Category: Politics

The two political nemeses-turned-allies are reportedly working on a legal framework to define the structure and operational mechanisms of their proposed political union. This arrangement would see Odinga secure a plum government position while also bringing more of his allies into the Cabinet.

The drafting of the agreement comes just days after Odinga returned home following his unsuccessful bid to become chairperson of the African Union Commission (AUC).

In their first meeting since returning from Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, the two leaders met at State House Mombasa on Monday, February 24, where they reaffirmed their commitment to a broad-based government. Several of Odinga’s lawyers, who have drafted past agreements with previous regimes, were present in Mombasa, further fueling speculation.

Odinga and Ruto faced off in the disputed 2022 presidential election, which the former prime minister accused Ruto of rigging. However, in an unprecedented move, they joined forces after deadly youth-led protests erupted in the country in June last year over punitive taxes. This was widely seen as Ruto’s attempt to have Odinga help him quell the unrest.

In return, Ruto absorbed some of Odinga’s political lieutenants into the Cabinet in what he termed the formation of a broad-based government. The President also led efforts to lobby for Odinga’s AUC bid. However, this move was not without criticism, with some accusing Odinga of riding on the blood of young Kenyans who died in the protests for political gain.

With their renewed political dalliance, it is becoming increasingly apparent that the leaders are keen to elevate their political collaboration to a new level.

Should Odinga yield to Ruto’s overtures, he is reportedly set to be rewarded with the appointment of several of his allies to senior government positions, including Cabinet Secretaries and Principal Secretaries. Some of Odinga’s supporters are pushing for a 50-50 power-sharing arrangement by 2027.

Odinga could also benefit from a proposed constitutional amendment that would see the creation of the position of Leader of the Official Opposition, the reintroduction of the Prime Minister role, and other governance adjustments aimed at enhancing inclusivity and national cohesion.

Amid growing speculation, Odinga has promised to make a major political announcement next week, further heightening rumours of a potentially game-changing realignment in Kenyan politics.

“The African Union Commission (AUC) election is now behind us. I’m back home, ready for the next move, which I will share with Kenyans in the coming week,” he said during a press briefing.

Meanwhile, Ruto’s former deputy, Gachagua, who was ousted last year over insubordination, is expected to unveil a new party and form a coalition with other like-minded opposition leaders in a bid to challenge Ruto in 2027.

He has repeatedly accused President Ruto of betrayal and has vowed to lobby against him, seeking to deny the Head of State votes from the vote-rich Mount Kenya region, which played a huge role in Ruto’s election.

According to a report by The New York Times, Tshisekedi, whose government has struggled to retain control over territories recently overtaken by the M23, is negotiating trade agreements for the DRC’s prized minerals.

The Congolese head of state’s goal is to leverage the natural resources—among the most abundant in the world—to garner assistance from Western powers, hoping they will apply more pressure on Rwanda, which he accuses of backing the M23 rebels. Rwanda has repeatedly denied the claims.

The DRC is rich in minerals, including cobalt, copper, diamonds, and gold, and has vast untapped resources valued at an estimated $24 trillion. Cobalt, in particular, plays a crucial role in global supply chains, as the DRC provides about 60% of the world’s cobalt reserves.

Tshisekedi’s offer aims to entice the U.S. and European countries into becoming more involved in the region, with the hope of tipping the scale in the DRC’s favour in its battle against M23 in the wake of the capture of Bukavu and Goma, key cities in eastern Congo.

Tshisekedi’s negotiations come at a time when China has made significant inroads into the DRC’s mining sector, with many of the country’s mineral resources controlled by foreign entities.

This has fueled ongoing tensions, as the local population continues to live in poverty despite the wealth generated from mining activities. Congo’s mineral wealth has often been siphoned off by foreign companies, with only a fraction of the proceeds benefiting the Congolese people.

The DRC’s mineral wealth has long been a point of contention, especially regarding Rwanda’s alleged role in supporting the M23 rebels, a claim Tshisekedi has repeatedly made.

Rwanda, for its part, denies involvement, and M23 spokesperson Lawrence Kanyuka has refuted Tshisekedi’s assertion that the group is motivated by the DRC’s mineral resources.

In past media statements, Kanyuka stated that M23’s struggle is not for control of valuable land but for survival, accusing Kinshasa of oppressing ethnic groups, particularly the Kinyarwanda-speaking communities in the east, and denying them recognition as true Congolese citizens.

