challengers following the disqualification of the country’s two largest opposition parties.
President Samia Suluhu Hassan, who assumed power in 2021 following the death of John Magufuli, is running with Emmanuel Nchimbi, a seasoned politician and former minister.
Since the reintroduction of multi-party democracy in 1992, CCM has never lost a general election, and Samia Suluhu is highly likely to extend her party’s unbroken run of power, which began with its predecessor in 1961, to over six decades in the upcoming 2025 general election.
{{Main opposition leaders barred
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The election landscape changed dramatically after the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) barred the two largest opposition parties, Chadema and ACT-Wazalendo, from participating.
Tundu Lissu, leader of Chadema, was arrested in April on treason charges after what he termed a campaign for electoral reforms. His party was subsequently disqualified from the election.
Similarly, Luhaga Mpina, the presidential hopeful from ACT-Wazalendo, was disqualified twice. Although the High Court initially reinstated his candidacy, the electoral commission quickly reversed the decision following an objection from the Attorney General, and the High Court later upheld the final disqualification.
These developments have left smaller opposition parties in the running, though none are seen as posing a serious threat to CCM’s dominance.
With the main opposition out of the race, the remaining contenders include the incumbent, Samia Suluhu Hassan, along with 16 candidates from smaller parties.
Salum Mwalimu of the Public Liberation Party (Chaumma) is arguably the most politically significant figure among the minor opposition, largely due to his recent high-profile role in the main opposition movement.
Mwalimu previously served as the running mate to Tundu Lissu, the disqualified Chadema leader, in the 2020 presidential election, and was a former Secretary-General of that party before his defection to Chaumma. His participation is notable as he attempts to capitalise on the void left by his former party.
Haji Ambar Khamis (National Convention for Construction and Reform – Mageuzi – NCCR-MAGEUZI), representing a veteran opposition party, has put forth a core campaign pledge focused on major political change, promising to enact a new national constitution within his first 100 days if elected.
Gombo Samandito Gombo of the People’s United Front (CUF) represents one of Tanzania’s oldest opposition parties, with historical strength, particularly in Zanzibar. His campaign focuses on combating corruption, promoting fiscal independence through domestic revenue mobilisation, and pledging major investments in agriculture and free social services.
Saum Hussein Rashid of the United Democratic Party (UDP) and Mwajuma Noty Mirambo of the Union for Multiparty Democracy (UMD) are notable as two of the few female presidential candidates in the 2025 contest, highlighting the limited but significant representation of women in Tanzania’s political landscape.
Majalio Paul Kyara of the Sauti ya Umma Party (SAU) carries forward his party’s tradition of contesting presidential elections, with SAU having fielded candidates in every general election since 2005.
Hassan Kisabya Almas of the National Reconstruction Alliance (NRA), Coster Jimmy Kibonde of the Makini Party (MAKINI), Abdul Juma Mluya of the Democratic Party (DP), and Kunje Ngombale Mwiru of the Alliance for African Farmers Party (AAFP) are among the smaller party candidates seeking to offer alternative platforms, though none are seen as major contenders.
Georges Gabriel Bussungu of the Tanzania Democratic Alliance (ADA-TADEA), Twalib Ibrahim Kadege of the United People’s Democratic Party (UPDP), Doyo Hassan Doyo of the National League for Democracy (NLD), and Wilson Elias Mulumbe of the Alliance for Democratic Change (ADC) also bring their parties’ distinct agendas to the race, representing minor opposition voices.
David Daud Mwaijojele of the Social Democratic Party (CCK) and Yustas Mbatina Rwamugira of the Tanzania Labour Party (TLP) round out the field, adding further diversity to the slate of candidates despite their limited political reach.
If re-elected, President Suluhu is expected to consolidate her leadership within CCM and continue her agenda focused on economic reform, gender inclusion, and international cooperation.
Paula Ingabire, the Minister of Technology and Innovation, stated that the World Bank, as the main partner, contributed to the development of the digital ID system by investing over $48 million (more than Frw 69 billion).
She emphasized that this amount is insufficient “to achieve what we aim to do now,” and that the total cost for the completion of the project will exceed $70 million (over 100 billion Rwandan Francs).
Speaking to RBA, she explained, “The reason for this is the construction of the system and the upgrading of services that were previously provided to citizens based on the old ID system. These services will now be available using the digital ID. There are also tools required to ensure that people can access services based on the digital ID.”
While Rwanda has received support from various donors on this journey, the country itself is also contributing significantly to ensure the project’s completion.
In the 2024/2025 fiscal year, the project was allocated a budget of Frw 5,397,688,170 , and in 2025/2026, the budget has increased to Frw 12, 265, 253, 074 billion.
