{"id":29858,"date":"2016-10-30T02:23:45","date_gmt":"2016-10-30T02:23:45","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/new.igihe.com\/why-canada-refused-un-s-request-to-go-to-the\/"},"modified":"2016-10-30T02:23:41","modified_gmt":"2016-10-30T02:23:41","slug":"why-canada-refused-un-s-request-to-go-to-the","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/new.igihe.com\/english\/why-canada-refused-un-s-request-to-go-to-the\/","title":{"rendered":"Why Canada refused UN\u2019s request to go to the Congo in 2010"},"content":{"rendered":"

{It came down to a political decision by former PM Stephen Harper to avoid what looked certain to be a military and political quagmire for years to come.}<\/p>\n

Canada took a long hard look at sending a military commander and soldiers to lead international peacekeeping troops in the Democratic Republic of Congo at the request of the United Nations.<\/p>\n

It was early 2010. And the Canadian government was angling \u2014 in vain, it would turn out \u2014 for a rotating seat on the powerful UN Security Council.<\/p>\n

By May, the former Conservative government of prime minister Stephen Harper had turned down the request.<\/p>\n

Canada would not send soldiers to lead or boost a UN mission that was struggling to stabilize a massive country where government and army corruption was endemic, rebel attacks rocked the east, and violence to control Congo\u2019s vast mineral riches flared.<\/p>\n

The government offered only a brief explanation: \u201cCanada is fully engaged in Afghanistan until 2011. That is what we are concentrating on for now.\u201d<\/p>\n

However, with Africa back on the radar, the Star conducted interviews and reviewed nearly 1,000 pages of heavily redacted documents obtained under the Access to Information Act to put together a picture of why Canada gave the UN the cold shoulder, and to shed light on the looming decision facing the current Liberal government.<\/p>\n

It\u2019s clear that in 2010 it wasn\u2019t simply a question of military resource constraints. The military said it had enough.<\/p>\n

Instead, it came down to a political decision by Harper to avoid what looked certain to be a military and political quagmire for years to come.<\/p>\n

Sources say Harper and his cabinet took the view that Canadian soldiers should not be sent to function as domestic or counterterrorism police in countries that were effectively at civil war where there was no end in sight.<\/p>\n

Another source puts it differently. Deepak Obhrai, parliamentary secretary for foreign affairs at the time, said: \u201cLet me tell you, the Harper doctrine was very clear on these things \u2014 if you\u2019re not effective, he does not see why we should be going out there.\u201d<\/p>\n

Six years later, Prime Minister Justin Trudeau boasts that \u201cCanada\u2019s back\u201d on the world stage.<\/p>\n

He, too, is angling for a seat on the Security Council, but he has decided to recommit Canadian troops to UN \u201cpeace operations.\u201d Ministers and public servants are analyzing where to deploy up to 600 Canadian soldiers and 150 police.<\/p>\n

Three ministers say a decision has not yet been made. But it seems several African hot spots beckon: the Democratic Republic of Congo, Mali, South Sudan, or the Central African Republic.<\/p>\n

All present opportunities, challenges and risks from Canada\u2019s perspective.<\/p>\n

Last time around, that is exactly what the public servants, deputy ministers, military leaders and government officials analyzed.<\/p>\n

There had been at least three requests from the UN for Canada to contribute a commander to the Congo mission, according to the documents. The UN also indicated it needed 13 helicopters, \u201cintelligence assets,\u201d and a C-130 Hercules military transport aircraft for a mission that was \u2014 and remains \u2014 the largest deployment of peacekeeping troops in the world, where some 20,000 military personnel wear blue helmets.<\/p>\n

The UN asked Ottawa to send a deputy police commander for its police mission in Congo. In addition, the European Union, which also had a police operation there, asked Canada for a police commander and officers.<\/p>\n

At least one senior Mountie, who had previously worked with the EU\u2019s mission, urged the RCMP to accept.<\/p>\n

However, an RCMP briefing memo was grim:<\/p>\n

\u201cThe conflict in the Democratic Republic of the Congo has been one of the bloodiest, longest-running struggles in the world, with a death toll surpassing that of Iraq and Afghanistan combined.<\/p>\n

\u201cBelligerents on all sides commit horrific human rights violations and use sexual violence as a weapon of war. The front lines of the conflict are blurred, with many actors with varying loyalties.\u201d<\/p>\n

The RCMP called the overall security situation in the country \u201cstable, but unpredictable, particularly in the east\u201d<\/p>\n