Meanwhile, reports of Tshisekedi’s latest overtures come just days after the U.S. government imposed sanctions on General (rtd) James Kabarebe, Rwanda’s Minister of State for Regional Integration in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, accusing him of facilitating connections between Rwanda and M23.

The Rwandan government strongly condemned the sanctions, terming them “unjustified” and counterproductive to regional peace efforts.

“The sanctions are unjustified. The international community should support, not undermine, ongoing regional efforts toward a political solution. If sanctions could resolve the conflict in eastern DRC, we would have had peace in the region decades ago,” Government Spokesperson Yolande Makolo said.

Rwanda has consistently argued that the crisis in eastern Congo is rooted in deeper historical and governance issues that require political solutions rather than external pressure.

In a post shared on X, Nduhungirehe questioned the motives of the American non-governmental organisation, indicating that refugees were returning home following the M23 rebels’ capture of Goma and assurances of security.

“What a ‘scandal’! How can IDPs dare return home in a secured environment? Why don’t they stay in those camps forever to justify the relevance of the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO) and Human Rights Watch (HRW)?” Nduhungirehe wrote on Friday, criticizing the UN mission’s nearly three-decade presence in the country without resolving the conflict.

HRW’s latest geospatial analysis revealed that nearly all displacement camps west of Goma had been dismantled since M23 rebels took control of the provincial capital in January.

According to satellite imagery from 16 February shared by the NGO, only debris remained where thousands of tents once stood.

HRW claimed that the closure of the refugee camps violated international humanitarian law, “which prohibits the forced displacement of civilians except when required for their safety or due to imperative military reasons.”

M23 has repeatedly denied allegations of human rights violations, asserting that their fight is against decades of persecution and marginalisation of Congolese Rwandophones in eastern Congo.

Rwanda has also been vocal about the plight of Kinyarwanda-speaking Congolese, many of whom have been displaced due to ethnic discrimination. Over the years, more than 100,000 have sought refuge in Rwanda.

In a recent interview, Nduhungirehe contextualised the long-standing issues facing Congolese of Rwandan descent, tracing them back to colonial-era border divisions.

“Rwanda was a German colony, and in 1910, 1912, and 1911, there was a meeting in Brussels where Belgium, Germany, and the United Kingdom artificially drew the borders between the three countries. Part of the Kingdom of Rwanda was given to Congo along with its people, while another part was given to Uganda. As a result, there are people of Rwandan culture and heritage in both countries—DRC, which was then Congo, and Uganda,” he explained.

“But those in Uganda never faced issues; they were integrated into society and considered Ugandan. However, those in Congo, who have lived there since 1910, were never fully recognised as Congolese; they were always suspected of being Rwandans. This marginalisation persisted even after Congo’s independence. In the 1970s, then-President of Zaire, Mobutu Sese Seko, granted them citizenship, but ten years later, in the 1980s, he revoked it, leaving them in a precarious situation,” Nduhungirehe added.

In recent days, President Ndayishimiye has made statements with warlike rhetoric, indicating that his country is prepared to attack Rwanda and confident of victory.

On February 11, 2025, during a visit to residents of Bugabira Commune in Kirundo Province, near the Rwandan border, Ndayishimiye said Burundians were ready to confront Rwandans.

He said, “Be prepared, do not be afraid. We know them well. In Bugesera, you know them. Since the era of the monarchy, they have never defeated us. Do you think they can now? Remind them, ‘Do you know where it all started in Kirundo?’”

On Sunday, February 16, President Ndayishimiye posted on X claiming he had intelligence suggesting Rwanda was planning an attack on him.

“After discussions with countries friendly to Rwanda, those who were expecting to benefit from a Rwandan attack on Burundi should abandon their hopes. But Burundians, stay alert because no one knows the day of a thief,” he wrote.

Rwanda’s Foreign Minister, Olivier Nduhungirehe, responded by saying that the Burundian president had gone beyond just making threats against Rwanda and had begun plotting for action.

“It is Burundians who sent soldiers to fight, to support the Congolese army, and to battle M23 while also targeting Rwanda. Their rhetoric about attacking Rwanda is not surprising,” he stated.