The digital national ID will be issued to Rwandans aged 16 and above, as well as foreign residents and refugees in Rwanda.
Currently, the IDs will be distributed to Rwandans, foreign nationals living in Rwanda, refugees, asylum seekers, adopted children, foreign nationals staying temporarily, immigrants, and stateless individuals residing in Rwanda.
Minister Ingabire added, “We used to have a number of people without proper identification, which made it difficult for them to access basic services. The digital ID will simplify service delivery because it will contain all your information, enabling you to open a bank account without needing to visit the bank.”
The digital ID will have both a physical card, like the current one, and a digital version in the form of a QR code, which can be carried on a mobile phone or computer. Additionally, a ‘token’ number will be provided, which will be used to access your information, distinct from the national ID number.
The National Identification Agency (NIDA) recently announced the launch of the ‘pre-enrollment platform’ to validate citizens’ records and correct errors in the national ID system, ahead of the digital ID rollout. More than 3,300 people have already registered on this platform.
This platform was officially launched on August 7, 2025, during the 28th edition of Rwanda International Trade Fair at Gikondo Expo Grounds.
The project will be extended nationwide, starting in the districts of Huye, Gisagara, and Nyanza in the Southern Province.
Residents in these areas will be assisted in correcting their personal information, submitting biometric data, and other requirements.
Two sites will be set up in each sector, with trained staff to prevent errors in the process.
Biometric data to be collected will include fingerprints, eye scans, and facial images. Both Rwandans and foreign nationals in Rwanda are eligible for the digital ID.
From birth to age five, children will receive an ID that only includes their photo, as biometric data changes over time. Children aged five and above will be required to provide additional biometric data.
Over 1,144 people have already received training to assist residents in correcting their information and providing biometric data. These individuals will be helping the public from October 28, 2025, to December 2025. By January 2026, the trained workforce is expected to grow to 2,500 individuals.
Minister Ingabire noted, “By December, we will be covering nine districts, and another 21 districts will be served in the following year, by May 2025. This means we need to train more staff to reach the remaining districts and complete data collection by the end of May.”
The digital ID will include data across nine categories, an expansion from the previous system’s seven categories, to ensure a complete and accurate identification profile. These will include names, parental information, email and phone numbers, address, place of birth, and more.
By May 2025, Rwanda will be the first country in Africa to implement a fully digital national ID system within the planned timeframe, while other countries that started before Rwanda are still in the process of building their systems.
The contingent, led by Joint Task Force Commander Major General Emmy K. Ruvusha, arrived at Kigali International Airport to a warm reception following their contribution to ongoing counter-insurgency efforts in northern Mozambique.
Addressing the troops, Major General Kagame commended their dedication, professionalism, and resilience in the face of operational challenges. He lauded their outstanding achievements over the past year and urged them to continue upholding the highest standards of conduct and discipline as members of the RDF.
Rwandan troops were first deployed to Mozambique’s Cabo Delgado Province in July 2021 at the request of the Mozambican government, following years of attacks by Islamic State-linked insurgents.
Since the deployment, joint operations between the Rwanda Security Forces and the Mozambican Defence Armed Forces have significantly weakened the insurgency, restored security in several districts, and facilitated the safe return of thousands of displaced residents.
The return of the contingent comes two months after Mozambican President Daniel Francisco Chapo’s visit to Rwanda, during which a renewed Status of Forces Agreement was signed to extend Rwanda’s military support in Cabo Delgado.
“Thanks to this cooperation, we can see peace returning to the region,” President Chapo said during his visit, acknowledging Rwanda’s crucial role in stabilising Cabo Delgado despite sporadic attacks that still occur.
Bolsonaro’s legal team argued that the trial was marked by due process violations, including a lack of proper defense and reliance on what they called a flawed and contradictory plea bargain testimony. They also cited legal errors in how the charges were applied.
In September, the Supreme Federal Court ruled by a 4-1 vote that Bolsonaro had led a criminal organization seeking to keep him in power following his 2022 election defeat.
The former president was convicted of five charges: attempting a coup d’etat, violently seeking to abolish the democratic rule of law, leading an armed criminal organization, aggravated property damage, and destruction of protected historical heritage.
The government’s five-year plan, running from 2024 to 2029, is supported by a clear financing architecture. While private investment is set to provide 43 percent of the total, the remaining 57 percent will come from public resources, including government revenues and external grants and concessional loans. This public-private funding mix is designed to propel Rwanda towards an average annual GDP growth rate of 9.3 percent over the five-year period.