Then, as now, Congo President Joseph Kabila faced elections and was fighting to keep power. He demanded the UN reduce its troops and he strong-armed his opposition critics.<\/p>\n

Today, Kabila is defying a constitutional two-term limit and vying for a third. The UN reported last week that Congolese police, armed forces and the Republican Guard had used excessive \u2014 including lethal \u2014 force to quell demonstrations in September when at least 53 people were killed and 143 injured over two days, and more than 299 were unlawfully arrested.<\/p>\n

The assumption in 2010 by military and foreign affairs officials was that a Canadian commander would need Canadian troops under his direct command. The lesson of retired lieutenant-general Rom\u00e9o Dallaire\u2019s 1994 experience in Rwanda had been learned.<\/p>\n

Officials urged that the request for a force commander and the possibility of a larger troop contingent in 2011 be considered separately.<\/p>\n

According to Andrew Leslie, who was then the commander of Canada\u2019s army, the Department of National Defence believed the deployment was not only doable, but easily managed and worth doing.<\/p>\n

Now an elected Liberal MP and government \u201cwhip,\u201d Leslie said the military had ample capacity to take on a new deployment, putting the skills honed in Afghanistan to work in another country that needed stabilizing. It could show allies that Canada was prepared to help in other global hot spots.<\/p>\n

At first, Michael Kaduck, director of peace operations and fragile states policy at Foreign Affairs, wrote that the mission was \u201cpotentially an attractive offer\u201d in line with Canada\u2019s priorities in the region.<\/p>\n

In a widely distributed memo, he nevertheless urged \u201ca hard look\u201d at what civilian, military and police support Canada could offer, what impact it would have on Canada\u2019s engagement in UN missions in Haiti, Darfur and South Sudan, and what kind of political support such a mission would require and for how long.<\/p>\n

\u201cWe need to consider the overall question of whether this is the right UN mission for Canada, now and in post-2011,\u201d wrote Kaduck.<\/p>\n

At that time, Canada had just 12 soldiers posted to the UN in Congo, mainly as legal advisers to improve the military justice system and the Congolese capacity to investigate and prosecute the rampant sexual violence.<\/p>\n

For months, the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade analyzed the UN request under criteria for when Canada should intervene in fragile states and conflict zones. It sought input from its many branches, Canada\u2019s international development agency CIDA and from the Royal Canadian Mounted Police.<\/p>\n

Candice Dandurand, a civilian deployment officer at foreign affairs, \u201cfirmly\u201d supported sending Mounties to the EU mission, according to a March 17, 2010 email. She said it dovetailed with Canada\u2019s support of the UN mission to fight rampant sexual and gender-based violence, and had the backing of the department\u2019s Africa branch and the Canadian embassy in Kinshasa, the capital.<\/p>\n

Other advisers identified challenges: Canadian allies were represented at mission headquarters, but there were no \u201cformed contingents\u201d of allies on the ground. The bulk of the UN forces came from India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Uruguay and South Africa.<\/p>\n

Canada had already contributed more than $250 million on the Congo mission since its start in 1999, and had spent $124 million over the previous decade in humanitarian and development aid, and could build on its work.<\/p>\n

There had been \u201cprogress\u201d as a result of Canada\u2019s efforts, but advisers said \u201cmuch more is needed.\u201d<\/p>\n

\u201cThe DRC is a fragile but not a failed state.\u201d<\/p>\n

The analysis weighed more questions: whether Congo was a direct and\/or indirect threat to Canada or its allies, whether it was a source of organized crime or terrorism, whether Canada had a major strategic interest, such as a key bilateral relationship, at play and whether engagement carried \u201cimplications under international law, including tribunals such as the International Criminal Court.\u201d<\/p>\n

The answers to those questions and others are blacked out.<\/p>\n

Andrew Leslie fills in some of the gaps.<\/p>\n

He says the Canadian Forces saw the region\u2019s instability as a potential recruiting ground for Al Qaeda and were keen to help stabilize it. He says government officials also considered the extensive business interests of the Canadian mining industry, and the fact that China was increasingly influential in the country.<\/p>\n

Leslie was dispatched in February 2010 \u2014 before the UN\u2019s request was formalized in March \u2014 on a reconnaissance trip.<\/p>\n