Speaking from Addis Ababa, where he is attending the African Union summit, Nduhungirehe said that security discussions on Saturday reaffirmed the resolutions of SADC and EAC meetings, emphasizing the urgent need for negotiations between M23 and the Congolese government and the immediate cessation of hostilities.

Burundi has strengthened its alliance with the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), committing to removing Rwanda’s influence. They have also reportedly enlisted armed groups, including FDLR and Wazalendo, to support their agenda.

Youssouf emerged victorious after a tense seven-round secret ballot, defeating Kenya’s former Prime Minister Raila Odinga and Madagascar’s former Foreign Minister Richard Randriamandrato.

The race was highly competitive, with Youssouf initially trailing Odinga in the first two rounds. However, he gained momentum in subsequent rounds and eventually secured the 33 votes needed for victory in the final round, becoming the sole remaining candidate.

The Djiboutian who celebrated his 60th birthday a week ago, replaces Moussa Faki Mahamat of Chad, who served two terms as AU Commission chief.

His election comes at a crucial time for the African Union, which faces mounting challenges, including military coups in West Africa and ongoing conflicts in eastern Congo.

The AU has often been criticised for its handling of security crises, and Youssouf’s leadership will be closely watched as he takes on these pressing issues.

Seasoned diplomat

Born on September 2, 1965, in Djibouti City, Youssouf is a seasoned diplomat with over 30 years of experience in governance and international relations. He has served as Djibouti’s Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation since May 22, 2005, making him the longest-serving foreign minister on the continent.

He attended Djibouti High School, where he obtained his baccalaureate in 1985, to Lumière University Lyon 2 in France, where he pursued foreign languages between 1985 and 1990. He later studied business management at the University of Liverpool in 1988 before earning a master’s degree in management from Université Laval in Canada in 1995.

Youssouf began his diplomatic career in the 1990s at Djibouti’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, where he led the Arab Affairs Department. From 1997 to 2001, he served as Djibouti’s Ambassador to Egypt. His rise in government continued when he was appointed Minister-Delegate for International Cooperation in 2001, eventually becoming Foreign Minister in 2005.

Over the years, Youssouf has played a pivotal role in shaping Djibouti’s foreign policy and strengthening its diplomatic influence.

In 2008, he served as Chairman of the 129th Ordinary Session of the Council of Foreign Ministers of the Arab League. He has also been a key negotiator in regional security matters, particularly concerning the Horn of Africa.

Youssouf’s leadership at the AU is expected to focus on strengthening regional security, economic integration, and diplomatic partnerships.

In a 2008 interview with The New York Times, he spoke about Djibouti’s strategic importance, expressing ambitions to develop its economy along the lines of Dubai. He argued that Djibouti was even better positioned than Dubai due to its geographical advantage at the crossroads of Africa, the Middle East, and Asia.

As AUC chairperson, he will be tasked with implementing the AU’s Agenda 2063, which aims to transform Africa into a global powerhouse. His diplomatic expertise and extensive experience in foreign affairs will be crucial in navigating the continent’s geopolitical landscape.

Personal life

Despite his public prominence, Youssouf maintains a private personal life. He is multilingual, fluent in Arabic, English, and French, but little is known about his family.

“I told President Tshisekedi multiple times, ‘The only way to end this conflict is through dialogue,’” Lourenço said in an interview with Jeune Afrique following the capture of Goma by the M23 rebels. “But each time, my advice was met with resistance.”

Lourenço warned that the conflict in eastern DRC risks spreading across the region without dialogue to address M23 grievances on, among others, persecution and marginalisation of Congolese Rwandophones.

“We cannot allow this war to escalate further. Every effort must be made to stop it,” he emphasized.

Reflecting on Angola’s own history, Lourenço drew parallels between the DRC crisis and Angola’s past conflicts.

“Even when we faced aggression, we sat down with our enemies. We negotiated with South Africa’s apartheid-era military and reached the 1988 New York Agreement,” he said.

“We also engaged in talks with UNITA to bring peace to Angola. Why should the DRC be any different?”

According to Lourenço, the December ministerial meeting between Rwanda and the DRC had made significant progress, with Rwanda agreeing to lift defensive measures and the DRC committing to dismantling the FDLR. However, he stressed that further steps were still needed.

“We must build on that progress and work toward a peace agreement signed by both leaders,” he urged.