{{Doubling private investment and creating jobs
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The NST2 aims to more than double private investment, from a 2023 baseline of $2.2 billion to $4.6 billion by 2029. This capital influx is expected to support the creation of 1.25 million productive and decent jobs over the strategy’s duration, addressing key unemployment challenges.
Much of the investment will be channelled through the domestic financial system, according to the newly released Financial Sector Development Strategy (FSDS) 2025–2029. Over 70 percent of private funding is expected to flow via local banks, insurers, pension funds, capital markets, and a growing fintech sector.
The approach aligns with Rwanda’s long-term goals of achieving upper-middle-income status by 2035 and high-income status by 2050, by building a more competitive, innovative financial sector capable of directing capital to manufacturing, agriculture, housing, and small businesses.
{{Addressing financial bottlenecks
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Despite a 96 percent financial inclusion rate, Rwanda faces bottlenecks that limit private capital flow. These include low national savings, high lending costs, a shortage of long-term financing products, and gaps in access to finance for SMEs, women, youth, and agriculture-dependent communities. The government aims to raise national savings from 12.4 percent of GDP to over 25 percent by 2029.
{{Reforms to unlock credit
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The FSDS sets out reforms to strengthen trust in financial institutions, expand accessibility, enhance customer engagement, and boost financial literacy. Banks and microfinance institutions are expected to expand credit to productive enterprises, while Umurenge SACCOs will be consolidated into a national cooperative bank to improve community-level lending efficiency. These reforms are intended to help businesses grow and generate jobs.
{{Capital markets as an engine of growth
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The strategy also targets capital market development. Plans include expanding listings on the Rwanda Stock Exchange, increasing corporate bond issuance, and attracting venture capital and private equity into high-growth sectors. Export revenues are projected to grow by at least 13 percent annually, reaching $7.3 billion by 2029.
Pension funds, including the Ejo Heza long-term savings scheme, will provide a stronger domestic supply of long-term capital, offering Rwandans more opportunities to save and invest.
{{Digital finance to accelerate investment
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Digital finance forms a key part of the plan. Building on mobile money and the eKash national payment system, Rwanda is exploring the introduction of a Central Bank Digital Currency to reduce transaction costs and facilitate cross-border trade.
To track implementation, the FSDS establishes a governance and monitoring framework led by the Ministry of Finance with sector regulators. Progress will be measured through quarterly reports and joint reviews assessing the financial sector’s contribution to NST2 goals.
Though Rwanda’s financial sector currently contributes just 2 percent of GDP, the government emphasises its outsized role in mobilising investment for national growth.
Officials believe that, if successfully implemented, these reforms will create a stronger, more resilient economy, reduce reliance on concessional financing, and unlock opportunities for citizens to save, invest, and generate wealth.
In a statement issued on Monday, October 27, the group rejected the allegations as inaccurate, clarifying that Twangiza Mining had temporarily suspended operations in May 2025 due to security and technical challenges, not as a result of looting.
The group explained that the mine, formerly a subsidiary of Banro Corporation (Canada) and now operated by Chinese-owned Baiyin International Investments Ltd, faced operational disruptions caused by COVID-19 restrictions, targeted attacks on Chinese workers, and extensive aerial bombardments by FARDC drones since October 2025. These factors made normal mining activity impossible, AFC/M23 said.
The group also dismissed claims regarding underground mineral transport, noting that Twangiza is an open-pit mine, with all facilities, including processing and storage, located on the surface and compliant with international standards.
“There is no underground tunnel system, and no underground deposits have been exploited,” said AFC/M23 spokesperson Lawrence Kanyuka.
Other allegations addressed included the expulsion of residents and the demolition of churches. AFC/M23 clarified that population movements were caused by ongoing military operations by FARDC, Wazalendo, and FDLR, not by the mining company. Damage to civilian infrastructure, including religious buildings, was attributed to indiscriminate aerial bombings, not Twangiza Mining.
AFC/M23 also rejected claims that Twangiza Mining relies on Rwandan technicians, calling such narratives part of a broader campaign of ethnic stigmatisation against Eastern Congolese communities.
The group clarified that the mine employs Congolese, Chinese, and South African staff, all recruited through official and traceable channels, and that there is no evidence of Rwandan workforce involvement. AFC/M23 added that Reuters’ reporting failed to verify these claims, which they said fuels divisive rhetoric.
Concluding its response, AFC/M23 said: “Reuters’ claims appear largely inaccurate and based on a misunderstanding of the real situation. The letter from CEO Chao Xianfeng dated 8 May 2025 confirms that Twangiza Mining suspended its operations, meaning that activity was indeed halted, but without any intention of definitive closure.”
“This nuance, a temporary shutdown for technical and security reasons, is essential to distinguish an industrial adjustment decision from a cessation of activity.”