Leslie says the military had boosted its ranks of reservists and regular members by 3,000 members in the three years up to 2009. \u201cI knew, and we knew, that we would have had capacity in 2010 . . . to launch into the DRC \u2014 not in the same scale as in Afghanistan but in a meaningful way . . . and we could have sustained it, of course.<\/p>\n

\u201cIt was viewed as a mission that was definitely interesting. If the government of Canada wanted us to do it, we would do it.\u201d<\/p>\n

The military\u2019s enthusiasm didn\u2019t impress the Harper government.<\/p>\n

In the view of two former senior Harper government officials, the military was always keen to deploy, no matter what.<\/p>\n

The government insiders spoke on condition of anonymity because they were not authorized to talk about cabinet-level discussions at that time.<\/p>\n

One told the Star that the UN\u2019s request, like many that came to the Harper government, amounted to a dangerous mission that threatened to put Canadian lives on the line in a country where there was little peace to keep, and no clear end in sight.<\/p>\n

The Conservative prime minister\u2019s skepticism was a big change from 2006 when Harper first travelled to Afghanistan and told Canadian troops that they were, \u201cserving in a UN-mandated, Canadian-led security operation that is in the very best of the Canadian tradition, providing leadership on global issues, stepping up to the plate, doing good when good is required.\u201d<\/p>\n

Others explain the government\u2019s thinking differently.<\/p>\n

Obhrai said in an interview the government had \u201cno appetite\u201d for the mission because it had concluded Canadian troops could not be \u201ceffective\u201d in achieving Canadian goals. It was thought the \u201cmore appropriate\u201d intervention would be to offer logistical support to African Union forces, which the Conservatives did. As well, given widespread human rights abuses, including by government forces, \u201cit would have been absolutely disastrous,\u201d said Obhrai.<\/p>\n

\u201cWho are you supporting? Which side are you going with? The side that you want to go with are (sic) also being accused of human rights abuses.\u201d<\/p>\n

Whatever misgivings Harper had were soon underscored.<\/p>\n

At Foreign Affairs, plans for a team of department and RCMP officials to travel to Congo were put on hold because Canada\u2019s then-governor general, Micha\u00eblle Jean, was on an official four-country visit to Africa, including Congo and Rwanda \u2014 at Harper\u2019s request.<\/p>\n

Jean\u2019s mid-April trip revealed just how much displeasure had been generated by the Harper government\u2019s decision to reduce the number of African countries eligible for aid, and how little enthusiasm there was for Canada\u2019s attempt to win a Security Council seat.<\/p>\n

While she was there, a senior UN official in Congo made a direct public appeal to Canada to help. Soon after Jean returned to Ottawa, it was rebuffed. The government decided to turn down the request for a commander.<\/p>\n

Late on April 29, 2010, Canada notified the UN of its decision, and Defence Minister Peter MacKay reassigned Leslie to lead a study of how to transform the Canadian Forces.<\/p>\n

\u201cI think they (the former government) were tired of the Afghan war,\u201d Leslie now says. \u201cThat they were tired of either soldiers going overseas and getting hurt . . . or even worse. I think they were tired of spending money on these missions, and they were a tired team.\u201d<\/p>\n

Yet even after refusing the UN\u2019s request, officials continued to study the possibility of deploying to Congo in the following year. The Foreign Affairs and RCMP team finally travelled to Congo in mid-May.<\/p>\n

What the group saw there was eye-opening.<\/p>\n

Handwritten notes from one unidentified official documented \u201ca lack of infrastructure, starvation deaths in prison\u201d and a dismal judicial system unable to keep pace with sex-crime investigations. Goma\u2019s one judge faced a \u201cbacklog of 8,000 cases.\u201d The country had fewer than 1,200 judges and needed \u201cat least 5,000.\u201d<\/p>\n

It\u2019s difficult, due to redactions, to say if the final recommendation to cabinet was in favour of a deployment of more Canadian military and civilian resources.<\/p>\n

But Leslie believes the bureaucratic analysis shifted to accommodate the political signal that the government was averse to the mission.<\/p>\n

Today, he still believes Canada should engage in an African mission, although as a member of the Privy Council, he will not say where he thinks Canada can be most effective.<\/p>\n

Obhrai, one of the Conservative party\u2019s leadership contenders, says the problems that were obvious in Congo in 2010 are evident to this day, and the same risks exist no matter what troubled nation in Africa Trudeau might be looking at.<\/p>\n

He said his advice to Trudeau: \u201cDon\u2019t do it.\u201d<\/p>\n

\"Former<\/figure>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

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