As he prepares to assume the chairmanship of the African Union, Lourenço reaffirmed his commitment to resolving the crisis, stating that appointing a mediator for the Rwanda-DRC conflict would be a priority.

“Tshisekedi must understand that there is no other way,” Lourenço concluded. “If we truly want peace, we must be willing to talk.”

Speaking at a European Parliament session on Thursday, Rwanda’s Ambassador to Germany and Representative to the European Union, Igor César, condemned what he described as “lazy narratives” and called for a fact-based approach to addressing the crisis in eastern DRC.

César emphasized Rwanda’s vested interest in a stable DRC, pointing to significant trade relations between the two nations.

In 2021, Rwanda exported goods worth $683 million to the DRC, and by 2022, the DRC had become Rwanda’s top export partner, accounting for over 33% of total exports.

“Why would we jeopardize this?” he questioned, arguing that Rwanda’s economic growth depends on peace, not conflict.

The ambassador criticized the ongoing scrutiny of Rwanda, stressing that the real perpetrators of mineral smuggling and instability in the region are well-documented but remain largely unaddressed.

“The real smuggling networks are known. The real perpetrators are well-documented. And yet, the scrutiny always falls on Rwanda. Why?” he asked.

He attributed this to a blame-shifting strategy designed to avoid genuine accountability and reform in the DRC’s mining sector.

César also defended a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) signed last year between Rwanda and the European Union on critical raw materials, stating that the EU itself initiated the agreement.

“We engaged in this agreement in good faith because it aligned with our vision and pre-existing strategies,” he said, emphasizing that the demand for these minerals is a shared global interest.

The ambassador highlighted documented human rights violations within the DRC, citing reports from the U.S. Department of State and the UN Joint Human Rights Office.

He noted that Congolese security forces have long been identified as the leading perpetrators of human rights abuses in the region.

“This is not new. This is not accidental. It is a pattern,” he stated, criticizing the international community’s silence on such issues.

He also referenced past incidents, such as the 2021 assassination of Italian Ambassador Luca Attanasio, which was attributed to the Kinshasa-backed FDLR, and the hiring of over 2,000 European mercenaries by the DRC government in violation of international conventions.

“How long will your silence continue?” he asked, challenging the European Parliament on its selective response to regional issues.

César warned that the DRC government’s reliance on military solutions, including alliances with ethnic militias, the FDLR, and foreign mercenaries, undermines regional peace efforts.

“This reckless strategy—pursuing every possible option except genuine negotiations—continues to fuel instability,” he said while calling for a shift toward political dialogue.

The ambassador stressed that the only viable path forward is the implementation of the East African Community (EAC)-Southern African Development Community (SADC) joint summit’s recommendations, which include a cessation of hostilities, humanitarian action, and a return to negotiations.

“We now have a renewed opportunity to reset the political process and move towards a genuine resolution,” he said.

Reaffirming Rwanda’s commitment to peace, César dismissed accusations of expansionist ambitions.

“Rwanda has no expansionist agenda. We are not looking to redraw the borders we inherited from colonialism. All we want is credible, long-term peace for the development of our region,” he stated.

He concluded by calling on all stakeholders, including the European Union, to reject divisive narratives and support efforts aimed at achieving lasting stability in the Great Lakes region.

“Peace requires courage, accountability, and the rejection of the forces that fuel division and violence,” the ambassador remarked.

The ambassador’s remarks come amid concerns over the deteriorating security situation in eastern Congo, which recently culminated in the capture of Goma by M23 rebels. While the international community has accused Rwanda of supporting the rebels, Rwanda has denied the claims, instead stating that the M23 members are Congolese Rwandophones fighting against decades of persecution and marginalization by the government.

Despite repeated denials from the DRC government, the truth has gradually emerged. What was once concealed is now undeniable—the world has witnessed it unfold.

Recently, 288 mercenaries engaged by the DRC government were defeated in battle and granted safe passage through Rwanda to return to their home country, Romania.

The presence of foreign fighters in the conflict had long been suspected. Reports first surfaced in early 2023, alleging that the Congolese government was relying on mercenaries to combat M23. While Rwanda repeatedly pointed to this, Kinshasa dismissed the claims as propaganda.

At the time, residents of Goma reported seeing armed foreigners lodged at Hotel Mbiza. Many suspected they were members of Wagner, the infamous Russian mercenary group.

Curious about the allegations, IGIHE posed the question to Russia’s former ambassador to Rwanda, Karen Chalyan. He denied Wagner’s presence in the DRC but admitted hearing that the mercenaries came from Eastern Europe.

“I wish I had Rwf1000 for every time I’ve had to answer this question. Then, instead of doing international relations, I would be a very rich man spending his days in the world’s fanciest casinos.

“Let me say once again: there are no Wagner personnel in the DRC. And, to preempt another question, no agents of the Russian government are involved in any advisory capacity in eastern DRC—much less fighting,” the ambassador stated.

Three years later, it is no longer a rumour. IGIHE recently visited Goma and the very building where these mercenaries had stayed. The visit came after their surrender and evacuation through Rwanda.

At 6 AM on January 29, 2025, we arrived at the La Corniche border post between Rwanda and the DRC, expecting the mercenaries to be handed over by 10 AM. We waited for hours, only to learn that after surrendering to MONUSCO, negotiations were still ongoing.

M23 wanted them to leave the DRC in full military gear since they had been combatants, but the mercenaries refused.

At 3 PM, they crossed into Rwandan territory. Each one was thoroughly searched before being transported to Kigali, where they were later flown back to Romania.

Some of them wore United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO) caps, raising questions about how a UN agency could allow such individuals to use its insignia.

This further reinforced allegations that during their time in the DRC, they were shielded by MONUSCO forces and even collaborated with them.

All of the mercenaries worked for Asociatia RALF, which UN experts identify as a Romanian enterprise composed of former Romanian soldiers from the French Foreign Legion.

They were reportedly paid around $5,000 per month—while regular Congolese soldiers earn as little as $100 or sometimes go unpaid. Their contracts stipulated an “indefinite period” of service, with a one-month break after every three months of deployment.

One recruit disclosed, “I am a fitness trainer by profession. I was in charge of the physical training of Congolese soldiers, preparing them for the battlefield.”

Another told us at the border that he had been in Goma for only two weeks after arriving from Tunisia. He even showed us his passport.

In Goma, they were housed in Quartier Les Volcans in a luxurious four-story apartment—one of the finest in the area. Inside, we found documents detailing their military strategy against M23, revealing plans to engage on multiple fronts.

Asociatia RALF is believed to operate across Africa, with contracts mentioning several “operational locations,” including Burkina Faso, DR Congo, Ivory Coast, Niger, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Gambia, and Guinea.

The presence of mercenaries in the DRC is not new. Between 1960 and 1965, the country became a battleground for foreign fighters.

One of the most infamous was Thomas Michael Hoare, who, along with his “4 Commando” unit, fought alongside Moïse Tshombe in Katanga’s secession war, serving Belgian interests.

In 1964, he returned to Congo as a military leader for Tshombe, commanding 300 South African fighters under the unit known as “Wild Geese.”

Meanwhile, in Kisangani, Pierre Mulele’s Simba rebels had taken 1,600 hostages, including European missionaries.

With the help of Belgian paratroopers, Cuban pilots, and CIA-backed mercenaries, Hoare defeated the Simba rebels in what became known as “Operation Dragon Rouge.”

Hoare often claimed that wars could be won even with a choir of church singers.

On July 7, 1967, Belgian mercenary Jean Schramme and his 120-man unit, alongside 2,500 Katangan fighters, took control of Bukavu, declaring the region an independent state—the “État des Volontaires Étrangers” (EVE).

Schramme aimed to overthrow Mobutu Sese Seko’s government and avenge the deaths of Patrice Lumumba and Pierre Mulele. However, his rebellion lasted only four months before being crushed.

Another notorious mercenary, Frenchman Bob Denard, first appeared in the DRC in 1961 to support Tshombe’s coup attempt against Mobutu.

He returned in 1964, this time fighting for Mobutu’s government alongside European and Katangan mercenaries.

Even revolutionary icon Che Guevara once set foot in Congo, reportedly seeking to expand his movement from Argentina.

The involvement of foreign fighters has continued into the modern era.

In June 2011, then-President Joseph Kabila hired DynCorp, a U.S.-based private military contractor known for deploying mercenaries to Iraq and Afghanistan. Kabila paid $17 million to train the Congolese army (FARDC).

Yet, history has shown that mercenaries have never brought lasting peace to the DRC. Instead, they have left behind devastation, plunder, and further instability.